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Crime in A Young Democracy: Sharing Notes on a Destructive Animal.

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1. Introduction

Does South Africa stand on the threshold of experiencing that the scourge of apartheid-oppression is to be replaced by the scourge of crime?

Consider the following: A 1997 study by Antoinette Louw and Mark Shaw found that in the areas of reported serious assault, reported murder, housebreaking (business and residential), car theft, rape and robberies a continued and significant increase occurred between 1980 – 1996 (Louw and Shaw, 1997: 8-9). They further argue that the brunt of these crimes are borne by the poorer parts (urban and rural) of the South African citizenry.¹ (This is obviously not to say that the rich and well-off and middle class is not also being hit.)

While government spokespersons, such as Mr Dullah Omar, the previous Minister of Justice admitted that "crime is a serious problem" and that (it) will take more than popguns to squash (organised) crime (Sunday Times, 9 August 1998), crime remains an extensive and worry-some presence that negatively affect thousands of South Africans daily and will continue to do so if no strong and decisive steps are taken to bring it under control.

Consider again the following: The office for serious economic offences (OSEO) at the end of 1996 was attending to the investigation of 36 cases involving R12 000 000 000 (R12 billion). In 1995 the figure was R209,1 000 000 (R209,1 million) (Atkinson, 1997: 8). During January 1997 to December 1997, cash-in-transit heists (CIT's) totalled 230. Note that this number does not take into account the heists that were repelled by security guards. A steady rise in CIT-heists occurred between 1990 and 1996 with somewhat lower figures reported for 1997/98 (i.e. 214 cases reported during 1998).

In terms of crime statistics available per police area, that is *reported crimes*, 1998 saw 24 875 murders, with Johannesburg (1 145), Soweto (1 151), East Rand (1 116), Durban (2 435) and Umtata (1 201) the top scoring cities. Rape of adults (29 444) and rape of people between 0 and 17 years (19 836) were exceedingly high.² Top scoring police areas for the latter were Durban, the Natal Midlands, East Rand, Johannesburg and Soweto. Assault classified as assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm totalled 234 056 (more than a quarter million cases).³ Burglary on business premises and private lodgings for 1998 totalled 199 313 and 94 102 respectively.⁴

Attacks on farmers in rural areas and on small holdings remains high: 1994 saw 442 attacks (92 persons killed), 1995 saw 551 attacks (121 persons killed), 1996, 468 attacks (109 persons killed), 1997, 470 (142 persons killed) (Visser, 1998: 10). The government has expressed its dissatisfaction with the situation but it seems, despite meetings with farmers and agricultural unions, incapable of putting an end to these attacks.⁵

Of a less serious nature, though the financial implications are hard-hitting, is stock theft of which 40 490 cases has been reported. In this case the (police) areas hardest hit were the Boland, Drakensberg, East London, Eastern Free State, Natal Midlands, Southern Free State, Umzimkulu and Tugela. Interestingly enough and confirming a strong link between poverty and crime, many of these areas are adjacent to underdeveloped rural areas, cities with a high rate of unemployment such as East London and Durban or cross-border areas marked by under-development i.e. Lesotho.

2. Notes on Methodology

This project obtained statistics on various categories of *reported crimes* (37 categories — see attached page/table), broken down per police areas into crimes per 100 000 of the population for 1998. These data were transferred to GIS maps, as per area. Some of these maps form part of this article.⁶

Crime Categories

1	Murder
2	Attempted murder
3	Culpable homicide
4	Robbery with aggravated circumstances: firearms
5	Robbery with aggravated circumstances: without firearm
6	Other robbery
7	Public violence
8	Illegal strikes
9	Rape: 0-17 years
10	Rape: adults
11	Intercourse with a girl under the prescribed age and/or female imbecile (statutory rape)
12	Indecent assault
13	Crimen injuria
14	Cruelty towards and ill-treatment of children (excluding sexual offences, assault and murder)
15	Kidnapping: children 0-17 years
16	Kidnapping: adults
17	Abduction (for sexual or marriage purposes)
18	Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm
19	Common assault
20	Burglary — business premises (including attempts)
21	Burglary — residential premises (including attempts)
22	Stock theft (including poultry)
23	Shoplifting
24	Theft of motor vehicles and motor cycles
25	Theft out of or from motor vehicles
26	Other thefts (not mentioned elsewhere)
27	Arson
28	Malicious damage to property
29	All fraud, forgery, malappropriations, embezzlements, etc.
30	Drug-related crime
31	Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs
32	Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
33	Explosives act
34	Carjacking
35	Hijacking of trucks
36	Robbery of cash in transit
37	Bank robberies

In this contribution the following crimes which are clustered together in 13 categories will be briefly analysed.

