

From Formal to Informal Migrant labour System: the impact of the changing nature of the migrant labour system on mining communities in Lesotho and Mozambique

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Abstract

The 1990s saw major disruptions to the centuries' old migrant labour system that underpinned the economic development of the SADC region and the South African economy in particular. This was due to changes in the mining industry, being the main user of the migrant labour, and the South African government's internalisation and localisation process of the labour market. Using empirical evidence gathered in Lesotho and Mozambique, this paper argues that the migrant labour system has changed from the formal to the informal/casualised migrant labour system. Not only do foreign migrant workers use illegal or illicit means to cross the border to South Africa, but they are also being employed in mines as casual workers. Of course, migrant workers' persistent return to the South African mines is caused mainly by socio-economic difficulties resulting from the erosion of the core source of livelihood in their communities. This paper argues that the situation is further complicated by the expansion of South Africa's capitalist empire throughout the region, if not the continent. It further shows that migrant workers' return to the mines is also underpinned by the socio-cultural elements associated with minework created over the years. Once regarded as rural aristocrats, now both current and ex-mineworkers are plagued by several degrading identities, such as men who cannot provide for their families and carriers of diseases in communities.

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Introduction

The formal migrant labour system had been at the core of the economic development of Southern Africa, and the South African economy in particular. This paper argues that it was after South Africa's transition to the democratic dispensation in 1994 that the system has shifted from the formal to the informal/casualised migrant labour system. Not only is there a growth of clandestine or illegal migrancy to South Africa, but foreign migrant workers are increasingly being employed in mines as casual workers. The following section looks at the evolution of the migrant labour system in Southern Africa and how the system had been understood in the region. It is shown that the formal migrant labour system, associated with the establishment of the capitalist mode of production in Southern Africa, has not only led to the underdevelopment of the sending countries, but has also created the migrant culture that is embedded in mining communities.

This is followed by the discussion of the developments around the system in post-apartheid South Africa, which shows that South Africa, as the *de facto* economic leader in the SADC region, pursues seemingly contradictory policies of internalisation and localisation of the labour market and regional co-operation. While the internalisation and localisation of the labour markets effectively dissuades South African companies to employ foreign nationals, the so-called regional co-operation may be regarded as the South African economic expansion as it benefits South Africa than other countries in the region. Indeed, South African companies' investments in other SADC countries are accompanied by neo-apartheid workplace regime and flexible business practices that puts workers at the disadvantage. In effect, workers look back at the formal migrant labour system with nostalgia, and thus left with little choice but to return to the South African mines. Using two case countries, Lesotho and Mozambique, the final section of this article continues to show that workers' return to South Africa can also be attributed to the migration culture associated with the formal migrant labour system.

The evolution of migrant labour system in Southern Africa

The study of migration in Southern Africa, and labour migration in particular, is as old as the act of migration itself. Many studies on migration have been undertaken by various scholars such as Weyl (1991), Jooma (1991), Whiteside (1985) and Crush (1987, 1991, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2004) and Allen (1992). Some of these studies have adopted a narrative and historical approach, whilst others have undertaken an ideological and theoretical approach.

However, the common thread amongst these studies is that labour migration in southern Africa was/is a capitalist project underpinned by capital's need of access to labour. According to Weyl (1991), this was done through "mobilisation

of certain regions as areas of labour supply and others of accumulation" (Weyl 1991:01). While this process led to a certain extent of the economic development in the region, it simultaneously led to the underdevelopment of other areas. For instance, Simelane (1986) shows that some societies, such as that of Swaziland, had to be transformed from being self-sufficient in food production at the turn of the century to being highly dependent on food imports from South Africa (Simelane 1986).

This socio-economic situation meant that certain societies that relied on subsistence farming for years were suddenly forced into wage labour, especially to the mines in South Africa, so as to afford basic needs. The urgency of dependence on wage labour was further facilitated by immediate needs such as accumulating enough money to pay 'hut tax' or to pay dowry imposed by traditional authorities under the auspices of government.

It follows, therefore, that labour migration in Southern Africa was also a class project aimed at the proletarianisation of Africans (Weyl 1991). The proletarianisation process, however, was never a complete one since the established modes of livelihood, such as subsistence farming, were never completely destroyed. While there is a consensus that the proletarianisation process resulted in migrant workers assuming a fuzzy class characterisation, the conceptualisation of this process is a contested one in relation to Southern Africa.

On the one hand, some scholars argue that capital's need of cheap labour necessitated maintenance of the traditional or indigenous modes of living, although in a more diluted state, "in order to provide a basis of subsistence and social security of migrant workers" (Weyl 1991:03). As such, the cheap labour force was an 'episodic' one used when and if required and alternating between the life of a mineworker and subsistence farmer. Indeed, migrant workers' length of contracts with mining houses was also informed by a need to harvest fields back home.

Due to this co-existence of capitalist and semi-feudalist modes of production, the argument continues, it is not surprising that most of the labour supplying countries boast a limited level of industrialisation (Weyl 1991). The results of this approach are still apparent in some of the countries that are historically migrant labour suppliers such as Mozambique and Lesotho whereby the only other notable source of income available outside remittances is subsistence farming.

On the other hand, other scholars argue that the proletarianisation process of African men should be seen against a background of African workers' need to express their masculinity in the face of an oppressive racial capitalism (Bonner 1995; Morell 1998). In the case of mineworkers, this resulted in a distinct migrant

culture, characterised by a combination of the urban and rural livelihood practices. For example, ethnic/tribal migrant associations like *Ma-Russia* by the Basotho and *Maluita* by men from the former Northern Transvaal were meant, firstly; to protect important traditional ethos from the erosive effects of the urban life and, secondly; to assist individuals to adapt to the urban environment (Bonner 1995).

From Weyl's (1991) arguments it can be seen that underdevelopment of some African countries was a colonialist project that played its role in creating reserves for cheap labour to be absorbed by what had turned out to be a 'regional economy' centred around the South African mining industry. Weyl (1991) further argues that important as it is for capital accumulation, the migrant labour should rather be described as "a permanent-periodic, episodic process...by selected segments of the population" (Weyl, 1991:16). The immediate question following from this observation is what happens when the system is being phased out? The following section answers this question by looking at the history of migrant labour system in Southern Africa and the impact of its phasing out in Lesotho and Mozambique.

The impact of the migrant labour system in sending countries

The mining industry had been the main user of migrant labour following the discovery of diamond in Kimberly and gold in the Witwatersrand in 1866 and 1886 respectively. TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa)¹ had been at the core of recruitment and administration of the labour supply from South African homelands and semi-independent states, as well as sending countries including Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Zambia since the late 1800s (Davies and Head 1995).

