Inequalities and justice
influences, effects, intersections and evidence

Rethinking global development
The future of social sciences
Universities’ contribution to development
Social grants and fiscal sustainability
The HSRC hosts researchers from all four of our offices every second year to encourage them to discuss their work across boundaries and debate some of the issues around the reach and impact of research. These conferences are important to staff members who are dispersed across the country and aims to provide them with opportunities to interact, share views and talk about their research.

This year’s research conference theme, ‘Inequalities and justice: influences, effects, intersections and evidence’, called for multidisciplinary approaches in addressing inequalities and injustices in South Africa in preparation for the 2015 Word Social Science Forum (WSSF) in Cape Town. The HSRC Conference critically reviewed current research, ideas and policy around the WSSF theme of ‘Transforming global relations for a just world’.

To quote Wangari Maaithai:

The people are learning that you cannot leave decisions only to leaders. Local groups have to create the political will for change, rather than waiting for others to do things for them. That is where positive and sustainable change begins. It is important to nurture any new ideas and initiatives which can make a difference for Africa.

There is already much that we know about the idea of justice and by extension, inequality and injustice. We know that inequality and injustice are common, occur on multiple levels, and frequently intersect. There is an abundance of research on economic inequality and its effect on the quality of life and social relations within countries of the world. Many studies have shown significant relationships between economic/social inequalities and violence; crime rates; community involvement; political participation and policy making; health and life expectancy; social cohesion; trust and even human happiness.

Furthermore, we also know how inequalities and injustice, produced by the unequal distribution of wealth, low quality education, social fragmentation, unjust labour practices and accidents of birth, lead to unfair discrimination and thwarted opportunities for human development. From economic disparities where 10% of the country earns and owns 90% of its wealth, to gender differences where women do two-thirds of the world’s work, own 1% of the world’s wealth and occupy 14% of leadership positions, to where those living in poverty are also subject to exorbitant lending practices, food insecurity and frequently live in isolated and alienated communities.

Of course these inequalities are never discrete, and are compounded and intersect such that those who occupy multiple positions of inequality are most severely affected, such as poor black women.

To paraphrase Maaithai: what we need now is a focused African perspective on inequalities and how to close the gaps of status and privilege related to both moral justice and national development. We need to show this commitment.

This edition of HSRC Review covers a selection of articles based on papers delivered at the HSRC research conference. These are, however, not comprehensive as many presentations appeared in the form of articles in previous editions and are therefore not repeated here.

Professor Olive Shisana
CEO HSRC
Documenting the ‘unwritten’ law of the Royal Bafokeng

Like many other tribal authorities on the African continent, South African traditional authorities have, for centuries, governed themselves through customary law. Customary law has lived through different epochs, from colonialism to the current constitutional democracy, where it presides over personal law matters such as marriage and inheritance.

Over the years, a considerable number of researchers from different disciplines have conducted research on the customary laws of African ethnic groups. Considering its dynamism and adaptability, customary law remains relatively unwritten and warrants further research, which is what a research project – led by Dr Gerard Hagg and his team in the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme – is aiming to achieve.

In November 2012, the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) commissioned the HSRC to conduct a baseline study of all existing customs, values, principles, laws, rules and procedures pertaining to governance among the Bafokeng. The aim of the study is to document these elements in ways that could guide future generations.

The study includes looking at traditional and corporate institutions of governance within the Bafokeng to understand how they work and how they relate to each other. This phase of the research is limited to the documentation of official and living customary law, as well as current customary practices.

As a result of limited available literature on the subject, the research team augmented desk studies with individual and small-group interviews. The interviews covered the following customary issues:
- Traditional authorities
- Succession and inheritance
- Bafokeng social structures
- Marriage and family law
- Property
- Allocation of liability for loss
- Courts
- Gender and youth.

In addition, HSRC researchers utilised participant observation by attending important events such as Pitso ya Kgothakgothe (the annual general meeting) and Dumela Phokeng (regional community consultative meetings).

The study is nearing completion and in January 2014, a comprehensive report of the research will be submitted to the RBN.

Mapping the historical route of the liberation struggle

The South African National Heritage Council (NHC) has commissioned the HSRC to conduct research that will contribute to the identification and recording of the life histories of unsung heroes and heroines of the liberation struggle, and to identify and provide the stories behind these historical events that will eventually become a Liberation Heritage Route (LHR).

The LHR is intended to comprise a series of sites that express the key aspects of the South African liberation experience, says project leader Dr Gregory Houston of the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, and would be visited by tourists and others interested in the history of the liberation.

‘These sites are linked together by a common historical narrative of the liberation struggle and experience, and consist of historical evidence of events and activities associated with the history of the struggle. Included are the Wesleyan Church where the ANC was formed in 1912, the Sharpeville Massacre, Liliesleaf Farm, Johnny Makhatini House, the Langeberg Rebellion, the Bisho Massacre, and Victor Verster Prison. Some of these sites are well documented, while others are not. There is thus a need for research to add historical evidence of the significance of the latter sites,’ Houston says.

