There are two remarkable photographs in this edition: Wits SRC president Nompendulo Mkhatshwa, leading a student march in the #FeesMustFall protests last year; and nearly 40 years earlier, on page 26, a photo of an unknown young woman in school uniform, leading a student march in the 1976 Soweto uprising, thereby visually linking two momentous episodes in the history of South Africa.

The focus of this edition is therefore to remember where we have come from and to see where we are today. Greg Houston recorded authentic voices of people who were there in 1976, in Soweto and in other areas. Sharlene Swartz and colleagues compare 1976 to youth activism today. We want to look beyond the unnerving overspill of anger and destruction that accompanies the tectonic shift taking place in South Africa when a generation of so-called ‘born frees’ are again fighting for access to education.

But this is putting it all too simplistically, as it is also about not experiencing the ‘freedom’ that we all like to claim. It is about historic monuments and how these symbols of colonialism and white supremacy are perceived, discussed in an article on page 32. This feeds into yet another issue, the flare-up of racist spats on social media, picked up by the mainstream media.

On racism, one tends to ask oneself: is this real? Yes and no, says our research, reflected in an article trying to make sense of race relations on pages 20 to 23. In a survey late last year, before the renewed outburst of racist spats on social media, there were signs of improved race relations. Does it mean that six months later, these gains have now been lost?

So what now? Our CEO, Professor Crain Soudien, noted at the closing of a recent HSRC dialogue on racism that we need to find new ways of understanding and creating meaning when it comes to ‘race’. We need to confront the reality of how disrespectfully African people have been – and still are – treated around the world.

This requires ‘tough self-reflection, challenging the way in which we use the colour of our skins to make inferences about our characters, intelligence or our capacities’, Soudien said. ‘We all need to find a way of saying that “I am not my outward appearance. I am not what I look like. I am not my white skin or my black skin”.

‘In confronting this and considering where we have come from historically, we need to acknowledge how difficult this is. Undoing racism requires every day work in our everyday lives. Central to this practice is an awareness of how racism works and a fundamental realisation that the fight against racism starts with an awareness of how it is insidiously inserted into the everyday.’

We have to recognise that it is not simply political correctness that we want. It is not just about being civil to each other. ‘We have to live more conscious, more knowing lives. We have to constantly seek, test, and reject evidence of the racial stereotypes on which we blindly function.’

The editor
News roundup

Tracing unemployment among graduates from Rhodes and Fort Hare universities

A poor schooling background follows students right through university and graduation, and influences their chances of finding employment, especially if they are black and female. This is one of the conclusions reached in a study by Rhodes University researchers Michael Rogan and John Reynolds.

The study formed part of the Labour Market Intelligence Partnership, a research consortium headed by the Human Sciences Research Council and funded by the Department of Higher Education and Training. It was published as a working paper, entitled ‘Schooling inequality, higher education and the labour market: evidence from a graduate trader study in the Eastern Cape, South Africa’.

The researchers interviewed a random sample of successful graduates from Rhodes University (RU) and the University of Fort Hare (UFH). Data from 469 graduates from RU and 742 from the UFH were gathered through telephonic interviews and an online survey.

One of the most striking findings of the study was the difference in unemployment rates between the two groups. The unemployment rate among Rhodes graduates was 7%, while the unemployment rate among Fort Hare graduates was almost three times as high (20%).

The risk of unemployment is significantly higher for black graduates, and in particular for black women, says Dr Michael Rogan, first author of the paper. ‘The disappointing conclusion… is that race and gender, and not achievements, appear to be consistent predictors of success in the labour market.’

Another significant link with unemployment is low income schooling, says Rogan. ‘In other words, being female and coming from a low-income school carries an extra risk of unemployment.’ He recommends that rather than addressing study choices to solve graduate unemployment, policy should focus on improving the match between these graduates and the labour market.

UKZN boasts first black woman PhD in town planning

Dr Hangwelani Hope Magidimisha, who was a PhD intern at the HSRC, is the first black woman to be awarded a doctorate in town planning at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her PhD concentrated on the persistence of spatial inequalities of service delivery in contemporary South Africa despite concerted efforts by the government to eliminate them. Specific reference is made to Vhembe District Municipality in Limpopo, which ranks among the most deprived areas in the country. Her study pointed to prevailing spatial inequalities and concludes by recommending a sphere of spatial equality model that sets in motion dynamic responses in households and bureaucrats in a bid to eliminate spatial inequality.

Source: UKZN online newsletter

New@HSRC • New@HSRC • New@HSRC

The Research Use & Impact Assessment (RIA) unit at the HSRC has made several new appointments:

Mrs Rachel Adams, a senior researcher on civil and political rights at the South African Human Rights Commission, has been appointed as a chief research specialist in the Research Use & Impact Assessment (RIA) unit.

Dr Edmore Marinda has been appointed as a research director in RIA and will head monitoring and evaluation in this unit.

Dr Stephen Rule, an independent research consultant with extensive experience in the design and management of social and industry-related surveys and data analysis throughout Africa, has been appointed as a director in RIA.

Prof Leickness Simbayi, who has a rich history within the HSRC, spanning over 15 years, has been appointed as the Deputy CEO for Research at the HSRC. He is the founding executive director of the HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB (HAST) research programme, the largest research programme in the HSRC.
e-Learning on tablet PCs has for some time been touted as the next revolution in education – a digital innovation to enhance the teaching and learning process. However, a study at a South African college showed that many students found navigating these portable electronic devices challenging and made only superficial use of the wide array of functionalities available to them – Kim Trollip.

A bitter pill: not all students ready for e-learning
In 2012, while lecturing at Rosebank College in Pretoria, Kudzanai Shambare noticed that while some of his students were tapping along on the touchscreen tablet PCs (tablets) issued to them by the college, many of them simply left the devices lying idle on their desks.

Kudzanai, a trained economist at the HSRC with an interest in social development policy, decided to team up with his brother Richard, a business management expert, to try and figure out what was stopping students using the tablets to their full potential.

The brothers used the opportunity to study a new e-learning innovation within a higher education institution (HEI) in an emerging economy setting. Their study found that, despite the inherent usefulness of mobile devices for the purposes of e-learning, some 45% of respondents spent less than an hour a day on their college-issued tablets.

Approximately 30% spent between one and three hours on the devices and only 25% used them for more than three hours a day. It appears that participants using tablets for more than three hours a day were those who had not only adopted them, but had also committed to their use as an e-learning tool.

Using mobile devices to enhance learning

Mobile devices are an increasingly ubiquitous presence in our lives. Forward-looking HEIs are working to use mobility to enhance the way their students learn and work.

By incorporating mobility into their learning strategy in the ‘right way’, it is believed that universities and colleges can multiply the benefits of e-learning by helping students to perform at higher levels.

The models that the researchers generated during the course of their study suggest that the 2012 roll-out of the tablets at the college was flawed.

When the tablets were introduced, learning materials were pre-loaded onto them electronically. Paper-based learning materials were not issued, so students’ only access to study materials was through the tablets. Two to three months into the year, a significant proportion of students expressed dissatisfaction with the new e-learning devices and many began requesting paper-based learning material. Usage rates of tablets among students steadily declined.

Overall, the adoption rate of the tablets at the HEI was much lower than expected and raised questions about the factors influencing adoption of e-learning approaches.

What went wrong?

The researchers posit that an individual will be more likely to make the effort to learn to use a new technology or innovation if, firstly, they perceive it to be useful (perceived usefulness) and if, secondly, it is easy to use (ease of use). They also looked at behavioural intention.

The study found that the level of knowledge among students about tablets was not as high as expected. Some 69% of the 344 students surveyed had no prior experience of using the devices and were only exposed to the technology once they started studying in higher education. This indicates a clear need for HEIs to provide basic training on tablets right at the start of the students’ first year and not to assume that because students are members of the ‘Google generation’ they’ve had extensive exposure to a variety of information and communication technologies (ICTs).

‘As a result of our findings, we would encourage educators, when designing e-learning programmes, to anticipate low levels of adoption in the introductory phases of the ICTs, because at this point, it is often innovators and early adopters who use the technology,’ explains Kudzanai Shambare. ‘For successful and wider integration, we would advise HEIs to organise marketing campaigns that highlight product features and
practical workshops that demonstrate their usefulness, as these are important determinants of adoption.’

**Mobile learning must be integrated into the broader learning environment**

e-Learning can be an effective way to reinforce learning experiences within the broader education context, the brothers found, but the institution rolling out the innovation must properly integrate e-learning solutions into the larger ecosystem of the higher education environment.

The tablets provided by Rosebank College were versatile, multi-purpose devices that could be used for reading pre-loaded textbooks and study notes, for information research on the Internet, for content creation (taking notes during class), and for performing many other functions.

As shown in Figure 1, 72% preferred reading study notes on tablet PCs, but only about 11% used the other applications, such as browsing the Internet, typing homework and doing research.

The Lifepad tablet PCs that were issued to students at the Rosebank College have to be linked to a wireless (WiFi) network for access to the Internet and do not support SIM cards, but the WiFi network had not yet been rolled out to students and was only available to staff. This meant that one of the key functionalities of the devices, web browsing, was not available to the students—an obvious case for better integration into the larger higher education environment.

**Factors influencing user-adoption of e-learning technologies**

Using structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques, the researchers identified the obvious and the less obvious reasons for the low uptake and concluded that the less complicated the students perceived tablets to be, the more likely they would be to find these devices useful.

The researchers found that SEM immediately piqued the interest of other researchers internationally, as it is believed to be the first time this modelling technique has been used to study the adoption of tablet PCs within the context of e-learning in South Africa. SEM is flexible and enables modelling multiple variables and accommodating multiple inputs or factors, also highlighting the relationships between these factors.

**So what now?**

Effective learning takes place when students assimilate new knowledge on an ongoing basis. Computer mediated technologies such as tablet PCs not only allow for continuous learning interactions between students and their educational content and instructors, but also deepen these interactions. The ability of tablet PCs to promote faster interchange of information among students, and between students and lecturers, makes them potentially important educational tools.

The e-learning courses themselves must obviously also be tablet-friendly.

The researchers propose that HEI management teams ensure that the usefulness of tablet PCs for e-learning purposes must be made obvious to the students; that wireless access to the Internet is provided on campus so that tablet PCs can be used for information research via the Internet; and since innovations takes time to be fully adopted, it can be assumed that over time, the use of tablet PC features will increase.

Kudzanai Shambare is optimistic that further studies, using SEM techniques, will be conducted into e-learning roll-outs to enhance the teaching and learning process at South African HEIs.