The recruitment and administration of the labour supply by TEBA was done through a labour agreement regulating the contract of employment signed between the mineworker and the mining houses. Amongst others, the agreement between South Africa and the concerned countries² stipulates the minimum age of workers (at least 18 years of age) and the duration of contracts (12 months/313 shifts – the maximum of which could be 18 months), assigns responsibilities to employers, recruitment agencies and both governments. In some cases, such as in Mozambique and Swaziland, the agreement made

¹ The name TEBA (which was also used in reference to the famous recruiter H. M. Taberer) was adopted in the 1970s for WENELA (Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) and its local recruiting arm, NRC (National Recruiting Corporation) (Jeeves and Yudelman 1986).

² The agreement between South Africa and Mozambique also stipulates the geographical location where workers could be recruited. This followed the 1928 agreement, which came amidst "the Tropical Labour Ban" and thus prohibited the recruitment of mineworkers beyond 22 degree south latitude. As a result of this, mineworkers in Mozambique were traditionally from the central and Southern Provinces of the country including Maputo, Inyambane, Giza and Manyica.

provision of the office delegated to be responsible for the safety and welfare of migrant workers in South Africa and the administration of taxes collected from the mining labour. The office also ensured the delivery of the assets of the deceased mineworkers to the relevant families or relatives, which was done through the sending country's department of labour, in the home country. In a situation where the department of labour is not able to trace the relatives of the deceased worker, all the assets, including the deferred payment, were invested in the communities where the mining labour is drawn³.

Furthermore, the agreement made provision for the deferred payment which is the money which was paid in the workers' home country. This money differed from 60% to 80% of the workers' salary and could be paid periodically to a relative chosen by the worker, deposited into the worker's savings account or to the worker himself at the time of his return to the home country. The monies were used mainly for the overall sustenance of the homesteads and communities (Ngonini 2007).

Apart from the social functions such as paying *lobola*, the deferred payment money was also important to sustain livelihood strategies of the rural communities. For instance, an average mineworker in Lesotho would take leave during the farming season so as to assist with both farming labour and buying. In Mozambique, an average mineworker had access to a motor cycle, which served the transportation needs of the majority of the rural communities (Cobbe 1982).

The money further boosted the general economic status of concerned countries and the rural economy in particular. For instance, some of the infrastructural developments in rural areas of Lubombo and Shiselweni in Swaziland and Mafeteng and Mofale's Hoek in Lesotho are attributed to the migrant labour system.

The migrant labour system met challenges along the way - such as withdrawal from formal labour migrancy arrangements of countries such as Tanzania and Zambia after they attained political independence. However, the system was sustained because of the significance of the involved countries' economic relations with South Africa (Prothero, 1974). For instance, Lesotho, as well as Swaziland, is geographically bound to South Africa and its economy is largely dependent on remittances from South Africa. Similarly, Mozambique did not withdraw from the arrangements of migrant labour system after its independence in 1975 because of the significant contributions made by the migrant remittances to the country.

³ See the treaties signed between South Africa, Mozambique and Lesotho in 1964, 1973 and 1986.

In fact, Crush (1997) argues that Mozambique and Lesotho can be classified as long-standing labour supplying countries⁴. These are countries in which the migrant labour system has had the biggest impact in terms of national and household economies. Together with Botswana and Swaziland, their economies are heavily dependent on remittances from the mining labour market in South Africa.

Yet, the dependence on remittances was also a form of underdevelopment. This is because remittances from the South African mines, as the dominant source of economic activity for many years in these countries, also made it difficult to stimulate other livelihood strategies. (Cobbe 1982). Other than agricultural development, remittances were used mainly for immediate consumable items. In fact, argues Cobbe (1982) in reference to Lesotho, remittances contributed very little for the economic development of the country because they were pumped directly to the communities. As a result, the economy does not have sufficient capacity to re-employ retrenched migrant mineworkers from South Africa.

Equally important is the fact that the migrant labour system had an impact of creating a distinct migration culture for migrants. Back in their communities, migrant labourers enjoyed a status of urbanised citizens, which simultaneously contributed to the diminishing of a traditional agrarian livelihood. Due to the exposure to urban life, migrant workers were trendsetters in terms of new developments in fashion, technology, and so forth (Ngonini 2007).

The migrant culture, however, also had negative impact on the community. Firstly, the system led to breaking up of families in labour sending areas. In addition to the shift in gender roles in mining communities, the system promoted the practice of polygamous relationships amongst mineworkers with dire consequences in the wake of mass retrenchments. This, often than not, led to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in mining communities. Yet, the current crisis of livelihoods should not distract our attention from the privileged position that mining enabled migrant workers to entertain with regard to their communities. The fact that he had enough money, in terms of rural area standards, to sustain all his families gives an idea of a relative wealth of the mineworker in the period

⁴ According to Crush (1997), the other two types of labour supplying countries to South Africa were episodic labour supplying countries and occasional supplying countries. The former, which includes Malawi and Zimbabwe are characterised by fluctuation of numbers of migrant labourers in South Africa as a result of structural changes either in South Africa or the supplying country. For instance, the fluctuation of migrant workers from Zimbabwe was a result of the opposition of active recruitment by WENELA in that country in the 1960s, desperate labour demand in South Africa in the 1970s and the political independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. The latter, which include Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, are countries that have not supplied labour to mines since the 1960s.

prior to the 1990's. Secondly, the prospects of working in mines as a career captured the imagination of children, boys in particular, in these communities.

The above discussion captures the co-existence of the traditional and modern forces central to the debate on the impact of capitalism on the social life of Africans. On the one hand, the persistence of the practices of traditional practices encapsulated by ethnic/tribal gangs consolidates a view that "chiefly or tribal patriarchy" was not subordinated to the logic of capitalism (Morell 1996). On the other hand, the erosion of agrarian livelihood, coupled by increasing change of domestic gender roles, proves the subjugation of the traditional gender roles to capitalist mode of production. These seemingly contradictory phenomena set the stage for an exploration of ex-mineworkers in communities. It further indicates the importance of the context in which the discussion of the impact of the phasing out of the formal migrant labour system should be located. The main question, which the following section seeks to grapple with, is how can one look at the impact of the phasing out of the migrant labour system on ex-mineworkers themselves, their families and communities?

Background to the research

The aim of the research conducted was to look at the experiences of ex-mineworkers in three Southern African countries, including Lesotho and Mozambique. As such, a team of researchers visited the selected countries where they've spent five to six days in each country interviewing relevant stakeholders using semi-structured interviews. The interviews were particularly targeted at three groups of respondents, namely, government representatives, relevant civil society organisations, and ex-mineworkers and ex-mineworkers' widows. This article is based on twenty interviews conducted with government representatives, relevant civil society organisations, and, where possible, ex-mineworkers and widows of mineworkers in Lesotho and Mozambique⁵. In addition, researchers collected relevant documents, such as statistical data on migrant workers to South African mines and research documents from relevant stakeholders.