- Murder, attempted murder and culpable homicide form one cluster.
- Robbery with aggravated circumstances — with firearm, robbery with aggravated circumstances without the use of a firearm and other robberies form another.
- Public violence and illegal strikes another.
- Rape (0-17 year), adult rape, statutory rape and indecent assault another.
- Crimen injuria and cruelty towards or the ill treatment of children (excluding sexual offences, assault and murder) are discussed as a cluster. So also abduction for sexual or marriage purposes.
- Another cluster is formed by assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and common assault.
- Burglary on business premises (including attempts) and burglary on residential premises forms a category.
- Stock theft, shoplifting and theft of motor vehicles and motor cycles and thefts from vehicles and motor cycles and "other thefts" are categorised together.
- Arson and malicious damage to property forms a category.
- Carjacking, hijacking of trucks and robberies of banks as well as cash in transit (CIT's) robberies are clustered together for the purposes of this discussion.
- Fraud, forgery, malappropriations and embezzlement will be discussed separately.
- Drug-related crimes and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs forms a category.
- Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and crimes committed under the Explosives Act forms another category.

The clustering of crime categories were made to facilitate easier analysis of the current crime situation in the country. After discussing/analysing the crime statistics a brief, crisp discussion of suggested preventive steps will follow.

In each case attention will be given to policy, policy directives, police responsibilities and the role of the civil society or (civil) community in crime prevention and reduction. Throughout this contribution the assumption is made that crime prevention (or at least reduction) requires an interactive and mutually co-operative approach between government on various levels, the police (SAPS), the civil community and security companies.

3. Notes on Theory

"South Africa's transition to democracy has been characterised by a sharp increase in crime" (Haefele, 1998: 1). The author further remarks that this is not a unique trend in recently democratising (or attempting-to-democratise) societies. The Soviet Union, now Russian Federation is quoted as but one example (Haefele, 1998: 1).

Haefele is not the only observer to note this. Elsewhere it is argued: "The end of this century is characterised by a transition from an era of war between sovereign nation-states to an era of ecumenical, pluralistic and relatively peaceful co-existence under a new world order of freedom. Some, more optimistic observers have hailed this momentous event as the decisive triumph of democratic liberalism. However, the transition is marked by a disastrous increase in criminality which is fast becoming a world-wide phenomenon" (Penna, 1998: 1).

He further remarks that "[f]ar from moving towards 'the End of History', an 'Age of Crime' is entered into" (Penna, 1998). For Penna the country of his origin, Brazil, is moving from an age of war to an age of crime (Bid). No comforting words, indeed.

In South Africa the possibility of the scourge of apartheid being replaced by the scourge of crime is ever present. Part of this is explained by the nature of the transition that South Africa shares with other states that moved from authoritarian rule to democracy, as was the case in Latin America quoted above.

A further element is added when Jean-Francois Bayart (1993, 1999), who links criminality with:

- high occurrence and prevalence of poverty, and
- in the African case, the near monopoly that new bureaucrats (the civil servants, the security bureaucracies and the military) have over skills, access to scarce resources and administrative capacity.

Examples where such monopolisation of resources amidst a sea of poverty lead to widespread corruption (and even supreme kleptocracy) are Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, the Central African Republic under President Bokassa and contemporary Nigeria.

South Africa differs from the above-mentioned countries. While poverty is widespread, the economy is diversified, various stakeholders interact and interplay within the economy, various structures of control exist constitutionally and financially and the state bureaucracy while influential cannot fully monopolise (state-) resources and dominate access to various "skill-zones".

Thus the "criminalisation of the state" is not a foregone conclusion in South Africa's case. However, the possibility exists that in some "skill-zones" i.e. state departments (financing, etc.) on national and provincial level or even local government level, potential space exists for criminal activities — and thus a partial criminalisation of (some) state structures. White-collar crime (both in the public and corporate sector) seem to be unacceptably high. It has to be noted that white-collar crime on various levels did exist before the transition to democracy. Hence it is difficult to argue that it has increased, because under apartheid structures there probably had been a large degree of under-reporting prevalent.