**The less complicated the students perceived tablets to be, the more likely they would be to find these devices useful.**

*Fig 1*

**Tablet PC applications used**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reading notes</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typing homework</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researching</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not used</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The graph illustrates the percentage of students that use the tablet PC for each category of use. Some used it for more than one category, as indicated in the paragraph above.
SPOTLIGHT on Matric 2015:

Is our education system failing our learners?

With the minimum pass requirements for matric down to 30% and the dwindling numbers of professionals in mathematics and science, is the school system doing enough to prepare learners for specialising in mathematics and science? – Vijay Reddy and team

South Africa’s matric pass rate took a further dip, from 75.8% in 2014 to 70.7% in 2015. While this is accompanied by some intervention to improve the numbers, the results are still a cause for concern.

The success of failure: What ‘progressed’ learners reveal about our education system

Announcing the National Senior Certificate (NSC) matric results for 2015, the Minister of Basic Education, Angie Motshekga, referred to ‘progressed learners’ who may have contributed to the decrease in the overall pass rate. This highlights the question of what a ‘progressed learner’ is and what is revealed about them by the matric results.

The Department of Basic Education (DBE) defines progression as ‘…the advancement of a learner from one grade to the next, excluding Grade R, in spite of the learner not having complied with all the promotion requirements’.

South Africa’s policy states that a learner may not spend more than four years in any particular phase and therefore may only fail one grade once. Thereafter, the learners are advanced to the next grade even if they fail to meet the promotion requirements.

Countries such as the USA and Canada also practise progression of learners, referred to as ‘social promotion’. This practice has raised concerns around the struggles faced by these progressed learners when they lack the prerequisite skills and knowledge to enable them to cope with the subject matter. Progression may lead to learners becoming despondent, frustrated and dropping out; and furthermore creates added pressure for teachers in terms of the time required to give the progressed learners extra support.

The argument for progression is based on moving learners through the schooling system. Learners who are retained run the risk of dropping out of their age cohort and ending up in a grade with much younger children, with the associated social and emotional implications.

Class of 2015 numbers

The matriculation class of 2015 showed the largest number of progressed learners since the publication of the...
policy in 2013 for the Further Education and Training (FET) phase. Of the 799 306 matric candidates, 65 671 were ‘progressed learners’.

Initial analyses of the results contradict certain of the assumptions around these learners. According to DBE, of the progressed learners who wrote the examinations, 22 060 (37.6%) passed, with 3 297 obtaining bachelor passes, 8 473 diploma passes and 10 264 higher certificate passes. Most notably, 1 081 obtained distinctions.

The link between grade repetition and knowledge and ability was investigated by David Lam, Cally Ardington and Murray Leibbrandt in a report titled ‘Schooling as a lottery: Racial differences in school advancement in urban South Africa’ (2011). Their findings include the disclosure that learning and measured performance generates higher enrolment, higher failure rates, and a weaker link between ability and grade progression. More specifically, the results suggest that grade progression in African schools is poorly linked to actual ability and learning. These results also point to a system that may be failing certain groups of South African learners.

Matric: Better or worse?

Using the 2011 to 2015 NSC results, we analysed the matric results in terms of meeting the demand for high-level scarce skills in the country – that is to access and achieve success in science, engineering, commerce, health and health-related courses and programmes at tertiary institutions. Access to these programmes depends on high quality school mathematics and science passes, with the knowledge required for these subjects being cumulative and unable to be remediated through catch-up programmes.

The mathematics and physical science performance trends, from 2011 to 2015, for those scoring above 50% and above 60% are shown below. Learners who achieved these results will make up the potential pool to study courses in the science, engineering and technology (SET) areas. It is important to consider both the actual number of learners achieving the requisite passes as well as the percentages (Figures 1 and 2).

What do these two graphs tell us? Firstly, 53 573 (20.3%) mathematics learners and

There is a shortage of professionals in the science, engineering, medicine and commerce sectors, and with only 30 000 students potentially accessing these areas, the graduate output in three or four years will not adequately alleviate our skills shortage.
42 502 (22%) physical science learners passed with a score higher than 50%. Almost half of these learners achieved above 60%, with just over 31 000 (12%) mathematics learners and close to 24 000 (12.8%) physical science learners achieving a score higher than 60%.

Secondly, there was a steady increase in numbers and percentages of learners achieving scores above 50%, from 2011 to 2013. These figures dropped in 2014 with a slight improvement in 2015 – although not to the 2013 levels. Thirdly, while the country boasts a high number of bachelor passes (166 263 in 2015), the pool of students with mathematics passes that meet university criteria to access the SET and health-related courses is only around 30 000.

Conclusion
In South Africa, the jury is still out on the value of progressing learners at the FET phase of schooling. It seems that what is needed is an understanding of what “passing” actually means and, importantly, the factors that influence whether a learner passes or not.

In addition, with the DBE’s focus shifting to a differentiated education system rather than the mainstream academic system, the policy of progressing learners may need to be reviewed, as learners who do not meet the requirement for progressing along the academic path may be pushed into the technical and vocational education streams.

There is a shortage of professionals in the science, engineering, medicine and commerce sectors, and with only 30 000 students potentially accessing these areas, the graduate output in three or four years will not adequately alleviate our skills shortage.

Authors:
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This article is based on the TIMSS SA newsletter, Volume 1 Issue 7, which can be downloaded from http://www.timss-sa.org.za.
The interplay between race and class, especially due to the legacy of apartheid, has long been acknowledged.

Houghton, Johannesburg: A scene from the exclusive English-speaking King Edward private school.
Credit: David Turnley/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images

Hoedspruit, 17 April 2015: A school near the Kruger National Park, which was built with international funds.
Credit: Lucarelli Temistocle/Shutterstock
**Class over race: new barriers to social inclusion**

The new year got off to an explosive start when racist comments posted by Penny Sparrow and others on Facebook were widely circulated on both social and mainstream media, with the ensuing wide-ranging responses in both public and private spaces. This incident has again brought to the forefront unresolved questions relating to race, racism and race relations in South Africa – **Kate Surmon, Andrea Juan and Vijay Reddy**

In South Africa, approximately 24% of the population have active social media accounts, with 13 million Facebook users. The availability of social media and ease of access to news reports has enabled the emphasis on racism and division to escalate, exposing the public to certain rhetoric which influences the mood of the country.

Reporters and active commentators on social media form a distinct group which may not be representative of the attitudes of the general South African public. This has prompted us to examine the attitudes of the South African public in the light of the results from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a nationally representative household survey administered annually to track societal values over time.

We focused specifically on the views around inclusion in schools of children of different races and socioeconomic groups. To gain insight into attitudes towards racial and class inclusion respondents to SASAS were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the following two questions:

1. Should children of different races be educated together?
2. Should children of the economically well-off and the poor be educated together?

The interplay between race and class, especially due to the legacy of apartheid, has long been acknowledged; we thus expected that the attitudes toward race and class inclusion would mirror each other. It was also important to investigate whether and how attitudes have changed over time. The trend findings from 2003 to 2014 in relation to the two questions are represented in Figures 1, 2 and 3.

One of the most interesting findings is that there has been a positive change in attitudes towards racial integration in...
schools over time, but that the attitudes towards class integration have been less positive and have not improved during this period.

In 2003, 85% of South Africans agreed that children of different races should be educated together, and by 2014 this figure had risen to 91%. A considerably lower percentage of the population were in support of integration based on class, with 77% of the sample agreeing that children of the economically well-off and the poor should be educated together.

By examining the responses of specific groups we are better able to unpack the results. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the responses of different groups to the above two questions.

When looking at educational achievement it is particularly striking that those with a higher level of education are less supportive of inclusion based on race and class than those with a lower education level, as highly educated people would be expected to exhibit more liberal attitudes.

Furthermore, in terms of age groups, the older respondents have less inclusive attitudes than the younger age groups.

When considering living standards – a proxy for socio-economic status – those in the ‘high’ group exhibit the lowest percentage of agreement. It is also interesting to note that both those in the ‘low’, as well as the ‘high’ living standard groups express a lower level of support for class integration.

Of particular interest are the responses of the different population groups. Figure 2 shows that the positive
attitudes of white and coloured participants have increased dramatically from 53% to 71% and 77% to 95% respectively from 2003 to 2014. Although the percentages for black and Indian/Asian groups have increased slightly, their attitudes have remained comparatively stable. The white group, at 71% in 2014, remains the group with the least inclusive attitude.

Attitudes to class integration
Regarding the attitudes towards educating children from different socioeconomic backgrounds together (Figure 3), the black and white groups have remained fairly stable at approximately 80% and 64% respectively, while the percentage of Indian/Asian people has slightly declined from 86% in 2003 to 80% in 2014. The percentage for the coloured population has increased substantially from 64% in 2003 to 80% in 2014. It is noteworthy that white respondents were the least supportive of social inclusion in schools based on socioeconomic status.

Explaining the differences in responses
It was somewhat surprising that the responses to the two questions did not mirror each other as expected. Due to the lack of qualitative data, we propose three possible explanations to stimulate debate around this finding.

Political correctness
Racism and race relations have received considerable attention since 1994. Since the inception of democracy in 1994 people have been aware of being ‘politically correct’ and needing to display antiracist attitudes so as to avoid the ‘racist’ label. People may therefore respond positively to the question of racial inclusion in schools, not because they genuinely hold this view, but rather because it is the socially desirable answer. The argument then could be that the question on class inclusion reveals more truthful attitudinal responses as it is easier to answer questions based on assets rather than human characteristics.

Changing social identity
Over the years, class divisions have become more marked and income inequality has increased both within and between racial groups. Therefore, a possible explanation may be that people are not basing their social identity on race, but rather on class. According to Social Identity Theory, these groups are important sources of pride and self-esteem, and give us a sense of belonging. People thus attempt to preserve their group identity by ensuring division based on class lines. This allows categorisation into ‘them’ and ‘us’, and provides justification for segregation based on class.

Maintaining the status quo
Another theory that could explain the finding is Systems Justification, which states that people like to preserve things as they are, and therefore tend to defend or rationalise existing social and economic arrangements. From this perspective, the findings may reflect the belief that the system, which endorses class inequality, is justified.

Going forward, the issue of social integration based on class, and the difference between the attitudes toward racial and class integration should be interrogated. The goal should be to better understand these public attitudes so that we can begin to effect change and aim to increase support for social integration in schools and expel perceived class divisions.