The limitations of this research are twofold. Firstly, the research does not claim to be representative of the views and experiences of ex-mineworkers, their families and communities, as the interviews were carried out only with representatives of specific organisations and few ex-mineworkers and widows. Therefore, the findings should rather be seen as indications of likely consequences of the changing nature of the migrant labour system in Southern Africa.

⁵ See appendix 1 for a list of interviews

Secondly, as it is always the case with fieldwork, fieldworkers did not manage to secure interviews with some of the key informants in these countries. These include interviews with ex-mineworkers and widows, and the Department of Labour and *Animo* (*Associação De Mineiros Mocambicanos/Association of Mozambique Mineworkers*), in Mozambique

Furthermore, by virtue of their differences, analysis of countries studied in this research may not be equal. There are studies already conducted on the impact of the phasing out or the casualisation of the migrant labour system in Lesotho, while there is very little in Mozambique. Equally important is to note that information such as statistical data is readily available in some countries, while that is not the case in other countries. In the case of Mozambique, the language barrier, since most of the information is stored in Portuguese, might have been an obstacle in accessing the required information.

From formal to informal labour system in Southern Africa

An analysis of the impact of migrant labour system requires one to situate it within the economic developmental thrusts of post-apartheid South Africa as the *de facto* economic leader in the SADC (Southern African Development Cooperation) region. One can identify two developments related to the phasing out of the formal migrant labour system. First, there had been a growing investment of the South African companies in South Africa and African continent in general, spearheaded through the principles of NEPAD and African Renaissance (Maloka 2005).

This investment expansion had been growing in the SADC region, in particular. Although there had been complaints from the South African government that it is difficult to express NEPAD principles through SADC, South African companies already benefit disproportionately from the bilateral trade with countries in the region. In their discussion of the expansion of South African companies in Africa, Daniel et al (2004) show that there had been a growing trade imbalances *vis-à-vis* both South Africa and the region and South Africa and individual SADC countries. For instance, South Africa's exports to SADC member countries were calculated at 7 times more than its imports from these countries in 1999. This proportion has risen to 8:1 in 2001 (Daniel et al 2004).

It is also important to note that the expansion of South African companies in the SADC region is accompanied by its hegemonic expansion which puts workers under the South African system of production and economy (Miller 2005). In research she conducted on Shoprite⁶ in Zambia, Miller (2005) shows that the

⁶ Shoprite is one of the South African based grocery chain stores operating in more than 14 countries in the African continent.

management's disposition to South Africa as an economic leader in the SADC region leads the South African companies to regard themselves as agents of modernisation in these countries. Mostly managed by white South Africans, these companies continue their apartheid practices, including racism, in the host countries. In Kenya, for instance, one opposition party legislator observed in 2001 that "[The South African companies] bulldoze their way around. It seems like they still have the old attitudes of the old South Africa"⁷.

Beside the apartheid attitudes displayed by the South African companies, the implementation of structural adjustment policies in countries such as Zambia and Mozambique makes them more prone to foreign companies' implementation of flexible production strategies in the workplace. In other words, workers are faced with the double-edged sword of apartheid workplace practices and difficult working conditions resulting from flexible workplace practices (Miller 2005).


Second, the post-1994 South African government has decided to localise and internalise the labour market so as to facilitate employment of the majority of unemployed South Africans. In particular, this was done through, firstly, the South African government's granting of permanent citizenship, in 1995, to foreign mineworkers who had been in South Africa since 1986⁸ and who had voted in the 1994 national elections (Davies and Head 1995; Wentzel 2003). Secondly, the South African government passed the Immigration Act (No. 13 of 2002), which, amongst others, prohibits employment of novices from other countries unless the employer can prove that there is lack of the skills possessed by the novice in South Africa.

In relation to the mining industry, the localisation and internalisation of the labour market come amidst three other major structural changes that affected the industry in the 1990s, namely; a relatively low gold prices and currency fluctuations in the late 1980s and early 1990s; a decline in export price, for coal mining in particular, due to increasing international competition, improved technology and cost increases; and transformation in the industry so as to facilitate meaningful participation of black people in the industry. In addition to the internalisation and localisation process of the labour market, the latter had also been pursued through the state flagship broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). The government pushes the transformation agenda by pressurising the industry to promote black ownership of mining companies (Bezuidenhout 2008).

⁷ Matu Wamac, quoted in Daniel et al (2004)

⁸ This was because the influx control policy was officially repealed in 1986.

In addition to the reduction of the significance of the mining industry to the South African economy⁹, this has resulted in major disruptions to the migrant labour system. Although they do not give a representative picture¹⁰, the number of workers recruited by TEBA Limited shows that there was a massive reduction of migrant workers from other SADC countries since the late 1980s. In the case of Lesotho and Mozambique, TEBA Limited data (Figure 1) shows that the collective number of people recruited from these countries has declined by 36.5% over a period of two decades from 141 729 in 1987 to 89 870 in 2007.



Source: Teba Limited

Figure 1: Number of workers recruited by TEBA from Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique from 1987 to 2007

Figure 1 shows that the phasing out of the formal migrant system was felt more intensively in Lesotho than Mozambique starting at least in 1995. While the number of workers recruited in Lesotho in 1987 was 101 739, it declined by 53.7 to 47 099 in 1995. Although the number of workers sent to mines increased from 1995, the number of workers recruited from Lesotho (44 933) is now more or less the same with the one from Mozambique (44 937). Although there had been some fluctuations for Mozambique, the figure shows that the number of workers recruited from that country had been stable.

Apart from the structural developments in the mining industry the decrease in the number of workers recruited from other SADC countries can also be attributed to the crisis in the global financial markets in 1997. Although these developments have shaken the system, the migrant labour system is far from ending as there is still a continuation of the recruitment of mine-workers from

⁹ Bezuidenhout (2008) shows that, for instance, while mine products made over 70% of exports in 1983, they only made about 35% in 1999. The contribution of 15.6% of the GDP in 1986 declined to 6.5% in 1998. In terms of employment, there was a decline of approximately 50% from about 800 000 employees in the 1980s to approximately 400 000 employees in the early 2000s.

¹⁰ These numbers do not include other forms of migration, including illegal/ clandestine and/or direct individual migration to the country.

neighbouring countries. Indeed, TEBA Limited still recruits novices, although at the lower rate than it was previously the case. For instance, TEBA Limited has registered 1 038 novices from Lesotho and 310 from Mozambique in a period between 2005 and 2007.