South Africa is a society in transition and given the prevalence of wide spread poverty and joblessness, does share with Latin-American states some social and economic disjunctions (Bayart, 1993). Transition to democracy took place following liberalisation ("freeing up political space") of previous suppressive/oppressive politics. Such political liberalisation

unfortunately, alike in Latin-America, brought more freedom, even over-statements of freedom and "demandism". The latter being a mentality of demanding what is needed without coupling it with the political and financial responsibilities embedded in being "the good citizen". The culture of "demandism" or "entitlement" following democratisation is not unique to South Africa, but it does provide a variety of socio-political challenges — one of that the growth of wide-spread criminality and the consequences thereof.

As a theoretical framework the transitional instability that facilitates crime via a culture of entitlement forms part of the informing agenda of this contribution. To a lesser extent and to some extent only as meta-text, the compiler of this report in his analysis took note of Bayart's notion of the "criminalisation of the state" as a salient African occurrence.

In this analysis the above notions will be informing the research approach here. However, in various areas in this analysis other theoretical approaches from the fields of policy analysis, criminology, sociology and victimology will be included.

Antoinette Louw argues: "Pre-transition forms of control broke down and have not been replaced by alternatives that work." Furthermore: "(L)evels of fear and crime are high and dissatisfaction with police, and to some extent, the courts is also strong" (Louw, 1998: 20).

Terry Karl, an American theorist studying transitions in Latin-America points out that "transition violence" frequently "transformed itself into a form of social violence directed against people, not property, and especially against people in rural rather than urban areas". She further observes, that in Latin-America a rise in violence against women took place — perhaps as an attempt to "(re-assert) patriarchal power in the home over women who were formerly combatants" (Karl, 1998: 20). She also points out that in "Central American cases, violence is extremely well-organised by gangs that consist of former police, government military, and guerrilla forces that were not sufficiently bought off or taken care of because of insufficient resources".⁷

The reason for the occurrence of crime as a prevalent phenomenon?

"We think this occurs because of an economic and authority gap . . . consequent (social) instability meant the economies decline(d) even further" (Karl, 1998: 21).

A third reason for higher crime is the transnationalisation of crime — a worldwide phenomenon that also influences South Africa. Transnationalisation of crime is a given assumption in this contribution. Note however, the idea here is not to blame immigrants or any particular social group, but to assist in this analysis to tone down/eradicate crime (in whatever form) in order to move away from the "very unacceptable levels of crime" (to put it mildly) in South Africa. More forcefully put: *To prevent South Africa to slip into a criminalisation of state and society.*

Analysis

In this analysis as outlined in the methodology section, the crime categories developed by the HSRC in 1996 will be used (see appendix). To simplify the analysis the various categories (37 of them) were clustered around 13 broader ones, as outlined in the methodology section above.

From these clusters the areas marked by highest crime were identified. These areas are Durban, Johannesburg, Eastern Cape (Queenstown/Umtata) and the Boland (see Table 1). While in this analysis the focus will be on these high-risk/high occurrence of crime areas. References will however be made to other areas and particular crime prevention strategies.

The proposals at the end of this contribution are specifically aimed at the high risk/high occurrence areas but many if not all of the proposals will apply elsewhere. In other words, the recommendations may be replicable.

For the benefit of the reader the "low crime" areas are listed in Table 2.

The low crime areas are Namakwaland, the Lowveld, Ulundi, Gordonia (Northern Cape), Drakensberg and Karoo/Upper Karoo. While in these areas murder, attempted murder and robberies are fairly low, it has to be noted that rape and statutory rape (and/or indecent assault), ill treatment of children or rape of minors as well as assault and common assault are unacceptably high. So also with shoplifting and stocktheft.⁸ For example in the Lowveld 1 390 cases of rape, indecent assault, minors being raped or ill-treatment of children was reported. In Namakwaland assault with aggravating circumstances and common assault totalled 1 790 cases during 1998. Also in Namakwaland stocktheft and shoplifting accounted for 1 124 cases (probably highly under-reported).

4. The High Risk Areas

The following illustrates the prevalence of crime in high-risk areas.

Durban for 1998: 5 991 cases of murder/attempted murder and culpable homicide, 611 cases of kidnapping and abduction (children and adults), 26 333 cases of burglary, 71 882 cases of shoplifting, stocktheft and other theft, 10 290 cases of arson and 1 312 cases of illegal possession of firearms and/or explosives.

Johannesburg topped the scale with 18 850 cases of robbery (with or without firearms, 8 972 cases of fraud and embezzlement of funds and forgery and 3 535 car- and truck hijackings, CIT-robberies and bank robberies.