Furthermore, findings such as these that reflect somewhat positive trends in attitudes toward racial inclusion can be used to raise the country’s morale, especially at a time when issues around race are seen to be causing divisions among South Africans.

Authors: Kate Surmon, junior researcher, Education and Skills Development (ESD), HSRC; Dr Andrea Juan, research specialist, ESD; Dr Vijay Reddy, executive director, ESD.
Students scatter in Orlando as they run from police during the Soweto riots. Circa June 1976.

Credit: ©Times Media
REMEMBERING
1976:
the Soweto uprising
and beyond

Recollections of people who lived through the 1976 Soweto uprising both there and elsewhere provide more authentic insights than those of outside observers. The authors draw vignettes from interviews with struggle veterans conducted in 2013 by an HSRC research team and external researchers for a research project commissioned by the National Heritage Council. Recollections exactly as told – Greg Houston, Mojalefa Dipholo and Nedson Pophiwa

Siphehile Zulu, a young school student in Durban in 1976: June 16, it is just quite clear where it came from because there was no other organisation around at that moment; it was the Black Consciousness Movement. In Beatrice Street in Durban, that is where the SASO/BPC [South African Students’ Organisation and the Black People’s Convention] offices were. When I was a young boy, my uncle who was a pastor, lived in Beatrice Street. So I ended up as a young boy interacting with these people. I would see this tall man, that is, Steve Biko. And there was the short one, Aubrey Mokoape. Before the uprising started I would go there and I would hear them say: ‘On June 16 there is going to be something big that we are organising as an organisation.’ Soweto was going to be the start. And then from Soweto it was going to go to all other parts of the country. So it was really organised. It was not just

June 16, it is just quite clear where it came from because there was no other organisation around at that moment; it was the Black Consciousness Movement.

Siphehile Zulu
spontaneous. You can’t just say: ‘All of you wake up and come to such a place to take part in a march’. That’s impossible. Somebody must have been organising it.

The idea was to bring about change as from June 16 onwards; to make sure that everybody was against Afrikaans being pushed down our throats. That was the rallying point... the apartheid regime made a mistake. They gave us something to rally ourselves around.

Mauppasant Mochele, a young student at Morris Isaacson High School in 1976: I grew up in Dube Village, Soweto, and went to school at Morris Isaacson High School, which was at the centre of the June 1976 student protests... I didn’t belong to any organisation. I was not an activist initially, but I grew up in an area where there were so many things that linked you with the struggle. First of all, it was where many of the previous struggles of the 1960s happened. A number of leaders that had been arrested were from the neighbourhood. We stayed a walking distance from where Mandela used to stay.

As young people we did not know anything about the struggle. What we knew was that we were staying in Soweto. Growing up in that environment meant that people never spoke about certain things… In school there were a lot of things that affected us in terms of what the regime was trying to do. All of a sudden there was this threat of changing subjects to Afrikaans as the official language. The subject itself was a very beautiful language... but as soon as they wanted to change to teaching subjects such as Biology in Afrikaans it became problematic. The issue was bringing about such drastic changes whilst we were in matric. The teachers were also not in favour of it, because they had to undergo retraining at their own expense.

The whole thing began at Morris Isaacson High School. The march grew in size as students joined from other areas. Soon the police arrived, and started shooting the students. Many dispersed, and many were shot and killed. There was chaos in Mfolo, Naledi, Meadowlands, Dube and many other areas in Soweto.

The entire township was supporting us at the time. They offered us water for the teargas, and fat cakes and other refreshments. Journalists were involved as well, reporting on the situation. Some even hid Tsietsi Mashinini and other student leaders... But over time there was a period where there was a lull. However, the soldiers were constantly present. They actually occupied the school premises and were monitoring everything. They were micro managing the principal of Morris Isaacson, Lekgau Mathabathe. He was very supportive of the struggle, and was detained several times.

All of a sudden there was this threat of changing subjects to Afrikaans as the official language. The subject itself was a very beautiful language... but as soon as they wanted to change to teaching subjects such as Biology in Afrikaans it became problematic.

Mauppasant Mochele
The lifeless bodies of those who had been shot were thrown into the trucks. They shot... Wandile in the elbow and threw him into the truck... Wandile died from bleeding and the piles of bodies being thrown on him.

Mafison ‘Murphy’ Morobe

I think the church environment and its notions of justice that we picked up from the stories [in] the Bible and the parallels that you grew up to see…. There were others like Reverend Castro Mayathula, Dean Farisani [and] Frank Chikane who were now beginning to come in from the Black Theology perspective.

Paddy Kearney, head of Diakonia in Durban in 1976: When the Soweto uprising took place there was a meeting actions, combined with the police and the army. Inkatha was very much against those boycotts.

Mafison ‘Murphy’ Morobe, a leading figure during the uprising and deputy chair of the Soweto Students Representative Council, who led the uprising in 1976. I had to read the Bible a lot. And later on I would understand the church that I belong to and its role in the history of our country; the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the AME Church. One of the fascinating things was that [my uncle, who was a preacher] preached the sermon in Afrikaans. So, my early exposure to the language was

Soldiers used to come into the township in a two-coach train and shoot people. The soldiers would wake you up in the wee hours of the morning to interrogate you. On one occasion the TIPA trucks that remove rubble came into the township. Suddenly soldiers appeared on those trucks, and started shooting at everybody, including young kids. The lifeless bodies of those who had been shot were thrown into the trucks. They shot this guy Wandile in the elbow and threw him into the truck. That’s when the killing spree escalated. They ultimately killed about 600 people, loading them into the trucks afterwards. Once in, you could never come back out again. If you raised your head, they would shoot you back inside. So you laid there, and they threw piles of bodies on top of you until you eventually died. So Wandile died from bleeding and the piles of bodies being thrown on him.

The one thing that irritated us the most were the bottle stores and drinking places which were found everywhere in the township. We eventually burned these down. We also took out the liquor and smashed it. We did this because we were seeing them as things that were affecting our daily lives, most importantly our parents who grew fond of drinking.不幸地，Dube 图书馆也被烧毁…

When we identified shortcomings in our plight, we knew that we needed something more, such as our own weapons. That’s when the idea of moving into exile came to the fore... After witnessing the massacre and bloodshed, there was no turning back. So we began searching for routes to exit the country. A guy by the name of Zion Vuyane came to us. He was not a revolutionary. He was more a ‘skollie’ than anything else. And he said: ‘Guys, what do you think about skipping the country?’ That was happening all over the place... Nobody said: ‘I belong to this organisation’. Finally we left for Botswana.

Ela Gandhi, executive member of the Natal Indian Congress in 1976:

Although we didn’t have Afrikaans here in Durban, the students here also went on massive boycotts... there was also support from teachers and parents in many of the Indian schools; very clandestinely by teachers because they could have been fired. They did not call in the police or warlords as was the case in the townships of KwaZulu, which resulted in unprecedented violence. Whereas when you look at KwaMashu and other townships the support that was there from progressive people was overshadowed by Inkatha’s violent actions.

at the SASO office in the Beatrice Street Congregational Church chaired by Fatima Meer. And she was saying to Manas Buthelezi over the phone: ‘Manas, you’ve got to bring what’s happening in Soweto to Natal’. And she organised the big protest meeting in Curries Fountain sports stadium. It was banned. And then she was banned.

Paddy Kearney, head of Diakonia in Durban in 1976: When the Soweto uprising took place there was a meeting...
lingua franca at home and also in the townships. The issue for me was not really so much the question of Afrikaans as a language in itself, but as more a function of a political aspect associated with the enforced utilisation of Afrikaans at schools.

In the late ‘60s I did pick up stuff about the Black Consciousness Movement… I often get asked: ‘Was there something that prompted you to be political?’ I just can’t place my finger on any one thing because there isn’t really any one thing. I suppose it’s just the environment as it was, the friends that I had, and my interest in books and my inquisitiveness, and perhaps I think the church environment and its notions of justice that we picked up from the stories [in] the Bible and the parallels that you grew up to see…. There were others like Reverend Castro Mayathula, Dean Farisani [and] Frank Chikane who were now beginning to come in from the Black Theology perspective. They sought to bring relevance to theology as it was preached to us and introduced to it a dimension that would make it relevant to the issues that we were raising with the Student Christian Movement of the time – that we can’t allow ourselves to continue to be focused on to the Bible. Our view was – and I think it was the correct view – that the Bible was being used by our oppressors to mollycoddle the masses and to keep us from sin beyond just the platitudes they wanted, the deeds that they were visiting upon us. And hence it was easy for us to find common cause with the Black Theology perspective, because then in that sense we had priests who spoke our language, the language of our own feelings, of our people, in a much more relevant sort of way.

And it was really in 1973/74 that I became slowly to be exposed to the ideas of the African National Congress, mainly through Radio Freedom, when some of us used to have shortwave radios and we would invite each other to come around to listen to Radio Freedom in the evenings.

Madoda Daki, matric student in Cape Town in 1976: In 1976 I was still doing my Matric when the Soweto uprising started. If I remember well, Jimmy Kruger said it could never happen in Cape Town or something like that. And we took it as an insult… I remember it was cloudy and cold that Wednesday, the 11th August 1976. Students from primary schools in Nyanga East and Sizamile came to our school. The nuns actually encouraged us to go out and join them before getting into their cars and leaving the school. So that was the beginning of our uprising. And as we were moving on this street next to the forest that we used to call Lovers Lane, the police came with teargas and dispersed us.
We would go and stone cars and burn things. People started disappearing… it was known that they had left the country.

Madoda Daki

We dispersed, but gathered again. And we then heard that some students had already been arrested and held at Guguletu Police Station. So we marched to Guguletu Police Station. When we were standing in the area that is now Malungu Park, the police were on one side and we were on the other. They were shooting teargas at us, but the wind was blowing the teargas back to them. It was becoming a bit of a farce.

I do not think any single organisation organised the uprising. But there were all sorts of slogans. ‘Africa for Africans’; ‘Izwi lebo; ‘Andela’. And we were also singing the song ‘Sowmni Na’. That was the song we sang on the 11th of August.

After the police had promised to release the arrested students, we dispersed. But the police then attacked. The students then started burning down government installations like the rent offices; stoning anything that represented officialdom… That Wednesday evening the lights were off in the township, and it was scary because there was shooting all over. You only heard gunshots. And it was obvious that the shots were not coming from our side because it was machine gunfire. From that moment one felt that there really was no turning back. The next day, although nobody had called a stay-away everyone stayed away from work. There was looting; people taking liquor from bottle stores. There was a heavy police presence, and the police were dressed in camouflage uniform. That was the first time I saw the riot squad. There was also this red Valiant with four white policemen or soldiers. The driver was driving with one hand and all the four windows had rifles pointed out shooting at anything that moved.