This is furthermore facilitated by the growth of employment opportunities in the mining industry resulting from the Platinum Group Metals (PGM) boom in South Africa¹¹ (Bezuidenhout 2008). Indeed, the recent data from the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) show that there had been an increase in employment in the mining industry since the early 2000s. The employment levels in the mining industry reached 458 600 in 2006 from just over 400 000 in 2000 (DME, 2007). Although it is still slow compared to the levels of retrenchments in the 1980s and 1990s, this is equal to an approximately 13% increase in employment from 2000 to 2006. The data further shows that the number of employees in the PGM (168 479) has overtaken those in the gold mining sector, which stands at 159 984. This implies that there is still a pulling factor for ex-miners to the mines as there is growth of employment opportunities resulting from the PGM boom.

Nonetheless, the mounting pressure to reduce costs in the gold-mining sector not only resulted in mass retrenchments of workers, but it has also led to the increase and intensification of non-standard forms of employment; that is, casualisation, externalisation and informalisation of work¹². The DME's statistics show that of all the employees in the mining industry, 29% (i.e 132 503) are employed by contractors¹³. However, the proportion of informal employees has decreased by 6% from 35% in 2005. This may be attributed to either of the following developments. Firstly, that there is a real decrease in sub-contracting practices, which does not necessarily mean a decrease in the informalisation of work. Secondly, it may be due to an increasing demand of skilled workers as a result of mechanisation of production in the industry¹⁴.

¹¹ These include Platinum, Palladium, Osmium, Ruthenium, Rhodium and Iridium which are made from the same ore material

¹² Although these processes are inter-related, they are not the same. Casualisation refers to a situation where standard employment is replaced by part-time or temporary employment. This can either be through direct employment of workers or subcontracting or outsourcing (externalisation). Thus, externalisation means a situation where the employment contract (usually two-way between employer and employee) is replaced by commercial contract (tri-angular employment relationship). Mostly as a result of these processes, employment becomes difficult to regulate (informalisation). Finally, therefore, informalisation means a process whereby it is difficult to use formal labour market policies to regulate employment relationship (See Theron 2005).

¹³ DME(2007)

¹⁴ A demand for trained and skilled mine workers started in the 1970s and has accelerated migrancy of mineworkers from other SADC countries. Nonetheless, the conditions for such workers were different from the normal migrant workers as they were able to be employed in the mine on the full-time and permanent basis. Different from the contract migrant labourer, the professional mineworker could take an annual leave in a specific period (Wentzel 2003).

It is worth noting that unlike in some industries such as retailing, the process of informalisation of work in the mining industry happens even in traditional mining work such as shaft-sinking, tunnel blasting, stoping, underground excavation and ground stabilisation (Bezuidenhout 2008). This means that ex-mineworkers' skills can easily be utilised in the sub-contracting industry. It is difficult to ascertain how many ex-mine workers are re-employed in mines. However, focus groups interviews with a group of mineworkers illustrated that there are some ex-mineworkers who were previously employed permanently, who are re-employed as casuals or temporary workers (ibid.).

According to Bezuidenhout (2008), while the rise of non-standard employment relationship is one of the strategies to reduce costs, it also serves two more hidden purposes. Firstly, this practice happens in the name of BEE. Indeed, there are BEE players, including the mining magnate Patrice Motsepe, who entered the mining industry via the ownership of sub-contracting companies. Secondly, argues Bezuidenhout (2008), this development can be attributed to employers' attempt to evade perceived rigid labour market policies in South Africa.

The developments in the South African mining industry resulted in major retrenchments and the rise of informalisation of work. The latter, coupled with the PGM boom, provides employment opportunities for mineworkers, ex-mineworkers in particular, in the mining industry. Although the recruitment activity is dwindling, it is quite clear that employment opportunities, especially in mine sub-contracting, are still available for migrant labourers in South African mining industry. This happens in a context whereby it is difficult for migrant workers to get an alternative employment, resulting from the spread of the South African workplace regime and flexible working conditions in their home countries. Given the changing nature of the economy, most mineworkers (both novice and ex-mineworkers) are being recruited to work as casual workers in mines. Thus, it is argued that the system has only changed from formal labour migrant system to what we call *casualised/informal migrant labour system*.

Nonetheless, the decline in recruitment, and the changing nature of the migrant labour system in particular, had negative impact on the mining communities as it is difficult for both aspiring and ex-mineworkers to eke out living and maintain the culture of migration in their communities. The following section closely looks at the impact of this development in the mining communities and, more specifically, the factors pushing workers to migrate from their home countries to South African mines?

The impact of the informal/casualised form of migrant labour in the labour sending countries, mining communities and mineworkers

The impact of the informal/casualised form of migrant labour system is felt on the national level, in the mining communities and by individual mineworkers. In this section, the article analyses the impact of this development in Lesotho and Mozambique. It is shown that the situation in the mining communities result in potential workers having little recourse but to return back to the mines in search of employment.

Lesotho

Lesotho's contract labour agreement with South Africa was only formalised in 1973 (Wentzel 2003) even though the country has been a source of labour to the mines from the late nineteenth century. Starting from the late 1970s, Lesotho became the main labour supplying country to South African mines. Although major retrenchments in the South African mining industry started in 1987 following the mineworkers' strike in protest against the apartheid regime, the drastic decline of Basotho men in the mines only started to be felt in the 1990s. For instance, while the number of Basotho men who were actively working in mines reached 130 000 persons in 1987, this number had declined to a little over 120 000 in 2001. Central to the way these changes affected the national economy, communities and households was the practice of the deferred payment scheme.

• *Deferred Payment Scheme in Lesotho*

The deferred payment scheme was established in 1974 in Lesotho. It was compulsory under the scheme for all mineworkers to deposit 60 per cent of their wages into an account at a specific bank in Lesotho. According to the Central Bank of Lesotho (1996), mineworkers' remittances had been important for the balance of payments as they provided a significant source of foreign exchange. Remittances contributed to between 40 and 45 per cent of Lesotho's Gross National Product over the years from 1984 to 1995 (Central Bank of Lesotho 1996). In addition, the Central Bank of Lesotho (1996) also estimated that approximately 40% of the country's population depended on remittances from the mines over a period from 1985 to 1990¹⁵.

The remittance monies in Lesotho were administered by TEBA and workers were only allowed two withdrawals from the fund prior to the end of their employment contracts (interview, Kikine and Mahula, 29/08/2007). In many cases the end of contract terms coincided with the beginning of the farming season not only to provide an extra pair of hands, but also to utilise the money to buy necessities such as agricultural equipment, seeds and fertilisers (Kikine and

¹⁵ The calculation derives from the fact that in average each mineworker had 6 dependants over this period

Mahula, 29/08/2007). From an economic perspective, the money had multiplier effects as they spurred economic activities in other non-agricultural sectors, especially retail and transport.