This is a huge task as the liberation struggle has given rise to hundreds of heritage sites throughout the country. Houston explains that many of the sites have a specific geographical location and/or structure(s), while many others do not. There are numerous events that cover a wide geographical area such that no single site or structure can be identified that epitomises these events, such as the 16 June uprising in places such as Cape Town and Soweto, which drew thousands of activists over wide geographical spaces and resulted in the deaths of many.

He foresees the creation of a series of liberation struggle memorials throughout the country consisting of plaques that contain the history of resistance and repression in that community, as well as the list of names of people who died during that event or series of events.

Houston says it could entail creating centres of memory or reflection in each province and/or major city that would serve both as repositories and resource centres for memory on the liberation struggle.
ASSAf recognises top South African scientists

The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) recognised top South African scientists at its prestigious annual awards ceremony in Pretoria on 23 October 2013.

ASSAf annually awards up to two ASSAf Science-for-Society Gold Medals for outstanding achievement in scientific thinking to the benefit of society. This year, HSRC CEO, Prof. Olive Shisana, was recognised for her contributions to understanding and containing HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Shisana is also honorary professor at the University of Cape Town and immediate past president of the International Social Science Council. Prior to this she served as the HSRC’s executive director of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health, and was previously the executive director, Family and Community Health, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.

Shisana is an authority on HIV surveillance, having been a principal investigator for several second-generation surveillance systems for HIV. She was one of the founders of the South African National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, as well as the Maternal and Child Mortality Surveillance. Her recurrent national household surveys on HIV/AIDS prevalence, practices and attitudes have greatly influenced the HIV/AIDS campaign in our region. She has served on many national and international scientific committees and advisory boards, such as the Ministerial Advisory Committee on National Health Insurance, the US Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Methodological Challenges in HIV Prevention Trials, the Emory University Global Health Institute Advisory Board, the South African National AIDS Council and the chair of the Nelson Mandela 46664 Board. She has recently been appointed to head the South Africa BRICS (the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Think Tank and is chair of the Council of BRICS Think Tank and co-chair of the AIDS 2016 Global Conference (hosted in South Africa).

The prize in the category Life and Earth Sciences was awarded to Prof. Landon Myer from the School of Public Health and Family Medicine, University of Cape Town. Prof. Cornie Scheffer, founder of the Biomedical Engineering Research Group (BERG) at Stellenbosch University received the prize in the category Basic Sciences, Technology and Innovation.

At the same event, the Sydney Brenner Fellowship was awarded to Dr Anna Coussens, a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Cape Town.

Spatial trends of unemployment: Policy implications for South Africa

Gina Weir-Smith

South Africa’s income inequality, as reflected in the Gini coefficient, increased from 0.64 in 1995 to 0.69 in 2005 and to 0.70 by 2008. A study by Gina Weir-Smith, a geographical information system specialist in the Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation programme, did a study to determine whether segregation increased between the unemployed and employed since 1991, and to identify structural breaks in municipal economies through changes in the industry composition.

She compared the spatial distribution of two population sub-groups, followed by a statistical analysis of segregation based on unemployment statistics for district municipalities. Census data from 1991 to 2011 was used to provide a detailed geographic coverage of the country, and then compared that to the industry composition of municipalities since 1996 to identify structural breaks in the local economy.

The findings showed that the dissimilarity between unemployed and employed increased in metropolitan areas and at the same time decreased in some rural areas. The industry composition of local municipalities shifted over time and in 2011 the majority of the labour force was employed in community services.

Weir-Smith concluded that increased dissimilarity means that the employed and unemployed has become more segregated over time. This could lead to decreased social cohesion, lack of access to labour opportunities and a mismatch between skills and labour demand. This increased inequality need to be addressed by broad policies supported by specific interventions that is targeted at the most needy people.
The ongoing challenge of development

The HSRC held its biennial research conference, themed ‘Inequalities and justice: influences, effects, intersections and evidence’, in September in Boksburg, Gauteng. The two-day conference provided its nearly 300 participants with the opportunity to present research findings that had a bearing on the theme, and allowed prominent academics and scholars to debate the topic during two plenary sessions. *Ina van der Linde, Narnia Bohler-Muller* and *Vasu Reddy* report.

The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.’ Quoting Antonio Gramsci, Dr Rasigan Maharajh, chief director of the Institute for Economic Research on Innovation at the Tshwane University of Technology, brought the HSRC Research Conference on the topic of inequality and justice to a close by posing questions beyond the scope of the convention.

The theme of the struggle of the birth of the new world; what went wrong in the old world; who the nursemaid should be and what the baby should look like was the metaphorical thread that ran through all the presentations.

Maharajh advocated for rethinking the way the world has developed and is developing. So far, development has come at a high cost. All environmental systems of the planet are in crisis, threatened by the current mode of production and consumption, leading to environmental degradation and inequality between and among peoples and communities.

The neoliberal form of global systemic organisation is manifesting in its most brutal form through one-sided (unilateral) actions by governments and through state violence. ‘The spectre of violence haunts us all,’ he declared, paraphrasing the Slovene philosopher and cultural critic, Slavoj Žižek.

The neoliberal form of global systemic organisation is manifesting in its most brutal form through one-sided actions by governments and through state violence.