The Thursday, people were telling stories of people dying. Now we were isolated. We decided to boycott school until freedom came because we were convinced that it was not going to take more than six months. But there was not much of a direction. We would go and stone cars and burn things. People started disappearing. After that everybody wanted to leave the country. Later that year, or early in 1977, Abe Mgwshe, Tony Yengeni, Boy James and others disappeared. And it was known that they had left the country.

Temba Nolutshungu, activist based in Cape Town linked to the Black Consciousness Movement in 1976: I organised a meeting of the Black Mamba Youth Movement, and included people who were not involved in politics. We sent out pamphlets …throughout Langa Township, and we said: ‘We are going to have a solidarity meeting to discuss what we could do for the people of Soweto’. This meeting took place in one of the committee rooms of the Langa Civic Hall. About 30 people turned up. I was chairing that meeting and said: ‘We must think in terms of how we can assist the people in Soweto. Maybe we could organise funding to send to the people to help them’.

Bongani ‘Days’ Gqiba stood up and said: ‘No Temba. This is all nonsense what you are talking about now. Our people are dying and you are talking about us organising food parcels and some funding and sending stuff over there. Let us strike here as well’. From that moment it was quite clear. No way could they be talked into doing something more moderate, and not confrontational.

From that moment on we organised petrol bombs and hid them in various parts of the townships. But we did not actually confront any structures or institutions in the townships that were manifestations of the apartheid system. We just waited. And then there was a meeting of the students at Langa High School. I was in Mowbray when I heard that the students had marched out of Langa High School. One of them, Xolile Mosi, was shot dead. I just dropped everything. And I was looking for everyone who had also in turn been looking for me, and for everyone else who had been at that meeting at the Langa Civic Hall. Everyone said: ‘Now it has started. This is it’. And from that point onwards, it was petrol bombs targeting beer halls and institutions that were an extension of the apartheid structures.

In the Western Cape you had the Africans, coloureds and the Indians and some whites. Those white students that were involved were right at the centre of the uprising. This had to do with the fact that we had the BCM and there were people like Steve Carolus, Jean and Ballo Naidoo, and their children. There were so many people that were involved. This explains why in the Western Cape the uprising continued for a much longer period than in other parts of the country. What did not make sense to the government is that you had the Africans side by side with the coloureds and Indians. For them it was something unthinkable. About two years after the Soweto uprising in Cape Town, I said to myself: ‘This must be the beginning of the end of apartheid. If you had this broad support by people that you thought had no interest in politics, how is the government going to put an end to this?’

In the Western Cape you had the Africans, coloureds and the Indians and some whites. Those white students that were involved were right at the centre of the uprising.

Temba Nolutshungu
Dr Mongezi Guma, a young priest in Cape Town in 1976: [I got] sucked in bit by bit because people had to be buried. So you go and bury this one, and you bury that one. But that begins to expose you to the students. And the situation itself begins to escalate beyond just a small skirmish in that corner. Other things begin to happen. There is disruption of schools. The students then ask you to mediate on their behalf when they are talking to the education department. And in December 1976, there was internecine violence in Nyanga. It was called the Black Christmas. This occurred literally at the doorstep of the church; all those people whose houses were burnt. There were also an increasing number of cases that came up in terms of the students. I then felt that we needed to contact some people who would be able to help us pay for the legal fees, refugees, funerals, etc. This is where the International Defence and Aid Fund came in.

Ann Tomlinson, an activist in the Churches Urban Planning Commission (CUPC) based in Cape Town in 1976: CUPC also played a pivotal role during the 1976 uprisings in the Western Cape. We used the networks of CUPC to get people who were injured to the hospitals and doctors so that they don't get arrested. We used to take them to the Christian Institute. Moira Henderson had an office in the yard of the Christian Institute and helped the detainees centre. We took young people who were detained and needed legal help to Dullah Omar, a lawyer in Woodstock. We also used the CUPC kombi and car to take families to Victor Verster or Pollsmoor or whichever prison where people were detained. Because many of the parents of the young people that were arrested didn't understand what was going on, we would support them and explain to them where their children were, and that we were getting lawyers to help them. We used the CUPC kombi so parents didn't have to pay extra money. I personally drove that blue kombi many times from Hanover Park to Wellington, Victor Verster, and back.

And I personally saw shootings happen in Hanover Park. I saw a man at the terminus apparently on his way home from working night shift. It was midday, and the police shot him. It was shattering to see that. I saw a young boy in a group chasing after a Snowflake van that was delivering flour being shot in the stomach. And you couldn't go and help because the police took him. And I kind of wondered what they were going to do with him. That child should have been taken by an ambulance. But the police were the first there. So you couldn't go nearby. I saw how the rent office in Hanover Park was stoned. And you get amazed at the feelings of people when they throw stones; all the people's frustrations were vented against these places of oppression.

Lumko Huna, a young activist in Cape Town in 1976: My involvement in the ANC intensified after 1976 because the programme was to use this opportunity to take some of these guys who were involved and bring them into the fold... Comrade Mountain Qumbela and other people said: ‘We need to recruit some of these young guys into the underground cells’. Now that was my main task because I was young. So I could easily speak to the young guys... I started meeting with Norman and Tony Yengeni. So I started speaking to them about the ANC. We started meeting at Mr Yengeni’s house in NY1 in a shack at the back. I would tell them about the ANC and give them some of the books. In this one book there was a diagram with steps on how to make a petrol bomb... I started recruiting young guys to join the movement in 1976. I had to tell some of our guys that the ANC had an armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. So: ‘Find guys who are interested in leaving the country’. At that time I was working with Fumani Gqiba. We started recruiting and sending guys out of the country. And we were meeting with comrades who were sent by the ANC from outside the country. We took people out through Lesotho.

Reverend Dean Farisani, leading anti-apartheid activist in Makhado in the 1970s: We started, I remember, the first branch of the Black People’s Convention here. And the message spread. We went to business people, to students, to whomever! And we fought against, among other things, Bantu Education. So, by the time 1976 happened there was hardly any school here that we did not go to address and encourage young people to actually resist. It was not only in Venda. I went to the then Cape Province, to Natal, to the whole of the Transvaal, what is called Gauteng now. We addressed meetings at Regina Mundu, at the DOCC, at universities, at Wilgespruit. We went to the Free State and encouraged people to join the liberation struggle.
Now when 1976 came, people who needed to leave would come to me. And we would assist them to cross the border. Some would cross the border and go to Mozambique. And while there, the ANC wanted to know their credentials. Are you a spy or not a spy? So then they would find ways to communicate with me. And I would write to confirm that that is a genuine comrade. ‘Feel free to accept him.’

Dathini Gwili, a young student in Tlokwe:

In 1976, most of us students at Tlokwe High School were not politically involved. But then what happened in June 1976 in Soweto affected us. That is when those guys from Soweto went all over the country. And they came here to politicise us in Tlokwe. That’s when my political career began. At the time there were no student organisations. There was a lull at the school then. But when those guys came in here they taught us how to organise ourselves into student bodies. That is when we became loosely organised under the leadership of the Student Representative Council (SRC). But it was not so strong. And a few years later we formed the Ikageng Youth Congress.

Authors: Dr Greg Houston, chief research specialist, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme, HSRC; Mojalefa Dipholo, master’s intern, DGSD; Nedson Phopiwa, chief researcher, DGSD.

The interviews were conducted by Dr Gregory Houston, chief research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme, HSRC; Dineo Seabe, Kombi Sausi, Mike Saneka, Hangwelani Magidimisha, Mojalefa Dipholo, Nedson Phopiwa, Shepi Mati, and Bernard Mbenga, all DGSD.
The longer walk to freedom:
MAKING SENSE OF RACE RELATIONS

There is much unfinished business in post-apartheid South Africa. Over the past year, a series of racist and bigoted outbursts on social media have generated widespread public debate about the state of race relations and social cohesion in the country. An HSRC team considers the trends in attitudes towards race relations, issues of trust, feelings of marginalisation and optimism.
These debates include the nature of free speech and hate speech, the difference between personal incidents of racism and the systems, structures and institutions that keep racism and racial inequalities in place. A series of student protests has also drawn attention to economic inequality, the slow pace of transformation in general, and institutionalised racism in society and on university campuses.

Against the picture emerging from social media of acute racial animosity in the country, we considered the trends in attitudes towards race relations over a number of years based on data from the HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) series.

The results suggest that there is general recognition of steadily improving race relations, particularly among black African adults. However, feelings of inter-racial dislike and mistrust persist at consistently high levels. Besides providing a measure of the improvement or deterioration of race relations, the data’s value lies in the fact that as well as giving us a more balanced national picture, it also points to the permeation and breadth of the ‘race relations’ problem.

The HSRC has conducted SASAS on an annual basis since 2003. The survey series consists of nationally representative samples of South African adults aged 16 and older, living in private households. The authors examined SASAS data from recent rounds of the survey series to understand how perceptions of race relations have changed in South Africa from 2003 to 2015. The survey sample ranged between 2 500 and 3 300 participants.

**Perceived changes in race relations**

Contrary to public sentiment, many in the country feel that race relations have been improving. Since 2008, participants in SASAS have been asked if they felt that race relations in the country had improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated in the last year (Figure 1).

In 2015, 51% of South Africans indicated that race relations have improved, 36% indicated that they have remained unchanged, and only 13% felt they had deteriorated. These results are similar to what was observed in most rounds of SASAS since 2008. Looking at Figure 1, we can see that only the 2010 results show a marked difference, probably due to the euphoric effect of the FIFA World Cup.

When asked about perceived changes in the nature of race relations since 1994, two-thirds (66%) of those participating in the 2015 SASAS round responded that relations had improved, compared to 22% who were neutral and 11% who believed they had worsened. The average across the full 2003-2015 period based on this measure is virtually identical.

**Who is optimistic about racial relations?**

There is significant optimism among black African adults about race relations in South Africa. Less than a tenth of black African adults (7%) felt that race relations in the country had worsened between late 2014 and 2015, while 55% reported improvements and 36% saw no discernible difference.

Black African youth were even more optimistic, with 71% of those aged 16-24 years expressing the view that race relations had improved since the end of apartheid and 56% reporting improvements since 2014. Somewhat more unexpected, a class gradient is evident among black African adults, where those with high living standards are moderately inclined to be pessimistic about race relations relative to those with low living standards.