The Lesotho government stopped insisting that migrant workers only receive their wages through the deferred payment scheme in the 1990s. Firstly, the portion of the money deferred to the country was cut to 30% of the actual wages of mineworkers in 1990. Secondly, in 1991 the government introduced the emergency clause that gave mineworkers permission to withdraw the money anytime they wished (Central Bank of Lesotho 1996). Despite this, a survey conducted by the Central Bank of Lesotho in 1992-1993 has found that mineworkers remitted an average of 71.3% of their salaries to the country. This is when one considers many ways in which workers remitted their moneys, such as taking the money home in person, transferring it through recruitment agencies, banks, or/and sending it with friends and relatives.

The flip-side of the Lesotho government's grant of freedom to mineworkers to withdraw the money anytime is that it seems most of the remittance money is being spend in South Africa. For instance, most Most mineworkers insist on getting the money in South African currency, which is more advantageous because they can spend it in both countries (interview, Kikine and Mahula, 29/08/2007). This is especially important for mineworkers who have families in both countries and/or dual citizenship.

As was the case with other labour supplying countries, the deferred payment scheme was also affected by South African government's decision in 1995 to give permanent citizenship to foreign workers. As some families moved to South Africa, there was a decrease in the number of Lesotho nationals employed in the country and a decline in remittances to Lesotho (See Figure 1 above).

Nonetheless, the major impact was felt in the rural areas. Not only did these developments reduce the main source of revenue for rural communities, but they also dealt a blow to the economy in general and the agricultural sector, in particular. As discussed above, remittances from the South African mines had also sustained agricultural activities. This collapse of traditional rural livelihood source resulted in members of community's experiment with other livelihood strategies. A research conducted by the Ministry of Employment and Labour (MEL), suggests that the retail sector; livestock theft; dagga (marijuana) production and selling; and prostitution seem to become more common livelihood strategies in the country.

- *Mineworkers' Culture and Identity*

Traditionally, working in mines had been regarded as a career in itself in most parts of Lesotho. There was a period when mining work came only second to circumcision or initiation school as a sign of masculinity. So important has minework been in the life of young Basotho men that school teachers have long gotten used to hearing that 'posts are not frozen in mines' (interview, Kikine and Mahula, 29/08/2007). Moloantoa Martin Ledimo, a historian and the principal of Maseru High School, gives us an explanation:

"The embeddedness of the mining culture in the country made it difficult for the Basotho young men to see the importance of going to school. Indeed, children were quite certain that employment is readily available in mines for them upon quitting school" (interview, Ledimo, 29/08/2007)

One can identify several factors that underpinned Basotho men's attachment to South Africa such as ample employment opportunities and relatively more attractive cosmopolitan life style in South African cities and towns (Theko, interview 30/08/2007). But, one major reason for this may be the fact that Basotho had never regarded South Africa as a foreign country (Lelimo 1998). Sesotho, which is spoken by the overwhelming majority of the population, is one of the official languages in South Africa. Lesotho nationals have relatives in some parts of South Africa. In particular, Free State, the South African province dominated by Basotho, is historically regarded as part of Lesotho, hence the name Mokahare in reference to Lesotho¹⁶.

Furthermore, mine work seems to resonate very well with traditional patriarchal notions of manhood such as toughness and shrewdness required to survive the dangerous working conditions underground (interview, Kikine and Mahula, 29/08/2007). Coupled with the all-male demographics and dominant white masculinity, this has accentuated the strong male culture of mineworkers. For instance, the establishment of ethnic/tribal gangs such as the Ma-Russia was partly a response to a need to express African masculinity that had been suffocated by the oppressive workplace regime in South Africa (Bonner 1995; Morell 1998). In most cases, such culture expressed itself through violence between different tribal groups and consolidation of traditional African patriarchal values. As Morell (1998: 625) argues "migrant men understood their masculinity in terms of respect, to be given by younger men and women particularly".

¹⁶ The name Mokahare, commonly known to Basotho, is reported to derive from Sesotho's expression, *Moo ka hare*, which means inside. This refers to the mountainous Kingdom being the inside country of Lesotho when one considers Free State as part of the country, which is, therefore, outside (Lelimo, 1998).

According to Lelimo (1998), the post-apartheid South African government should consider the restoration of Free State to Lesotho, as the province is a conquered territory of latter.

It is partly because of this mine culture that ex-mineworkers like to return to work in the mines in South Africa. There is a belief amongst ex-mineworkers that "once a miner, always a miner" or "If you have been a miner you don't think you can be anything else" (Interview, Kikine and Mahula, 29/08/2007). In other words, most ex-mineworkers do not think of themselves as something else than mineworkers. The Executive Director of the Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) Seabata Motsamai argues that "The history of migration in the country poses a big challenge to the teaching of entrepreneurial skills as most Basotho just do not have a concept for it". Indeed, this is also seen by a sheer number of ex-mineworkers who are seen, on a daily basis, in front of TEBA offices looking for an opportunity of mine employment.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that not all people looking for employment at TEBA offices are ex-mineworkers. Some of them are novices who have never worked in mines before (interview, Kikine and Mahula, 29/08/2007). Furthermore, one can disaggregate them into those who are desperately looking for a job and those who are selective of the kind of jobs they are looking for. The former group is dominated by novices who are readily available to snatch any opportunity available to work in mines and are mainly being employed by contractors. Meanwhile, the latter is dominated by veterans who not only know the difference between working for a contractor and mining houses, but are also well versed about which mines are good to work for. Most of these veterans would rather be unemployed than work for contractors (Kikine and Mahula, interview 29/08/2007).

- *Retrenchments and Ex-mineworkers in Communities*

With the informalisation/casualisation of the migrant labour system, most ex-mineworkers find it difficult to adapt in communities. The most common difficulty for ex-mineworkers in their communities is the destabilisation in gender roles that has taken place in families. Traditionally, males are regarded as heads of their households. Yet, the absence of men, away in the mines in South Africa, has seen women adopting many of these traditionally 'male' prerogatives, especially in the family. The return of ex-mineworkers has often seen a disruption of family life as men try to re-assert their 'traditional' roles. This is further exacerbated by the growing employment opportunities in the textile and garment industry¹⁷, especially for women. This development was aptly described by one interviewee:

¹⁷ The textile and garment industry is one of the two major sources of employment in Lesotho, including the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). Although they provided much needed income, the LHWP and the textile and garment industry have not been enough to significantly deal with the level of unemployment in the country. Furthermore, the textile and garment industry is under pressure following the phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 2004 (Chipkin, Modisha, Simelani and Jamela, 2008).

"The tables have turned now. More and more women, mostly working in the textile industry, are becoming breadwinners in their families. We suddenly see this 'big movement' of a return to the traditional way of living characterised by an emphasis on spirituality in social relations. There is mushrooming of circumcision all over the country. The major crisis is the evidence of social disintegration in the rural areas. As almost every household is faced with financial crisis in the rural areas, it is very difficult for people to help each other. The consequences of this are that there is always tension in the community and witchcraft dominates as one of the reasons people are suffering" (Rakuane, interview 28/08/2007).