Queenstown/Umtata rated throughout fairly high. Boland topped the scale in the categories for rape (adult and minors), statutory rape, indecent assault, crimen injuria and ill-treatment of children with 4 907 cases. In a second category namely assault (with aggravated circumstances) and common assault, Boland topped the list with 25 068 reported cases.

A look at the GIS maps provided in this article would further enlighten the reader.

TABLE 1 & 2 (see Xcell: crimetable file)

5. Recommendations

From the summary above it is clear that certain areas "excel" in certain reported crime categories. (It is unclear what percentage of under-reporting per area is applicable — at best guestimates are available.)⁹

For the purpose of recommendations here, what follow is based on reported cases only. The recommendations here apply to policy options, directives and preventative measures available to the government, SAPS and civil society (or the community). Victim empowerment and victim rehabilitation for the purpose of this contribution will fall outside the ambit of this contribution.¹⁰

Policy makers

1. The type of reported crimes committed varies from region to region, while all regions suffered crimes in all 13 categories.
2. The need to distinguish clearly between what I call "high-risk areas" and "low-risk areas" is apparent.
3. Policy makers will have to take note that such regional variances will have to be taken into account when policies are conceptualised and developed to combat crime.
4. Regional variances should also be informing budgetary decisions and allocation of scarce financial and human resources. *There is a clear need to redirect/re-allocate funding to high-risk areas.* Simply put: Prioritisation of funding should be an imperative in all government planning.
5. It is of utmost importance that direct efforts be made to inform the relevant services and agencies (SAPS, SASS, NIA, private security companies, the SANDF when involved in the corollary or secondary role of crime prevention) about (new) policies and to ascertain that such communication is clear and understood.
6. It should be ascertained that such communication of policy is transformed into directives.
7. In the following up on the latter it should be ascertained that directives is applied throughout on all levels.
8. Above all: The overall budgetary allocation of the police service (SAPS) should be reviewed with in mind the supply of greater resources and upgrading/empowering SAPS and to enhance quality policing through better training (and re-training when needed).
9. No fixed policy guidelines exist yet for private security companies to assist the SAPS in crime prevention and reduction. It is suggested that policy around such "partnership policing" be formulated and implemented without delay.

SAPS

It is acknowledged that (1) the SAPS are under-resourced to a significant degree and until such a time as budgetary re-allocation takes place, SAPS will have to perform better with fewer resources. This in itself is a Herculean task. (2) It is accepted that moral seems to be low. The policemen or women whether they perform well or bad do not enjoy enough recognition for their efforts from political leadership and the civil community alike. To put it more bluntly: An overburdened and badly paid policing community feel themselves not only under threat from criminality but also political leadership and the general public. The points

(1) and (2) above do not bode well for good performance in policing in contemporary South Africa.

The following is however suggested:

- (1) That specific attention be given to the communication of directives to all lower levels.
- (2) That check-up mechanisms be honed so as to ensure that directives are efficiently communicated and that they are followed/applied.
- (3) That where such mechanisms are not in place, they immediately be developed.
- (4) That where necessary re-training be embarked upon and that check-up mechanisms be put in place to ensure that levels of re-training are satisfactory.
- (5) In as far as directorates do have control over scarce and necessary resources such as vehicles, radio's and other equipment, such equipment be made available, seconded or transferred to police stations in "high-risk-areas".
- (6) With regard to investigation and investigative techniques, that

multidisciplinary approaches are incorporated into investigation — especially when syndicate crime is at stake. The reason for this being: "Traditional investigative techniques are no match for sophisticated crime syndicates. Multidisciplinary investigation teams are vital to the successful apprehension and prosecution of crime syndicates" (Schönteich, 1999: 9).

- (7) That renewed stress is placed on the role of the Investigating Directorate: Organised Crime and Public Safety as well as upgrading and enhanced training for staff:

The directorate is bringing together within one line of command all the different agencies engaged in the fight against crime.

This strength of the Investigative Directorate: Organised Crime and Public Safety should purposely be honed and enhanced.

- (8) That the anti-corruption drive on all levels be brought to attention of officers and constabulary. This does not only imply consistent high profile activity by police but also enhancing skills of the relevant staff throughout.
- (9) That respectable and competent private security companies be approach on a more than ad hoc basis to assist in crime prevention and reduction. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) provides for partnership with the private sector and SAPS did enter such relationships on an ad hoc basis. This capacity needs to be advanced. Since there is no fixed policy guidelines on how these partnerships should be formalised (Minnaar, 1999: 43), it is suggested the SAPS assist in drawing up such guidelines in consultation with local governments and the communities involved.