In contrast to black adults, white and Indian adults were found to be less optimistic about race relations. Two-fifths (40%) of white adults felt race relations had worsened since 2014 and roughly a third (34%) thought race relations had worsened since 1994. Similarly, about a third (32%) of Indian adults believed race relations had worsened between 2014 and 2015.

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**Changes in race relations in the last year, 2008 – 2015 (%)**

*In the last year, do you think that race relations in the country have improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse?*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Stayed same</th>
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while nearly a third (30%) thought that relations had deteriorated during the post-apartheid period. Among these racial minorities, the youth on average tended to voice more confidence about progress in race relations compared to older generations.

**Feelings of racial marginalisation**

While a general sense of improved race relations has emerged post-democracy, many South Africans express concern that their racial group’s position – economically, politically and culturally – is under threat from other groups (Figure 2).

In 2015, 61% of the population thought that people of other race groups were trying to get ahead economically at the expense of their own group. More than half (59%) thought that people of other race groups were excluding members of their own group from positions of power and responsibility. Finally, almost half (53%) believed that the traditions and values that are important to people of their race group are under threat because of the influence of other races. These figures are not appreciably different from those reported in the 2010 round of the survey series, and indeed the other four annual rounds of interviewing in between. Fears of marginalisation are shared by all race groups in South Africa, with a majority in each group expressing concerns about the marginalisation of their own group. This is evident from the fact that there is only a 4 to 8 percentage point difference between race groups for each of the three measures presented in Figure 2. Given how widespread these beliefs are, it is perhaps not surprising to learn in 2015 that more than half (53%) of all adult South Africans felt that other race groups will never understand what members of their group are like.

**Can people of other races be trusted?**

Trust is central to an individual’s ability to form social relationships and reject harmful stereotypes. It is also a commonly used measure of social cohesion. Since 2003 SASAS respondents have been asked their level of agreement with the statement ‘People of different racial groups do not really trust each other’ (see Figure 3). In 2003 nearly three-quarters (72%) agreed with this statement, with the figure remaining relatively stable until 2007, when levels of agreement began to decline gradually.

...to individualise and criminalise [racism], we ignore longer and wider trends that are pointing us elsewhere...our work must happen at the levels of individuals and groups but must also address the systems, structures and institutions that keep racism and racial inequalities in place.
Trust is central to an individual’s ability to form social relationships and reject harmful stereotypes.

In 2011, it fell to below two-thirds (64%) of the general public. Since 2011, public agreement with the statement began rising again, reaching 69% of the adult public in late 2015.

In addition, respondents to each round of SASAS since 2003 have been asked to register the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement ‘People of different racial groups will never really trust each other’. At the time of the first round of interviewing in 2003, three-fifths (60%) of the adult public agreed with this statement. Since 2003, there have been only modest variations, with total agreement ranging between 51% and 60% over the period, and standing at 55% in 2015. This pattern suggests fairly broad-based scepticism about the future of race relations in the country.

Conclusion

The SASAS series points to widespread recognition of improvements in race relations on a year-on-year basis since 1994. However, a considerable proportion of South Africans continue to feel threatened by other race groups and believe there to be limited interpersonal trust across racial lines. This raises a question about the kind of national conversation we seem to be having (in response to racist Facebook and Twitter posts), which tends to individualise and criminalise singular acts of racism. Yet if racial mistrust and dislike are as prevalent, consistent and widespread among South Africans as the data suggests, then we need to begin the conversation with the recognition that this burdens, shapes and constrains everyday interactions in a myriad of difficult and complicated ways (of which social media outbursts are simply a small indication).

The data, we suggest, should be used as the starting point; not necessarily to insist that there has in fact been an improvement in race relations or that there is room for optimism and hope (which there is), but rather to use the sobering survey figures as the basis for encouraging deeper understandings between groups about where we are, what it means to be here, and why we are where we are.

As the country prepares to welcome a new bill on hate speech in an attempt to curb racist language, the SASAS data can perhaps act as a valuable reminder that to individualise and criminalise, we ignore longer and wider trends that are pointing us elsewhere. They point us to the fault lines of social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa and remind us that our work must happen at the levels of individuals and groups but must also address the systems, structures and institutions that keep racism and racial inequalities in place.

Authors: Benjamin Roberts and Jarè Struwig, SASAS coordinators; Steven Gordon, PhD researcher, HSRC’s Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme; Heidi van Rooyen, executive director, Human and Social Development research programme (HSD), HSRC; Sarah Chiumbu, Molemo Ramphalile and Safiyya Goga, all HSD.
OUT LOUD:
poetry, youth voices and social change

Away from the media limelight and academic attention, black urban youth had long been in dialogue on a range of important social, economic and political issues through the Spoken Word movement. In Gauteng it focuses largely on the themes of race, politics, gender, sexuality and religion, declares – Ragi Bashonga

The Spoken Word movement addresses social ills as they affect and are perceived by the youth, and can be understood as a new form of liberation politics employed to serve a social function. A new study, ‘Selling narratives: An ethnography study of the Spoken Word movement in Johannesburg and Pretoria,’ portrays this genre as being more than mere performance or self-expression; it is effective in foregrounding and politicising the lived experiences of young artists and their communities.

Spoken Word poetry
Popular in the USA and in South Africa, Spoken Word poetry is an international informal poetry movement that is largely dominated by youth groups typically from ethnic or social minority groups.

As a form of performance poetry, this art form encompasses elements of traditional oral poetry, underground USA hip hop, musicality and theatre.

The poetry is most often memorised and performed on stage to a live audience, narrating the experiences of young people and their communities.

From politics to poetry: a Biko-nian legacy
Steve Biko’s ideology of Black Consciousness is known for its contribution to fostering positive black identities. The movement was also influential in using art, poetry, and theatre to imagine a utopian, pre-colonial past and give hope for the return of such a future.

Johannesburg’s current Spoken Word scene blazes with colour: African textile print clothing and politically messaged T-shirts allude to ascription to a state of ‘consciousness’. Literary scholar D’Abdon suggests that the messages and ideologies of Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness, as displayed in the chosen style of dress, continue to be reflected in the narratives of the present day Spoken Word movement in South Africa.

With a predominantly black demographic, race continues to be seen as a powerful feature in the narratives presented. Apart from the fact that the country’s population demographic is predominantly young and black, in South Africa, race cannot be divorced from issues raised in the poetry such as inequality, violence, and political neglect.

In the absence of meaningful dialogue across racial lines, it is further postulated that these racial narratives not only produce, but to a certain extent also sustain racial spaces. Nonetheless, more than merely an exclusionary practice that militates against members of other race groups, black poetry circles foster solidarity among a population group that continues to experience both macro and micro-aggressions in the new South Africa, as illustrated in the following extract:
The Spoken Word poetry movement is a safe space in which to express and share their frustrations...linked to continued racial subjugation.

Author: Ragi Bashonga, PhD research intern, Research Use and Impact Assessment unit, HSRC.
Six student leaders participated in a public conversation at the HSRC on how youth educational activism has changed since the Soweto student uprising in 1976, and their vision for future change and activism. The conversation took place a few months after various student movements such as #RhodesMustFall, #TransformWits, and #OpenStellenbosch captured South Africa’s attention and three months before the start of the nationwide #FeesMustFall and #EndOutsourcing national student campaigns – Sharlene Swartz, Alude Mahali and Sarah Chiumbe
Youth (educational) activism: then and NOW

The six student leaders were UCT public policy honours student Kgotsi Chikane, National President of InkuluFreeheid and one of the leaders of Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) and subsequently Fees Must Fall; Wits politics master’s student Simamkele Dlakavu, a leader from #TransformWits; UCT African studies honours student Jessica Breakey, a former student representative council (SRC) member, one of the leaders of the White Privilege Project; Petunia Mpoza from the Progressive Youth Alliance; and SRC member at Wits; Simphiwe Dubazana, a member of the UNISA SRC, and Bheka Ntuli, a member of the Democratic Alliance Students Organisation (DASO), Mangosuthu University of Technology. The answers that follow are direct quotations from their discussions.

How has youth activism changed since Soweto 1976?

Everything has changed – it’s now about the curriculum, African history and access for the marginalised.

Simamkele (Wits): Our struggle is not just for freedom in general, but against a political and economic status quo. We are in direct conflict with existing government policies and the economy has been allowed to function in this country.

Simphiwe (UNISA): The nature of activism in itself has changed. For instance, the generational struggle of the 1976 era was to try and create a uniform system of education that did not place one race on the pedestal while undermining the potential of the other race. It was more or less trying to create equality rather than a separation. We are no longer separate but we are still not equal. Now the generational struggle is, among other things, to transform the curriculum in itself. We are not only concerned with merely putting a black lecturer instead of a white lecturer, but want to be told about our history and the invaluable contributions that have been made by Africans. We also need to abolish the capitalistic system of education which continues to undermine the potential of those who are disadvantaged.

Unlike in 1976, we have to begin by showing people that change is needed; we had to overcome people’s complacency and entitlement.

Kgotsi (UCT): Unlike in ’76, we first have to change people’s mind-sets. Currently people’s mind-sets are that while we have problems we are better off than before. That mind-set inhibits us from thinking more deeply and saying, ‘Actually there’s a fundamental issue [of inequality] that we have in this country that if we don’t solve, ten years from now we will self-destruct’.

Entitlement and complacency

Bheka (MUT): Compared to the youth of 1976, today you will see young people are interested in contributing to this society. They are not actually complacent – they’re denied the opportunity to contribute. We have a National Development Plan that young people have not contributed to, it’s a farce. Imagine a 65-year-old writing a document about the future that they will not form part of. Young people are trying to find a space to contribute. If no-one is willing to fix this country, we will. Regardless of race, or class or background because it is our future children and our grandchildren who will inherit this country.

We want to be told about our history and the invaluable contributions that have been made by Africans.

We have the privilege of drawing on the experience of the 1976 activists

Kgotsi (UCT): When we started Rhodes Must Fall, we lacked organisational skills. It was of benefit to meet people face-to-face that were involved in 1976. It helped us learn... Parents [Kgotsi is the son of apartheid activist Rev. Frank Chikane] helped us in terms of organising, mass mobilisation and also practicalities – having enough water and food on the day, how to be peaceful in the face of...
violence…Also today there’s no clear enemy for you to fight. Back in the day there was a clear enemy so we also had to find new ways to mobilise.