These tensions also have an impact on civil society organisations' operations in two ways. Firstly, a decrease in income to families and communities means that some NGOs' are faced with the challenge of overcoming poverty. For instance, Development for Peace and Education (DPE), which provides economic and democratic education to people in Lesotho, finds it difficult to teach people about democratic participation because people are constantly asking "how can we participate in anything you urge us to participate when we are hungry?" (Shade, interview 28/08/2007). Secondly, civil society organisations have experienced an increase in men's participation, particularly in Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). The majority of these ex-mineworkers see participation in the CBO's as a way of finding a job (Shade, interview, 28/08/2007).

- *Illness, Ex-mineworkers and their families*

The main illnesses associated with the migrant labour system are Silicosis, TB and HIV/AIDS. This is in addition to common work-related disabilities, including deafness and being paraplegic. In an article discussing the lives of mineworkers in Southern Africa, a human rights lawyer Richard Spoor describes how most migrant mineworkers arrive in mines as strong young men and leave crippled by injury and disease¹⁸. Aptly captured by Shade, it seems "patients have been substituted for income that wives and dependents of migrant workers used to get during the height of migrant labour system" (interview, 28/08/2007).

Like a piece of worn-out machinery, these ex-mineworkers have been used and left to rust. While some of them are still able to do something for a living, others are too weak to walk and just lie-down waiting to die (Spoor 2005). The majority of them have either resigned because of the disease or were dismissed based on medical incapacity to work underground. A process of claiming for compensation is a long and tedious one that most of them end up dying without getting a cent. It involves long trips to Johannesburg to wrestle with the impersonal bureaucratic machinery which involves employers, the Medical

¹⁸ Spoor, R (2005). Gold Miners Return to Lesotho to die. www.busiwp.co.za/general/print (Downloaded 01/10/2007)

Bureau for Occupational Diseases and the Compensation Commissioner for Occupational diseases (ibid.).

The challenges do not end there as wives and dependents are always faced with a bleak future after the death of an ex-mineworker. In one case, for instance, an ex-mineworker's widow narrates a story of the difficulties she faced in burying her husband in the event of death. She also indicates the difficulties she faced during the process of making a claim for the benefits due to her family. In most of the cases, it takes long time before the beneficiaries receive the monies for which they are eligible. As a result of a loss of the provident fund of mineworkers in the hands of Fidentia¹⁹, it seems most mineworkers' dependants do not receive their benefits. The most painful thing for such widows is that they rarely get any explanation as to what it is happening with the money.

In addition to this, the scourge of HIV/AIDS is making it difficult for the families of ex-mineworkers to cope in the country. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Lesotho constitutes one of the highest in the world at 28.9%²⁰. This is much higher in relation to the average of the SADC region, which is 7.5%, and it is third highest only to Swaziland and Botswana. Furthermore, the study conducted in 2004 indicates that HIV/AIDS prevalence may be higher among migrant workers than other sectors of society. This observation resonates very well with the existing stigma that migrant workers are carriers of HIV/AIDS. This is associated with the nature of international migrancy, which encourages workers to enter polygamous relationships, since workers are forced to oscillate between South Africa, where they work, and Lesotho, where their families are based (Kimaryo et al 2004). Often workers find themselves either concubines or marry a second wife in South Africa (Kikine and Mahula, interview 29/08/07).

Mozambique

Mozambique had traditionally been one of the main labour supplying countries to the South African mines. The labour agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the former Portuguese East African authorities dates back to 1897 (Wentzel 2003). The agreement was up-dated in 1928 and further in 1964. As a

¹⁹ Fidentia is a Cape Town-based financial and technology company which is entrusted with administering provident funds of mineworkers in South Africa. In February 2007, the company was put under curatorship after various financial investigators found that the company had been engaged in 'spending spree' and that there had been transference of a 'substantial sums of money' offshore. It was reported that the money belonging to about 50 000 widows and orphans of mineworkers, approximately R 1. 2 million, has disappeared (www.ihw.co.za, Downloaded 15/11/2007). In March, J. Author Brown, the executive chairperson of Fidentia, Graham Maddock, auditor of the company, were arrested on fraud and theft charges. At the time of writing, Graham Maddock was serving a seven year jail term, while Arthur Brown was still out on bail after being arrested on the 14th of August on charges of misappropriation of R4.5 million, pending further investigation on the case (www.ihw.co.za, Downloaded, 15/11/2007; www.mg.co.za, Downloaded 10/03/2008).

²⁰ These are 2003 figures (Kimaryo et al; 2004)

result of “the Tropical Labour ban” (See footnote 2), which was never dropped in 1964, mineworkers in Mozambique were traditionally from the central and Southern Provinces including Maputo, Inyambane, Gaza and Manyica (ibid.).

During the country’s independence in 1975, the Mozambique government set out to gradually phase out migration of Mozambicans to South Africa. Simultaneously, the government set up agricultural projects, co-operatives amongst them, in an attempt to absorb the labour force in the country (Brochman 1985). However, it was the implementation of Marxist-Leninist policies and the active role played by the Mozambican government in the struggle against apartheid that prompted the South African government to drastically cut the labour relationship with Mozambique. Although there was a gradual increase of mineworkers sent to South Africa following this period, 1975 marks the start of mass retrenchments in Mozambique after the sudden expulsion of about 70 000 Mozambican men from South African mines (Wentzel 2003). In 1977, the number of workers recruited by TEBA was estimated at 35 000 men (ibid.).

However, the number of Mozambican workers in South Africa had steadily increased since then. In 1986, TEBA recorded recruitment of 44 732 Mozambican mineworkers, which is an increase of approximately 20% from 1977 number (Wentzel 2003). Although there had been fluctuations, the TEBA data show that the number of Mozambican workers recruited had been stable until as recent as 2007. Indeed, the data show that changes in the nature of the migrant labour system had very little impact on the number of Mozambican workers recruited to work in South Africa (See figure 1).

According to de Vletter (1998), this can be attributed to the fact that historically Mozambicans had been the first to be allocated to jobs and the last to be laid off in mines. Historically, the argument continues, Mozambicans had been regarded as hard working, less militant and would readily accept working in harsh conditions than other mineworkers. In addition, this may be a result of long years of Mozambican government’s lobbying of South African government and mining houses to employ workers from Mozambique, which went as far as establishment of campaigns to dissuade Mozambican workers from joining trade unions (De Vletter 1998).

As it is the case with other countries, the deferred payment system was central to the livelihood and the socio-economic benefits of the country. Therefore, the phasing out of this system would have huge impact on the country and the mining communities.