Civil Society or the (Civil) Community

Civil society — or the citizenry — is worldwide known that they complain as soon as "things are not in order". Unfortunately civil society (the conglomerate of institutions and associations, groups or interested parties outside the state) are also notorious for non-intervention or participation when crime prevention or reduction is at stake. South Africa in this respect is little different from other societies. However, civil society (and each individual

within it or represented by it), bear as much responsibility for crime prevention and crime reduction as political leadership, the SAPS, security agencies and others. This responsibility is both inescapable and morally necessary.

Thus the following proposals:

- (1) That more resources be made available to raise awareness amongst communities on the need for civic involvement in stemming the tide of criminality;
- (2) That current and other arising forces be used/utilised by SAPS as well as political leadership (national, provincial and local) to advance civic involvement in crime prevention (in a legally based manner);
- (3) That where such a need exists civil society organisations/associations in conjunction with SAPS and the private security industry ("partnership policing") strategise and act together in crime prevention and reduction. (This is especially but not exclusively relevant for "high-risk" areas.)

6. Conclusion

The danger of a partial criminalisation of state and society is a reality in contemporary South Africa. Ironically, one of the legacies of apartheid and transformation is the wide-spread non-racialisation of crime. Apartheid is partially to blame, so is the transition and transformation. To eradicate crime, much stronger and decisive steps are needed. So are planning and prioritisation on various levels. Crime will only be effectively under control if the political will is transformed into action. Lastly, crime prevention and eradication is the responsibility of both state and society. Needless to say, where the state and SAPS are seen to be inefficient or inactive, local communities will continue to devise and sharpen their own approaches in order to stem crime.

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For further reading:

The following list was specially compiled for the benefit of readers interested in both the theory and practice of crime prevention. It spans various areas within the crime field.

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Notes

¹ That South Africa is a country ravaged by poverty is not difficult to see. See Whiteford (1995) for an oversight of poverty extremes in South Africa.

Out of a population of approximately 38 million, Phillips (1998: 2) points out that approximately 6 million South Africans are unemployed. An article by Dr Ina Snyman (1992 pp. 37-38) states that as far back as 1992 (two years after the unbanning of the liberation movements and two years before democratic South Africa's founding elections) that joblessness is one of the main culprits contributing to poverty. Eight hundred respondents in this survey were questioned. Forty-seven per cent felt that the factor contributing the most to poverty was lack of job opportunities, 66% felt that job provision would be the best way to assist the poor and 59% felt that job provision would be the best way to combat poverty-related problems.

For the respondents (note, these are the perceptions of the respondents, not academics and politicians) unequal educational opportunities (10%), the legacy of sanctions against the apartheid state (14%) and lack of economic growth (10%) came far behind. While economic growth in the years since 1992 has increased significantly and investment are returning significantly, joblessness continue to grow under the current government.

The 1996 census results for South Africa reported that unemployment for South Africans averaged 33,9%. Eastern Cape rated top of the list with 48,5% followed by Northern Province with 46%, KwaZulu-Natal (39,1%) and North West (37,9%). Western Cape registered the lowest at 17,9%.

² Gauteng — known in the popular lingua (vox populi or "volksmond") as "gangsters-paradise" for 1998 alone boasts the following in key crime types:

- violent crimes, robbery with aggravating circumstances — 40 000 cases;
- assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm — 45 000;
- reported adults rapes — 8 000;
- property crime (theft) — 120 000;
- burglaries — 80 000;
- theft of motor vehicles — 56 000.

[(Massive) under-reporting can be suspected in Gauteng as elsewhere (*Gauteng Crime Brief*, 1999)]

³ Worldwide there are an under-reporting of crimes such as rape (including minors) and serious assault. There is reason to believe that under-reporting in these cases in South Africa is even higher. But also in other areas under-reporting is given.

⁴ "Underreporting of burglary is known world-wide" (Clarke & Hope, 1984: 17). Under-reporting with common burglary is a given in South Africa. Various reasons exists for this — the most important being the pervasive belief that police will not or is unlikely in following up cases — not to speak about the lost of personal goods. It is not surprising to hear people answer to the question "Did you report it?" simply "No." or rhetorically a "Why?" (Researchers own observation over seven years). A variation to the two answers above is frequently found (especially under middle-class and upper-class people): "Only for insurance purposes". These statements depict the lack of trust in police efficiency in combating smaller and big burglaries amongst South Africans of all classes and background groups.