Simamkele (Wits): We can’t have the same conversations that the ’76 comrades were having. We had to ask how we are adding to this conversation. We looked at the way that they did things. We looked at their mistakes, their way of mobilising. In our mobilisation we tried to learn these lessons. We also learned from the experiences that happened in the world – especially in the global south colonies. In the University of Nairobi, for instance, in 1968, they had a similar struggle led by the renowned author Ngugi wa Thiong’o where they transformed their university space.

Jessica (UCT): It’s always important to go back to the archive. I went back to the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) archive because their experience of white people and black people separating in order to wage separate struggles was very similar to what we were doing with the White Privilege project. This was like when Steve Biko told NUSAS that it was time to go on his own and he formed the South African Student Organisations (SASO) and the Black Consciousness Movement. The same conversations were happening about critical whiteness and about white privilege…So whilst the RMF self-emancipation dialogue was happening, we wanted to have the white privilege dialogue happen as well as a form of allyship.

Social media is probably the most fundamental aspect of how youth activism has changed since 1976.

Social media is a new addition to activism and is critical in numerous ways

Kgotsi (UCT): Social media is probably the most fundamental aspect of how youth activism has changed since 1976.

People think the turnout at our RMF protest was a random act of luck. But a lot of us read articles on how previous student movements and protests use social media to their advantage. We had 5 000 ‘likes’ on our Facebook page in less than a week – 5 000 people who are interested and with whom you can communicate directly. …This helped spread the idea to other student movements across the country as they got going. Then during the protests we were able to control the rhetoric itself through Twitter and Facebook – about university and police responses. This was completely different to 1976 when it was only the government who got to communicate about what was going on. But we also had to remember that social media excludes lots of people. Not everyone has Facebook or Twitter.

What should the future of youth activism look like in South Africa?

We need an overall and shared vision of transformation

Jessica (UCT): It would be so much easier if we just knew what the future is that we wanted. The activists of 1976 had one common vision. Now we want transformation, a future where everyone can be human…But I think the difficulty is trying to get to this end goal without stripping away each other’s humanity. This is an intersectional struggle – it’s class, and race, and economics, and sexuality, and gender. I really do believe that no-one is free until we are all free. I think that allyship is needed in all of those struggles.

We need a networked and united struggle, with practical solutions

Petunia (Wits): We must network and work together to solve these multi-faceted problems. I also believe that all of us can advance change in the little spaces that we occupy – be it in academia, in the townships that you come from. There’s hope – look at the calibre of young people advocating for change…A good start I think is to revisit the Freedom Charter which was a community charter. It will unite us across the political spectrum…regardless of race, creed or educational background.

Kgotsi (UCT): We don't have to be a multi-issue generation. We don't have to try and solve every single problem that exists. It is okay if your group focuses on a single issue.

We can all be a part of this knowledge generation and knowledge production.

Simamkele (Wits): Academics frequently silence us saying that the issues need experts to solve them, but that’s not true. Anyone can contribute and everyone can be a part of it. We need to go out into our communities and learn what people want. We can all be a part of this knowledge generation and knowledge production.

Economic emancipation is a key outcome

Bheka (MUT): I am driven by my own experience of having had little freedom to express my views and opinions in the past. I want to see an open society, where young people are drivers of change and advocates for development and transformation. I want to see a system of education that creates an economically independent African child.

Authors: Professor Sharlene Swartz, research director, Human and Social Development (HSD) research programme, HSRC; Dr Alude Mahali, research specialist, HSD; Dr Sarah Chiumbe, African Research Fellow, HSD.
Artisan training

COULD ASSIST YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

Artisanal and intermediate level training are important starting points for addressing the challenge of unemployed young people, currently estimated to be between 35% and 37%. This article explores the scarcity of young people in artisanal employment and the mechanisms of exclusion that contribute to this situation – Tamlynne Meyer and Angelique Wildschut.

Artisan development in South Africa is afflicted by the historical imprint of a system fraught with racial, gender and language prejudice. Equally important is the plight of the growing constituency of unemployed youth in our country. While many believe that artisanal and intermediate level training are important starting points for addressing this challenge, statistics do not give rise to much optimism. Overall, the employment of youth (15 to 34) in the craft and related trades workers (CRT) group has shown some improvement between 2008 and 2015 (42.4% to 43.6%). However, closer examination reveals that this increase can largely be attributed to the 30 to 34-year-old category, with declining employment levels for all other youth categories. This statistic runs alongside increases in adult employment in the 45 to 49 and 50 to 54-year-old categories. We are reminded not only that the South African youth is not a homogeneous group, but that we need to engage and investigate questions of youth access to employment more critically.

Such trends raise the questions: Why are there not more young people in artisanal employment? What are the mechanisms of exclusion that contribute to this state of affairs? These are important questions when we reflect on the aspirations of the South African youth on the eve of commemorating the 1976 Soweto uprising. Despite the many initiatives aimed at addressing the inequalities that led to the uprising, concerning trends still emerge from recent research on artisanal work and occupations in the country.

We are reminded not only that the South African youth is not a homogeneous group, but that we need to engage and investigate questions of youth access to employment more critically.

---

**Fig 1**

Employment of craft and related trades workers by age, 2008 and 2015 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group (years)</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 – 19</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 24</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 29</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – 34</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 – 39</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 – 44</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 – 49</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 – 54</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 – 59</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 – 64</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: StatsSA, 2008-2015

---
The occupational culture tends to socially exclude young blacks, based on assertions of lower quality education and training, higher drop-out rates and claims that they are less loyal and have attitude problems.
The research project evaluated changes to artisanal work and occupations across three artisanal trades. A case study on millwrights in the metals sector highlights trends pointing to the nature of occupational closure in artisanal training and employment that show how young African individuals continue to be at a distinct disadvantage when entering the labour market.

The occupational culture tends to socially exclude young blacks, justifying exclusion based on assertions of lower quality education and training, higher drop-out rates associated with such candidates and claims that they are less loyal and have attitude problems:

‘… the problem with the new guys at the moment … it’s their attitude which is killing them: They are not willing to listen and they are not willing to work hard … Some believe that they are just doing their artisan job (apprenticeship) because it is the only thing they have at the moment. (It often) backfires because you find that some are struggling to get the job because of their attitude - after they qualified they need to go back to the plants and beg for the job. So if you didn’t do well while you are still training, then it’s not easy for them to find a job. And outside they are looking for experience.’

A good relationship between an older experienced artisan and a younger apprentice is the cornerstone of the production of quality skilled artisans. However, younger black apprentices and artisans in this case experienced a high degree of hostility from older artisans, affecting their ability to learn and improve their skills.

Similarly, an older artisan elaborates:

‘… the problem with the new guys at the moment … it’s their attitude which is killing them: They are not willing to listen and they are not willing to work hard … Some believe that they are just doing their artisan job (apprenticeship) because it is the only thing they have at the moment. (It often) backfires because you find that some are struggling to get the job because of their attitude - after they qualified they need to go back to the plants and beg for the job. So if you didn’t do well while you are still training, then it’s not easy for them to find a job. And outside they are looking for experience.’

A good relationship between an older experienced artisan and a younger apprentice is the cornerstone of the production of quality skilled artisans. However, younger black apprentices and artisans in this case experienced a high degree of hostility from older artisans, affecting their ability to learn and improve their skills.

The older white male element typical of artisanal employment and training under apartheid continues to impact on opportunity and choice for young people.

A young black foreman describes the hostility he experiences in the workplace:

‘Yes, you (as a young black foreman) always come into contact with them (older, old-school, white artisans)… for me it’s more like … resistance to change … they’re used to their own, old ways and they feel that if a new guy comes in he’s going to change that and change that … The other factor (is) their own personal growth. Now, the normal (promotion route) is Apprenticeship, Artisan, Master or Senior then Supervisor. Now, (the company) take a Technician to work as a Super and this old guy who is a Senior who has been leading as Foreman for 34 years, he’s now off.

Younger black apprentices and artisans experienced a high degree of hostility from older artisans, affecting their ability to learn and improve their skills.

The maintenance manager has five sections that he is responsible for and only here and there one would pick up some racism. It is more generation conflict than racial conflict. The older generation followed the previous longer training route to become an artisan. After an 18 month training programme young artisans are not always mature enough to face up to the working environment.’

Manager.

This research shows how the older white male element typical of artisanal employment and training under apartheid continues to impact on opportunity and choice for young people. It is clear that the mechanisms for such exclusion are not as overt and appear under the guise of attitude, poor educational preparation and lack of company loyalty. In fact, the research shows that it is young black artisans who are most likely to be associated with these characteristics and thus portrayed as being less able and willing to do artisanal work.

Authors: Dr Tamlynne Meyer, senior research specialist, Education and Skills Development (ESD) programme, HSRC; Dr Angelique Wildschut, senior researcher/post-doctoral fellow, ESD.
A little over a year ago, the #RhodesMustFall campaign resulted in the removal of a statue of Cecil John Rhodes from the University of Cape Town campus. This action focused renewed attention on issues of race, redress, restitution, social cohesion and active citizenship in South Africa. But little is known of the views of the general public in relation to statues of apartheid and colonial leaders. The authors address the gap by examining data from the 2015 round of SASAS – Ben Roberts, Sharlene Swartz, Jarè Struwig and Steven Gordon.
STATUES OF LIBERTY?
Attitudes towards apartheid and colonial statues

The South Africa Social Attitudes Survey series consists of nationally representative samples of adults aged 16 years and older living in private households. In the 2015 round, a random sample of 3 115 participants were asked two experimental questions on the action participants would prefer to be taken regarding the statues of apartheid and colonial leaders.

What should be done with apartheid and colonial statues?
The first question asked was: ‘In your opinion, what should be done with statues of South Africa’s apartheid and colonial leaders, such as Cecil John Rhodes, King George, Jan van Riebeeck?’ The responses reveal that close to half of the adult public (46%) believes that the statues should be removed (Figure 1).

Among the balance of the respondents, there was only nominal support (4%) for what may be termed the ‘speaking back’ option, where new artwork is installed adjacent to existing statues; a third (34%) suggest that the statues should be left alone, while the balance (16%) expressed indifference or uncertainty. How unified or polarised are South Africans in these perspectives? One of the most striking and interesting findings is the uniformity of opinion on the removal of the statues across generations. The percentage favouring the removal ranged between 43% and

![Figure 1](source: HSRC SASAS 2015)
50% across age groups. There were however, clear differences in response by race, education and political affiliation. Among black African adults the first choice was removal (52%), which was more than 20% higher than for other population groups. The ‘leave alone’ option was supported by 61% of white adults compared to 29% of black adults.

