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?China is a sleeping giant. Let her
lie and sleep, for when she awakens she will astonish the world.?
These words by Napoleon Bonaparte in
1803 could not be more relevant today, given China?s significant diplomatic
and economic emergence in the post-Cold War era. But China?s rise has
produced mixed feelings.
On the one hand, China is a tantalising
opportunity. On the other, it is a terrifying threat. The enigma that
surrounds China has less to do with Beijing?s commercial and political
interests and the attendant prospects in the Chinese market, and more
to do with the uncertainty that lies beneath the rhetoric of its guiding
foreign policy principles of mutual interest, peaceful co- existence
and harmony in diversity.
South Africa?s increasing trade relations
and political friendship with China need to be examined beyond the rhetoric.
Following the democratic elections in 1994, the Two China dilemma (mainland
China and Taiwan) was one of the first critical issues in the government?s
foreign policy. The Mandela government was confronted by the following
issues:
First, forging ties with Beijing would
have sent out the wrong message about Pretoria?s own values in terms
of its democratic and human rights, especially after the Tiananmen Square
crisis.
Second, switching formal ties to Beijing
would have meant the loss of Taiwan?s largesse in lieu of the Reconstruction
and Development Programme.
Third, there was no guarantee that
Beijing would have reciprocated financially, given the relatively small
amount of investment in South Africa by China at the time.
And finally, there was no guarantee
that economic linkages with Hong Kong would have continued following
the island?s incorporation under Chinese rule.
The Mandela Presidency was guided by
the pragmatism that diplomatic ties with Beijing would bear for South
Africa?s rapid reintegration into the world community. It also looked
at the benefits, especially for the government?s aspirations in the
reformed UN Security Council and in the context of South-South co-operation.
Moreover, formalising relations with Beijing meant that postapartheid
South Africa affirmed mainland China?s position on one China.
China is now South
Africa?s largest trading partner and South
Africa is China?s biggest trade partner in Africa |
As such, on 1 January 1998 Pretoria
and Beijing formally entered into diplomatic relations, followed by
the Presidential Bi-National Commission (BNC) in 2000. Areas of co-operation
range from mutual support for the New Partnership for Africa?s Development
and Africa?s development, South-South co-operation, multilateralism
in reforming the global trade regime and the UN to foster peace and
stability in Africa, and pursuing a new international political and
economic order based on peace, justice, stability and equality.
In addition, both sides have reaffirmed
their commitments to expediting the Southern African Customs Union-China
free trade agreement, facilitating greater linkages around education
co-operation and the one China policy. Whereas the BNC reaffirms political
ties between both sides, it is in the realm of economic relations that
the heart of the relationship is rooted.
Since the establishment of bilateral
diplomatic ties between the two sides, trade has grown rapidly. Between
1998 and 2003 trade between the countries rose by an annual 36%, from
R5.3 billion in 1998 to R23 billion in 2003. From January to November
2004, trade exchanges between the two sides hit US$5.381 billion. China
is now South Africa?s largest trading partner and South Africa is China?s
biggest trade partner in Africa, amounting to about 20% of the total
volume of its trade with the entire continent.
Figure
1. South Africa?s bilateral trade statistics with China
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However, as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate,
trade between South Africa and China is heavily weighted in China?s
favour. In 2004 South Africa?s trade deficit with China was R9.85 billion,
a substantial increase of 88% since 2001.The reason for this yawning
gap is that manufactured products from China dominate the trade relationship,
followed by high technology. These include capital equipment, TVs, electronic
goods, ?white goods? and textiles. In contrast, South Africa?s main
exports to the mainland are iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, tobacco,
wool, granite, gold, copper, aluminium and auto components, thereby
making South Africa the net supplier of raw materials to China.
Two-way investment has also been on
the rise. By the end of 2002, Chinese enterprises had invested US$160
million in 98 projects in agriculture, textiles, electronics, mining,
as well as banking, transportation and communications in South Africa,
while South African enterprises had invested in 206 projects in China.
There are currently around 20 South African-based businesses with offices
in China and some 187 Chinese companies in South Africa with a stake
of around US$100 million in investment. As of 2004, Chinese foreign
direct investment (FDI) to South Africa amounted to about R500 million,
while South African FDI to China amounted to about R4 billion.
With China?s rising domestic demands,
the Chinese authorities are keen to find alternative sources of energy.
So Beijing?s expanding interests in the South African market include
technologies in mining, water management, electricity supply, solar
energy and nuclear research for energy requirements. By contrast, South
African companies investing in China include a basket of resources,
mining and financial conglomerates: Anglo American, AngloGold, Anglo
Platinum, Anglo Coal, Kumba Resources, Old Mutual, Standard Bank, De
Beers, Sasol, Absa, MIH (M-Tel), SABMiller, plus smaller specialist
entities.
Figure
2. China ? South Africa bilateral trade
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What has interested commentators is
whether South Africa and China are allies within the global community.
While some see these relations borne out of common synergies around
South-South co-operation, advancing a multilateral global order and
calibrated towards mainstreaming Africa?s development trajectory, others
are relaying it as nothing more than economic and political expediency
? i.e. South African corporates hoping to get their slice of the Chinese
market while China?s behaviour, in turn, matches that of national interest.
But not to engage with China in the
21st Century is tantamount to political and economic suicide, although
proceeding with caution is advisable. This is because:
Tensions over cheap
clothing imports from China will undoubtedly intensify |
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China remains the dominant pole in the South,
with greater influence, and sees itself as representing the voice
of the developing world and the South within the Security Council.
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The Chinese political and economic footprint
in Africa does not always match South Africa?s innate desire to
propel continental peers towards greater accountability and better
governance.
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The emergence of the Chinese investor in the
African market does represent a clash of interests and competition
for South African corporates also operating in the continent.
Figure
3. Commodity imports from China to South Africa
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The above points are all notwithstanding the current tensions around
local industries being crowded out by cheap clothing imports from China,
which will undoubtedly intensify under the proposed free trade agreements
in other sectors.
Clearly, then, South Africa?s relations with China
can be seen as a both an opportunity and a threat in the current global
order. South Africa can gain from China?s experience of developing a
cheap skilled labour force that enabled it to become the workshop of
the world. At the same time, Pretoria will have to absorb the inequalities
as relations grow, until such time as it catches up with the East Asian
dragon.
Sanusha Naidu is a Research Specialist
in the Integrated Rural and Regional Development Programme at the HSRC,
based in Durban. This article is drawn from a forthcoming chapter in
the State of the Nation 2005/2006 book. |