- ⁵ Observers of these attacks offer various reasons. They are (i) a persistent remainder of a culture of violence and crime, (ii) poverty, unemployment and relative deprivation, (iii) revenge, (iv) access to unregistered or stolen (registered) firearms, (v) organised crime, (vi) gang-related crimes, (vii) acts of intended murder is a result of, or the legacy of inflammatory statements (Visser, 1998: 2-5).

Ben Haefele (1998: 3-4) offers the following reasons for attacks:

- (i) Attacks on farmers, workers and families
- (ii) Armed robbery
- (iii) Brutal murder — without a clear intent such as robbery
- (iv) Incidences of arson and
- (v) Stocktheft.

Under category (iii) Haefele argues that "cases have been reported by attacks aimed solely at committing murder and the level of attacks "being well planned and carried out with military precision". Whether this implies third force activities or not, and for whatever reasons it occurs the current perception remain amongst the majority of the farming population that the government is either unwilling or incapable of putting an end to it.

- ⁶ The GIS maps are available from the Human Sciences Research Council's GIS Unit and forms part of the 1997/1998 research partly done with Innovation Funds received from the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST).
- ⁷ She further notes that such gangs or bands include many a ... former adversaries and that "(these) gangs have no ideological content whatever" (Karl, 1998: 20).
- ⁸ Note again that in these categories an under-reporting of crime is a basic assumption in writing this article — especially with regard to common assault, robberies and ill treatment of children as well as various forms of rape and/or indecent assault.

Theft from motor vehicles, light delivery vans (LDV's) bakkies and pickpocketing, which in these areas are prevalent, is known to be notoriously under- (if at all) reported. The town of Upington (Gordonia) being a case in point.

- ⁹ With reference to under-reporting the following:

Between 1995 and 1998 an HSRC public attitude survey found that South African respondents saw the maintenance of law and order as second most important after job creation. Between 1995 and 1997/98 the respondents favouring "law and order" nearly doubled.

In 1994 approximately 44% of South Africans felt that government control over crime was "small" or that there was "no control". By 1997 this figure for the two categories "small" and "no control" raised to approximately 63%. By 1997 (research released by the HSRC in 1998) it was felt by respondents that they mostly disapprove of the government's handling of the crime issue. African South Africans of this opinion were close to 65%; "coloured" South Africans ± 67%, South African citizens belonging to the "Indian" category were close on 90%. So were white respondents. Antoinette Louw remarks: "Crime statistics are usually regarded with caution: in South Africa they are treated with outright scepticism" (Louw, 1998: 11).

Part of this can be blamed on lack of a reporting culture or information culture within SAPS, insufficient training or/and resources and a high turnover of skilled personnel due to mostly low salaries and high job stress and bleak career options for people in the police structures.

In a 1996 survey by the HSRC (2 072 respondents countrywide representative sample) it was found that; 27% of the uncovered crime incidents (622) were not reported. While less serious crimes were vastly underreported virtually all crimes were under-reported. For example: Roughly 24% of violent crimes were not reported. Close to 40% of rape cases were not reported, 40% of common assault and nearly 20% of serious result were not reported. More than 20% of murders and more

than 10% of vehicle theft were not reported. More than 20% of housebreaking crimes were not reported (Pimstone, 1998: 15).

- ¹⁰ The important work done elsewhere by victim empowerment, victim rehabilitation and assistance to victims is not becried here. Indeed important work is being done in various areas (and deserves more public and government support). Some examples include programmes by NICRO and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The Nedcor ISS Crime Index, a joint venture between Nedcor, Business against Crime, and the Security and Governance Programme at the ISS provides an excellent example of high quality research (mostly quantitative but also qualitative) output that are published in an accessible and user-friendly way. The real challenge however, lies in communicating these findings more effectively to relevant state departments, SAPS, intelligence-services (NIA, SASS), private security companies and citizen groups involved in crime prevention. Coupled with this challenge to ensure that the knowledge transmitted is understood AND acted upon. This contribution however, focuses on crime prevention and crime reduction strategies on various levels.

What are at stake are not only the effective communication of research findings **BUT ALSO** the translation of the findings into viable strategies on various levels. And more — to ensure that strategies embarked upon, is monitored and strengthened (through briefings, best-practice evaluation, training and empowerment of SAPS and citizen groups involved in crime prevention and reduction). Implementation and contextual application of proposals derived at is actually what research should be aimed at. It is where research tie up effectively with application and co-ordinated effort. A major additional focus on research application within crime prevention is a challenge that can no longer be postponed in South Africa.