There were signs of an inverse association between education and removal of statues. Those with no schooling were more inclined to support the ‘removal’ option, as well as the ‘destroy’ option (20%). By contrast, those with a tertiary education were the only group where the ‘leave alone’ option was supported more than the ‘remove’ option (45% vs 39%).

With regard to political party identification, ANC supporters strongly believed in removal (53%), with the placement in museums the main choice. The ‘leave alone’ option was mentioned by slightly under a third (28%). EFF supporters voiced the strongest preference for removal (63%). Primarily support was reported for the ‘museum’ option, though EFF supporters did exhibit higher than average support for the ‘destroy’ option (21%).

The ‘leave alone’ was the dominant response among DA supporters (51%), with less than a third (29%) favouring removal. For those supporting other parties or not declaring their affiliation, there was a fairly even split between ‘leave alone’ and ‘removal’ (40% vs 36%).

Examining the different socio-demographic attributes, the highest support for the removal of statues was evident among residents of informal settlements, EFF and ANC supporters, those with no formal education, and black African adults. Conversely, white, Indian and coloured adults, DA supporters, the tertiary educated and the non-poor are more likely to advocate for the statues to be left alone and are less favourable towards the removal option. Coloured adults were two to three times more likely to report indifference to the question of removal compared to others.

Who should decide about what should be done?

The second experimental question in SASAS 2015 asked respondents ‘Who should decide what happens to these statues of South Africa’s apartheid and colonial leaders?’ Most responded that government should decide (34%), while around a fifth (22%) favours a referendum on the matter to allow citizens to decide (Figure 2). There was surprisingly low support (10%) for the option of letting ‘those most hurt by the past’ decide, while one might similarly have expected a greater share to opt for the ‘academics and historians’ option (15%). Around a tenth (11%) said they would choose ‘none of the above’, but these consist largely of those preferring the ‘don’t care’ option in the preceding question.

The belief that government should decide on action regarding statues was the most common response for all age groups. It was interesting to note that twice as many 16-19 year-olds (33%) support the option of a referendum as the basis for deciding, compared to those of pensionable age (16%).

There was again distinct patterning based on race, class, geography and political orientation. As Table 1 shows, black African adults placed considerably higher authority in government than the rest to make the decision (39% vs. 16-19%). White adults were distinctly

The survey draws attention to fundamental differences in opinion between black and white South Africans, between those of different political affiliations, and among those with varying education and wealth levels.
more likely to want academics and historians to decide (30%). Coloured and Indian adults showed similar patterns to each other, with first priority being a referendum followed by government deciding.

As for class and education variation, there was an inverse association. Half of those with a low living standard chose the state option, compared with 40% of those with medium living standard and a quarter of those with a high living standard (Table 1). By contrast, support for a referendum was higher among those with a medium or high living standard. Educationally, those with primary or no formal schooling were more likely than those with a higher level of education to prefer state authority. Those with secondary education exhibited lower support for state decision-making and greater demand for a referendum. Those who chose ‘none of the above’ also tended to choose ‘leave alone’ in response to the first question.

Lastly, from a political affiliation standpoint, ANC supporters were considerably more inclined than other party supporters to say government must decide, while DA supporters gave first preference to academics and historians, and are least likely to opt for government. Interestingly, EFF supporters have a strong preference (32%) for deciding by means of a referendum or vote, though the ‘government should decide’ option ranks a close second (28%).

**Conclusion**

These results represent the first evidence concerning the predispositions of the South African adult public towards the symbolic representations of colonial and apartheid figures following the 2015 protests. While nearly half believed they need to be removed, the rest either want them left alone or simply do not care what happens to them. Views on who should decide on the action taken are also polarised, with ‘government’ the dominant response, followed by the public through a ‘referendum or vote’.

We could not find proof that there was a strong age effect underlying these preferences. Instead, the survey draws attention to fundamental differences in opinion between black and white South Africans, between those of different political affiliations, and among those with varying education and wealth levels. These divisions and contestations will make action difficult to take. Greater public dialogue and debate should take place to reach a shared understanding, rooted within a broader agenda of social restitution.

**Authors:** Benjamin Roberts, SASAS coordinator and senior research manager, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme, HSRC; Dr Sharlene Swartz, director, Human and Social Development (HSD) research programme, HSRC; Jarè Struwig, SASAS coordinator and chief research manager; Steven Gordon, PhD researcher in DGSD.

There were signs of an inverse association between education and removal of statues… [with] those with no schooling…more inclined to support the ‘removal’ option, as well as the ‘destroy’ option.

---

**Table 1: How should it be decided what is done with the statues of South Africa’s apartheid and colonial leaders, by race and class, 2015 (row %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Referendum or vote</th>
<th>Academics and historians</th>
<th>Those most hurt by South Africa’s past</th>
<th>None of the above</th>
<th>(Do not know)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>39*</td>
<td>23*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian/Asian</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26*</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living standard level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>50*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23*</td>
<td>18*</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>9*</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How willing are South Africans to participate in violent attacks on foreign nationals? This question was among those asked in the latest HSRC population survey and the findings are worrying. The authors warn against underestimating the true extent of the challenge of achieving social cohesion in South Africa – Benjamin Roberts, Steven Gordon and Jarè Struwig
IN THOUGHT AND DEED?

Anti-immigrant violence and attitudes in South Africa

During the last decade there were growing concerns over the antipathy and incidences of violence directed towards foreign nationals in South Africa. In response, the national government convened a number of commissions to investigate the causes of these attacks. These have given rise to many interesting findings, though there is still much that is unknown about public attitudes towards anti-immigrant violence in the country. This article represents part of a programme of work seeking to better understand attitudes in this regard.

Data for the study comes from the 2015 round of SASAS, a nationally representative series conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. The survey, undertaken between October and December 2015, included face-to-face interviews with 3 087 adults over 16 years of age, living in private homes. The data is representative of the adult public, using Statistics South Africa’s most recent mid-year population estimates as a point of reference.

The extent of violence

To capture reported engagement in anti-immigrant violence, respondents were asked: ‘Have you taken part in violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in your neighbourhood’, after which they were presented with the following options to choose from:

- in the past year;
- in the more distant past;
- have not done it but might do it; and
- have not done it and would never do it?

In response, 80% of South Africans indicated that they had not taken part in such action and would never do so (Figure 1). This is an encouraging finding that highlights that anti-immigrant violence is broadly rejected by the public.

By contrast, 2.4% report having perpetrated such violence in the year prior to interviewing (late 2014-late 2015) and a further 3.4% stated that they had engaged in such behaviour in the more distant past. A combined total of 6% therefore report ever having committed such acts of violence against foreigners. On first impressions, this may not sound like an especially large share of the population, but it is equivalent to approximately 2.2 million adults.

In addition, more than a tenth of the adult population (13%, or an estimated 4.9 million) said that they had not taken part in such an action but would be prepared to take part. That a significant segment of the public expresses the intention to possibly commit acts of violence in future is cause for concern.

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Fig 1

Reported participation in violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in one’s neighbourhood, 2015 (%)

Source: HSRC SASAS 2003-2015
Questions may be raised about potential underreporting of past or potential future violence due to social desirability. However, similar research undertaken in Alexandra by the University of the Witwatersrand has shown that people do openly register their views on such matters. Even if there is a downward bias in reporting violent behaviour, the figures cited above are still unsettling.

**Who is more inclined to anti-immigrant violence?**

There were no significant gender or age differences underlying the reporting of anti-immigrant behaviour in the country. This is a notable finding since media representations often portray younger citizens and men as more greatly predisposed to violent behaviour. There are nonetheless race and class-based variations in response to self-reported violence measure.

As Figure 2 demonstrates, there is a distinct racial gradient in responses, with black African adults showing higher reporting on both past violent behaviour and potential future violence relative to white, Indian and coloured adults. This is likely to reflect an underlying association between deprivation and violence.

To assess living standards, use is made of the Living Standard Measure (LSM), which is a ten-point scale ranging from the poorest (LSM 1) to the wealthiest (LSM 10) and based on the possession of household assets, services and location.

We found that there was not much difference between economic groups in the reporting of past participation in anti-immigrant violence. The share of reported violence ranged between 5% and 7% for all except those in the highest living standard group. However, these figures mask subtle variations in the percentage that reported such violent action in the last year. Six percent of those with a low living standard level reported violent action in the last year, compared with 2% to 3% of those in the lower middle through upper high categories, and less than 1% among the highest category (not shown in figure).

The economic differences are more pronounced with regard to potential violence. Those in the lower and upper middle categories show a greater inclination towards potential future violence than other categories, which in turn translates into a lower overall rejection of anti-immigrant violence. This may reflect perceptions of economic threat, though this remains to be tested.

The more affluent are the most prone of all the groups in the table to denounce violence against foreigners. Similarly, if we examine patterns by educational attainment, those with a tertiary level education are less inclined towards violence than those with less formal schooling.

**Spatial variation**

Geographic differences also exist in the reporting of past and potential anti-immigrant violence. Provincially, the share of residents reporting past violent behaviour was highest in the Western Cape, Free State and North West (all 9%), with those in the North West more likely to report recent violent action (6%) relative to all other provinces.

More disconcerting though was the evidence suggesting that around a fifth of residents in Limpopo, Free State and the Western Cape felt that they would be prepared to take violent action to prevent immigrants from living or working in their neighbourhood.

While the share that would never engage in such action still remains high across the provinces, ranging from 71% in the Western Cape to 88% in Gauteng, the results do suggest that there is at least some tacit support for anti-immigrant violence among a sizeable minority in a number of provinces.

In terms of type of geographic location, there is no significant difference in the
mentioning of past violent behaviour in rural and urban areas (6%-7%). However, residents of informal settlements were appreciably more likely to report that they might engage in such behaviour in future than residents of other urban and rural localities (28% compared to 11% to 12%). This again points to an association between poverty, vulnerability and anti-immigrant violence.

Attitudes and behaviour

Our previous research has shown that many South Africans hold negative and hostile views of foreign migrants. The 2015 results are no exception. Respondents were asked whether they would welcome all, some or no immigrants to the country. About a third (33%) said that they would welcome all, roughly two-fifths (41%) reported that they would conditionally welcome some, while a quarter resolutely stated that they welcome no foreigners.

One question often asked is how such attitudes inform violent anti-immigrant behaviour. Just because someone views foreigners with animosity does not necessarily mean that he or she will participate in anti-immigrant violence.