- *The deferred Payment Scheme*

The deferred payment scheme in Mozambique operated differently from the one in Lesotho. As it was already shown, it was compulsory for workers to remit a certain percentage of their wages to their home country. The worker had to choose to be paid the remittances periodically, through the chosen relative or as a lump sum to be paid when he returns home. Although the compulsory deferred pay is 60%, it is estimated that Mozambican mineworkers remitted about 76% of their wages to the country (De Vletter 1998). According to Manuel Aranjo, head of the International relations in parliament, the agreement further made provision that the South African government would pay the Portuguese government in gold (Aranjo interview, 18/10/2007). Therefore, he says, the migrant labour system did not only contribute to the GNP and serve as a source of income for mineworkers' families and communities, but it also contributed to the balance of payment for the Portuguese government.

The deferred payment scheme served as the core source of livelihood in central and Southern parts of the country (De Vletter 1998). According to Mbeve (interview 18/10/2007), a community leader in Manyica province, most mineworkers were head and shoulders above their peers in communities. In comparison to others, the typical migrant mineworker has built a bigger house for his family; he could buy modern agricultural equipment such as tractors, spades, hoes, etc. Furthermore, he had a motorbike, which served almost all the transport needs of the community (Brochman 1985). In addition to taking people to and from big towns and other destinations, the motorbike was used to buy stock to be re-sold in these communities. As such, the migrant labourer could run small cafes or *Spaza shops*. Because there was a lot of cash circulating in the communities, thanks to the deferred payment system, these were lucrative business ventures for the owners.

The 1975 developments saw the stoppage of the arrangement of the payment of gold by the South African government. The termination of this bi-governmental relation, however, did not put an end to the deferred payment system (De Vletter 1998). There are estimates that mineworkers continued to defer about 60 - 76% of their wages to Mozambique (Aranjo, interview 18/10/2007). Nonetheless, the changing nature of the migrant labour system began a revolution in livelihood strategies in mining communities in the country. It also had radical implications for the culture and identity of migrant mineworkers.

- *The Changing identity of Mineworkers in Mozambique*

Mozambican nationals experienced the worst discrimination amongst migrant mineworkers in South Africa. In a survey conducted to look at Mozambican mineworkers' response to South Africa's offer of citizenship to foreigners in 1995, De Vletter (1998) shows that one of the reasons most Mozambicans did not apply

was the anti-Mozambican prejudice in South Africa, which cannot be identified for Lesotho. Aurelio Antonio Mbebe, an ex-mineworker from the Manyica district in Mozambique, suggests that this was a result of their ambivalent attitude to the anti-apartheid struggle (Mbebe, interview 18/10/2007). For them, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa was not their core business. Rather, they were in the country to work for their children back home. Hence, they had a rather limited role in activities of the labour movement (*ibid.*)²¹. This was likely exacerbated by the failure of the socialist-leaning policies in Mozambique. Marxist ideology, so important in South African trade-unions at the time, was hardly appealing to Mozambicans. Despite these political tensions it was not difficult for Mozambican mineworkers to quickly adapt to the life in mines.

Similar to experiences of other countries, the benefits of the deferred payment scheme consolidated the perception of a mineworker as the epitome of modern life in the country. He was the beacon of hope in poverty-stricken rural areas of the country. He had power to get any girl he wanted and could marry as many wives as his salary allowed. One ex-migrant mine-worker, for instance, has married four wives, three in Mozambique and one in South Africa and boast the total of 17 children (interview, Mbebe 18/10/2007).

This, however, did not happen without consequences as the spread of HIV/AIDS is now associated with ex-mineworkers and mineworkers in the country. In 2002, the national HIV prevalence rate among adults aged between 15 and 49 years was estimated at 13, 6% (National Aids Council 2004). In 2004, approximately 14.4% of the population were living with HIV/AIDS. Amongst these, women were the most affected at 60%²². According to the situational analysis of the National Aids Council, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is more concentrated in central and Southern part of Mozambique and closer to the South African border. For instance, the provinces such as Maputo (17.3), Manyica (19.0%), Gaza (16.4%) and Sofala (26.5%) have higher prevalence rate in the country. It is mainly because of this that mineworkers are one of the groups associated with the disease (*ibid.*).

According to Christina Matusse, head of the Department of Planning and Development, there is a belief in Mozambique that a number of ex-mineworkers come back from South Africa HIV positive (Matusse, interview 16/10/2007). This consolidates the stigma that migrant workers, including ex- and current mineworkers are carriers of disease in labour sending areas (Mbebe, interview 18/10/2007). Despite the wide spread stigma towards migrant workers, argues

²¹ De Vletter (1998) shows similar findings, as well.

²² The numbers here should be analysed with caution as they were derived from the weighed figures (National Aids Council, 2004).

Mbeve (interview 18/10/2007) discrimination against sick ex-mineworkers in communities is very limited because these people are still regarded as the children of the communities. Nonetheless, this does not deter youth in the country from considering mine work as a career. Mostly end up using illegal means to cross the border to South Africa²³.

In essence, the changing nature of the migrant labour system, which makes it difficult for potential workers to find employment, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other diseases including TB (Tuberculosis) leads most families to fall apart. Since most of the families are poor, observes Mbeve (interview 18/10/2007) they start selling the assets they accumulated during the period of the formal migrant labour system. Although the mining culture seems not to be as embedded as it is the case in Lesotho, this means mineworkers' identity has changed, as well. They were previously seen as the beacon of hope, but they are now associated with sickness. There is a view in communities that South African mining companies used their children and dumped them without proper incorporation into the economic life of their communities. Nonetheless, the main question of interest arising from this is the nature of the life of ex-mineworkers in communities.

- *Ex-Mineworkers in Communities*²⁴

Similar to other countries, it would be difficult for an ex-mineworker to adapt to life in his former community. As it is already highlighted in the Lesotho case, mineworkers played an important role in his family. Although it was difficult for most Mozambican mineworkers, they have adapted very well to the mine life. Given his loyalty and experiences, Mr. Mbebe does not understand why he was retrenched in the first place. As he puts it:

I have not done anything wrong to deserve retrenchment. The union was on strike because it demanded higher wages and I was retrenched because I was one of the people who were falling in the higher wage bracket. Also, it is not good that I worked in the mine for 24 years, but was given only 48 000. They say I contributed some of the money for my death! If they don't want to give me the money, they must at least give me 24 coffins and I will sell them. I'm not dead and it is my money after all. Therefore, they must give it to me. My heart is painful because it seems I've worked in the mine free of charge. All these papers from South Africa are all I'm left with (Mbebe, interview 18/10/2007).

It does not make sense for him that he only got R48 000 for working in Randfontein mine for 24 years. One of the most painful things for him is that he was not given all the money he is entitled to. For Aurelio Mbebe, the most logical

²³ See also Crush (1997)

²⁴ This section is mainly based on an interview conducted with Aurelio Mbebe, an ex-mineworker who worked in mines for 24 years and is now based in Mozambican province of Manyica.

assistance he could get from any organisation is to be re-instated to his job, as it is difficult for him to survive in Mozambique. Mr. Mbebe still keeps almost all the papers he received while working in the mine from 1977 in the hope of getting to be reinstated to his job. These include identity cards, salary advices, medical certificates, training certificates and so forth.