The survey results suggest that there is a significant but modest association between anti-immigrant sentiment and violent behaviour. While there is no difference in the patterning of past violent action, a more negative view of immigrants does influence the likelihood of reporting possible future violent behaviour (Figure 3). A quarter of those that welcome no foreigners indicate a potential for future violence, compared with 12% of those that conditionally accept and 5% of those that unreservedly accept the presence of foreign migrants in South Africa.

So, there clearly is a relationship between attitudes and behaviour. Yet it remains modest in character, as we can see that two-thirds (68%) of those welcoming no migrants would still never resort to violent action to prevent immigrants residing or working in their neighbourhood. This does not preclude the fact that they may resort to ‘softer’ ways of registering their opposition (such as avoidance or boycotting foreign owned shops), but it does suggest that large shares reject extreme behavioural expressions of their hostile views towards foreigners.

With considerable shares of the population experiencing economic vulnerability, expressing anti-immigrant sentiment and reporting possible targeted violence in future, it is paramount that the effort and resources devoted to addressing xenophobia in South African society are commensurate with the scale of the problem.

Conclusion

The most important finding to come from our analysis is not that a couple of million South Africans report that they have perpetrated violence against foreigners, but arguably that more than a tenth of the adult population deems its involvement in future anti-immigrant violence as a real possibility.

An apparent class dynamic appears to inform such intentions, which is worrying given the levels of material and social disadvantage that persist in the country. This situation is compounded by the fact that anti-immigrant attitudes drive the intention to engage in violent action to some degree, even though a majority of those voicing such views do not support such aggression.

The government is aiming to address the issue of anti-immigrant violence in our society through its social cohesion strategy. In embarking on this programme, we would caution policymakers and civil society leaders against underestimating the true extent of the challenge they are confronting. With considerable shares of the population experiencing economic vulnerability, expressing anti-immigrant sentiment and reporting possible targeted violence in future, it is paramount that the effort and resources devoted to addressing xenophobia in South African society are commensurate with the scale of the problem.

Authors: Benjamin Roberts and Jaré Struwig, SASAS coordinators, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) research programme, HSRC; Steven Gordon, PhD intern and researcher, DGSD

Fig 3 Reported participation in anti-immigrant violence by attitudes towards foreign migrants, 2015 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welcome all immigrants</th>
<th>Welcome some immigrants</th>
<th>Welcome no immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have done it before</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not done it but might do it</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not done it and would never do it</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HSRC SASAS 2015
The government’s RDP/BNG housing model is fast running out of steam, evident in declining rates of completion, fewer transfers of title deeds, escalating costs and growing concerns about shoddy workmanship. The response has been to try and find new ways of accelerating housing delivery, rather than to question the model itself. A broader approach to human settlements is required, with less focus on the sheer number of housing units – Ivan Turok

One of the visible signs of frustration within government at the declining delivery of new housing is the increasing talk of housing mega-projects and catalytic schemes. Recognising the political urgency, the human settlements department appears to have struck a chord in these uncertain times. Bold housing initiatives appeal to discontented citizens trapped in miserable squatter settlements. The prospect of a decent home in a secure environment has powerful appeal in the midst of hardship and discontent.

First announced by Minister Lindiwe Sisulu in her budget speech in 2014, the basic logic behind mega-projects is reasonably clear, although crucial details are hard to come by and the apparent lack of a policy framework, prior planning and technical preparation is surprising. The premise is that there is a growing housing backlog of between 2 million and 3 million units. This is attributed to an expanding population coinciding with a decline in house-building.

Questioning the new housing mega-projects

The supply of new housing has dropped over the past decade because the government’s RDP and Breaking New Ground (BNG) programme has run into the sand and private construction has been hit by the economic downturn. The housing shortfall is largest in the big cities because of urbanisation, constrained municipal capabilities to prepare and manage projects, and severe difficulties in obtaining land for development.
Density and concentration reduce transport costs, promote human and business interaction...and limit the costs of bulk infrastructure and public services.

Key figures in government believe that the best way to boost the supply of housing is through big schemes. Indeed, an appeal has been made for a Marshall Plan to deliver an unprecedented 1.5 million homes over the next five years. South African cities clearly need more affordable housing, but are these assumptions correct? Is this the right time to be launching a mass housing drive? Is housing the right sector to lead the economy out of recession? And what are the implications for the structure and viability of our cities and towns?

We know backyard dwellings are included in the backlog number. But in many places they should really be regarded as part of the solution rather than the problem, since they have created a useful market for low-income rental housing in reasonable locations with access to public amenities. They also provide a regular income for poor home-owners.

The mega-project promise is to cut unit costs and fast-track delivery at all stages of housing provision by streamlining administrative procedures. Combined with the lack of preparatory work, this increases the risk of problematic outcomes, such as houses being located on hazardous sites subject to flooding or subsidence. There must be a danger that social, environmental and financial safeguards will be compromised by overhasty processes.

Not seeing the big picture

Human settlements in SA have in recent years suffered from poor co-ordination within the government and disagreements between provinces and municipalities. Mega-project procedures suggest greater centralisation of control at national level. Yet the National Development Plan (NDP) and subsequent legislation assigned responsibility for spatial planning and land-use control to municipalities so as to improve spatial integration and alignment of house-building with transport and other infrastructure.

The provinces and private developers have come forward with 77 proposals for big urban expansion schemes, about 40 of which are in Gauteng. Each contains between 15,000 and 60,000 housing units — a mixture of RDP/BNG houses, subsidised bonded houses, rental property and serviced sites.

The commitment to mixed neighbourhoods is commendable, along with the desire to train young people, support women enterprises and tighten contractual relationships with building companies to avoid mistakes and fraud.

A major concern is the weak economic foundations of the mega-project model. These schemes seem to tackle only one dimension of urban development. Physical shelter and liveability objectives overshadow the need for economic development, jobs and social transformation.

Indeed a narrow housing agenda intent on speedy delivery could threaten the long-term prosperity of our cities. The single-minded focus on boosting the quantity of housing necessitates large amounts of cheap land that is easy to acquire and quick to build upon. This implies free-standing greenfield sites on the urban periphery, where there is little competition from other land users, and no prospect of objection from nearby communities.

Crucial details [of housing mega-projects] are hard to come by and the apparent lack of a policy framework, prior planning and technical preparation is surprising.

This will weaken the fundamental basis on which successful cities are built, namely proximity. Above all, cities are economic entities that generate jobs and incomes, which is why people migrate to them. Urban prosperity depends on intense interactions between people and firms that stem from spatial concentration.

Densifying cities a better option

Economic growth in cities is driven by productivity and the efficient use of land. Density and concentration reduce transport costs and promote human and business interaction. They also limit the costs of bulk infrastructure and public services. This is vital for national economic competitiveness, as well as for social inclusion.

The National Development Plan (NDP) made it crystal clear that SA’s legacy of sprawling, fragmented and segregated cities requires a concerted effort to promote more compact and integrated human settlements. This is essential to reduce travel times and transport costs for low income groups, as well as congestion on the roads.

Mega-projects may deliver some procedural efficiencies for the government, but at the expense of long-term inefficiency for households through lengthy journeys to work, and a brake on the productivity of the economy from sprawl and gridlock. The fiscal sustainability of municipalities is also at risk from the extra costs of installing and maintaining dispersed infrastructure networks in the new housing estates, on top of the package of free basic services to poor households.

A better way forward would be for the government to see its investments in human settlements as part of a broader city-wide agenda that pays more attention to the issues of urban transformation, productivity and jobs, alongside shelter and liveability. In short, the country needs a clearer strategy for building better cities, not just more houses.

Author: Prof. Ivan Turok, executive director, Economic Performance and Development research programme, HSRC.
State of the Nation 2016 analyses South Africa and how power impacts on mandates, accountability and contestations in the South African state by asking: Who is in charge? Is the state indeed in charge of the country's economy and development and to what extent is the government able to effectively drive its publicly pronounced developmental state agenda? When does 'leading' become 'controlling'? What are the roles of the private sector and civil society in development? To whom is the state accountable and how is it held accountable? What are the definitive signs that the South African state has been hollowed out in the interests of a market-led economy rather than functioning as a developmental or capable state? From the state's point of view, which external role players, forces and powers are preventing the state administration and agencies from fully achieving its goals?

Endorsement
'It seems to me that the State of the Nation series has done for South Africa what Antony Sampson did for Britain in Who Runs this Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century: anatomising the body politic, measuring change, identifying progress, diagnosing weaknesses and issuing policy prescriptions.' Colin Bundy, South African historian and former Principal of Green Templeton College, Oxford.

Teaching the ‘Native’

Subtitle: The Foundations of ‘Native’ Education Policy in South Africa, 1900-1936
Author: Joseph Daniel Reilly
Published month and year: February 2015
Format: 198mm x 148mm (Truncated A5)
Extent: 308

About the book
South Africa is a young democracy, and the fires of dissatisfaction and demands for non-racial, democratic change in its education system remain strong. Veteran anti-apartheid activist Joseph Daniel Reilly argues that the only way forward is a fundamental reform of the very way in which history is taught in South Africa from kindergarten through graduate school, from teacher training and curriculum design to national policies and local bodies implementing education policies. Ultimately, the reform of South African education must be a national project, done with the same missionary zeal of those committed racists from the British Empire and the United States ‘Jim Crow’ system who worked tirelessly to obliterate any possibility of Africans gaining access to legitimate, equitable education.

Endorsement
‘Teaching the ‘Native’ is an essential read in the on-going discourse about education in South Africa.’ Zine Magubane, Associate Professor of Sociology, Boston College.

Year of Fire, Year of Ash

Subtitle: The Soweto Revolt: Roots of a Revolution
Author: Baruch Hirson
Published month and year: June 2016
ISBN (Soft cover): 978-1-928246-07-7
Publisher: BestRed
Format: A5
Extent: 400

About the book
Some thirty-five years after its original publication, but never previously available in South Africa, Year of Fire, Year of Ash still stands as one of the leading accounts of the 1976-77 Soweto Revolt, one of the most significant acts of resistance in the history of the anti-apartheid movement. Authored by a South African activist and scholar who was intimately involved in the movement, Year of Fire, Year of Ash provides an unparalleled insight into the origins and events of the uprising, from its antecedents in the early 1970s to its role in galvanising the global struggle against apartheid.

This commemorative edition, published to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the start of the Soweto Uprising on 15 June 1976, includes a Foreword by Shula Marks and the South African edition also includes an abridged transcription of an interview with Billy Masetha.