His tales are furthermore filled with nostalgic memories of working in mines. For instance, he explains that he recently attended a funeral of one of his fellow ex-colleagues in mines. It was amazing for him to meet some of the 'boys' who were his protégés in the mines:

It was good to discuss so many experiences we went through together in the mines. Nonetheless, I was touched to see that all these boys, who came through my hands, were still working in mines. I promise I could even do better than most of these boys. But, I think the first thing is to find out what went wrong for us to be retrenched (Mbebe, interview 18/10/2007).

Despite the difficulties faced by mineworkers such as Mbebe, there is very little happening in these communities to uplift ex-mineworkers in the wake of retrenchments. Although TEBA Development and other civil society organisations are involved some projects, including agricultural projects to assist both ex-mineworkers and widows; and home-based care for sick mineworkers, it seems to be very difficult for the majority of mineworkers to get access to such schemes. As an example, Mbebe (interview 18/10/2007) says that they once gave TEBA Development a plot of land for their projects, but their activities seem to be based on whether you are a pensioner from TEBA or not. Their projects, he further argues, are not sustainable for the benefit of the communities.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that corruption has engulfed the compensation money in Mozambique, as well. One MP alluded to the fact that

"It was also discovered, about four months ago, that some officials from agencies and the government who were working to recover the money were involved in a fraudulent network that was diverting the money. Instead of paying it to the legitimate owners, they were stealing this money....! However, the government managed to identify these people. Some of the government employees were dismissed, while the others are now being prosecuted" (Aranjo interview, 18/10/2007).

Yet, lack of funds was identified by almost all interviewed civil society organisations and government representatives as the main reason for inability to sustain most development projects in the country (Cossa, interview 15/10/2007; Lazar, interview 16/10/2007; Matsume, interview 19/10/2007; Domingos; interview 19/10/2007).

Conclusion

Studies of migrancy have long shown that labour migrancy is never a permanent phenomenon. In the Southern African context, migrancy has been associated with both colonialisation and capitalism. There seems to be a consensus that this phenomenon had not only led to the economic underdevelopment of other countries in the SADC region, but also to a creation of fuzzy class characterisation of the working class. This class is characterised by a combination of the classical Marxist proletariat and attachment to semi-feudalist subsistence farming. This is mainly seen in traditional labour sending countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique.

Using Lesotho and Mozambique as case studies, this article indicates that the formal migrant labour system in the Southern Africa has changed to the informal/casual migrant labour system. Although it is not easily documented, available evidence shows that there had been a growth of illegal and/of clandestine migrancy to South Africa. This is mainly a result of post-apartheid South Africa's strategy of internalisation and localisation of the labour market in a quest to deal with unemployment in the country. Faced with economic hardships in their home countries, coupled with the subjection to South African workplace regime and flexible workplace practices by multinational companies in these countries, majority of which are South African, most migrant workers have little choice but to return to South Africa in search of greener pastures.

The illegal migrancy is furthermore facilitated by the remembrance of the colourful migrant culture rooted in the history of the formal migrant labour system. Previously seen as the rural aristocrat and ambassadors of modern life-style in their communities, both current and former migrant workers are now seen as patients and carriers of disease. Nonetheless, the stigma does not dissuade the younger generation from seeking employment in the South African mines which is mostly the case in Lesotho, where the mining culture is more embedded in the communities, than in Mozambique.

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APENDIX 1: List of Interviews

1. LESOTHO

Participant's name	Organization	Designation	Place	Date
1. Mr Sofonia Shale	Development for Peace and Education	Co-ordinator	Maseru	28/08/2007
2. Ms Makama Masitha	SMME Network	Co-ordinator	SMME Offices, Maseru	29/08/2007
3. Sebatla Monaheng	SMME Network	Business Development Executive	SMME Offices, Maseru	29/08/2007
4. Kikine Kikine	TEBA Ltd	Regional Co-ordinator	TEBA Offices, Maseru	29/08/2007
5. Mokete Mahula	TEBA Ltd	Regional Manager	TEBA Offices, Maseru	29/08/2007
6. Lekhetho Rakuane	Parliament	Member of Parliament	MDA Offices, Maseru	28/08/2007
7. Sister Margaret Mahapang	The Centre for the Poor and the Less Privileged	Director	CPI.P Offices, Maseru	28/08/2007
8. Moloantsoa Martin Lelimo	Department of Education	Principal	Maseru High School, Maseru	29/08/2007
9. M. Ntheke	Lesotho Mounted Police Service	Senior Superintendent	Maseru Police Station	29/08/2007
10. Rev. Rapelang Mokhahlane	Lesotho Envalegic Catholic Church	Reverent	Church Offices, Maseru	30/08/2007
11. Seabata Molsamai	Lesotho Council of NGOs	Executive Director	LCN Offices	30/08/2007
12. Marks Mosoetsa	NUM	Regional Organiser	MDA Offices	31/08/2007
13. Mamokhethi Mokhine✠		Widow	TEBA Offices	31/08/2007
14. Martha Makwe✠		Widow	TEBA Offices	31/08/2007

▲Not her real name

2. MOZAMBIQUE

Participant's name	Organization	Designation	Place	Date
1. Anastacio Matsume	Sinheim (Trader Union)	Secret Provincial	Maputo	19/10/2007
2. Diogo Milagre	National Aids Council Secretariate	Deputy Executive Chief	Maputo	17/10/2007
3. Fernaldes Domingos	General Union of Cooperatives(Poultry Farmers Cooperative)	Executive Director	Maputo	19/10/2007
4. Jose M. Carimo	Teba LTD	Regional Manager	Maputo	17/10/2007
5. Angilica Mauhifue e Juue Cossa	Asociation of Kindlimuka	Secretiria/Vice President		15/10/2007
6. Zacaria Mbeve		Community Leader	Manyica	18/10/2007
7. Aurelio Antonio Mbeve		Mine-worker	Manyica	18/10/2007
8. Steven Lazar	Iris Ministries Inc. (Orphanage)	Director	Maputo	16/10/2007
9. Francisco Mandlate	Iris Ministries Inc.(Orphanage	Administrator	Maputo	16/10/2007
10. Laurencio Tualo Antaio	Assenza Baptiste de Beneficience	Pastor / Community worker	Maputo	16/10/2007
11. Elisio Nhantumbo	Ministry of Planning and Development	Official	Maputo	16/10/2007
12. Christina Matusse	Ministry of Planning and	Head of the Department	Maputo	16/10/2007

	Development			
13. Manuel Aranja	Government	Member of Parliament	Parliament, Maputo	18/10/2007