– Dr Rasigan Maharajh
Capitalism has created an environment for the improvement in the material living conditions of humanity, such as the provision of infrastructures such as water supply, housing, electricity, transport connections and a wide range of essential products and cultural activities. This is however not universal, and has increasingly become dependent on international linkages in global chains of production for their provision and maintenance.

Maharajh said the economic crises experienced by several rich countries were deeply structural; structural in the sense that the planet had been exploited to such an extent that economies built on the environment were no longer sustainable, considering the various indicators such as climate change, energy consumption, degradation of the environment, financial crises and food insecurity. ‘The damages wreaked in the pursuit of growth and development on the very ecological systems that sustain life are beyond capacity to remedy,’ he stated.

For example, the cost of environmental damage caused by the world’s 3,000 largest publicly-listed companies was equated to US$2.15 trillion. And if the cost of environmental degradation by these companies was brought into their equity portfolio, weighted according to the MSCI All Country World Index (MSCI is a leading provider of investment decision support tools worldwide), more than 50% of these companies would be bankrupt.

This decline in the economies that belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is not provisional; a 2010 OECD report stated that this ‘realignment of the world economy is not a transitory phenomenon, but represents a structural change of historical significance’.

Maharajh advocated for an alternative development model, or ‘a new productive paradigm’. Currently, new industrial sectors are emerging that include the clean economy industry. BRICS is expanding productive systems and infrastructure towards an orientation that is ostensibly linked to sustainability. China, for example, has emerged as the country with the highest public market financing in the clean energy sector, and together with Germany, both of these countries have overtaken the USA.

To address global and local issues of inequality and justice, he concluded by saying that ‘progressive organisations involved in the struggle for social justice and the individuals involved in these struggles have the role of uniting autonomous organisations around a clear vision of a future global community, which can develop out of the current conditions and be imbued with the transcendental objective of building a new post-capitalism paradigm’.

Our vision of a developmental state is of a state that is both capable and caring.

– Derek Hanekom

Minister of Science and Technology, Derek Hanekom, agreed. ‘Our vision of a developmental state is of a state that is both capable and caring,’ he said. ‘The economic growth that we strive for must be inclusive growth; at the heart of everything we do must be a commitment to eradicating poverty and reducing inequality.’

He said that although his department was at the forefront of the drive towards a knowledge-based economy, which was essential if South Africa was to compete in an increasingly competitive global economy, South Africa could not play the game on the same terms as labour-cheap countries such as China and India.

He added that it had to be acknowledged that the ‘knowledge-economy revolution’ shared some of the
downsides of the industrial revolution of two centuries ago in that it appeared to be the mechanism through which economic growth – including innovation-driven economic growth – sometimes translated into widening inequalities. ‘For us, the choice is not necessarily between capitalism and socialism but whether, in pursuit of the knowledge-based economy, we can find a better balance between macroeconomic strategies and industrialisation on the one hand, and African humanism on the other hand,’ Hanekom said. In the drive for progress and innovation, the poor should not be left behind.

**Beneath the theme of an Africa that is rising... lurks evidence of deepening inequality.**
– Prof. Adebayo Olukoshi

Prof. Adebayo Olukoshi, a member of the HSRC Board and director of the UN Africa Institute for Development, pointed to the contemporary narratives of ‘an Africa that is rising’ – what Dr Alioune Sall called the ‘myth of African rising’. But beneath the theme of ‘an Africa that is rising’, with sustained growth rates of 6% on average across the continent for at least a decade, lurks evidence of deepening inequality that needs to be addressed urgently if Africa is to avoid the pitfalls of economic growth without sustainable human development.

Structural transformation is only possible if African countries address their macroeconomic frameworks; frameworks that redefine policies that serve the public purpose and not only the market, which is the current trend. This also implies that Africa should rediscover the social compact, a disciplined framework within which a macroeconomic policy will begin to make sense.

**Research shows that drug abuse, mental illness, violence and unemployment are more prevalent in unequal societies.**
– Joel Netshitenzhe

Resonating Olukoshi’s views, Joel Netshitenzhe, executive director of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), said inequality could also constrain high growth as well as the sustainability of such growth. Its impact goes deeper though: research shows that drug abuse, mental illness, violence and unemployment are more prevalent in unequal societies.

But there are measures available to deal with inequality, such as the absorption of more people into economic activity, quality education, efficient public services, progressive taxation and appropriate spatial settlement patterns. While economic growth is critical to dealing with inequality, such growth should be pro-poor in the sense of reducing the cost of living for the impoverished, determine a minimum wage and address the high packages paid to CEOs.

**A society that does not put equity at the core of its existence is doomed to fail.**
– Dr Alioune Sall

Yes, agreed Dr Alioune Sall of the African Futures Institute, a society that does not put equity at the core of its existence is doomed to fail. However, inequality cannot be fully discussed without looking at other issues that have an impact on the poor, such as migration, human rights, health, social fragmentation and gender inequality at the home and at the market.

**We need not hate the white way, but need to love the black way.**
– Dr Siphamandla Zondi

Responding critically to ‘the ideology of development aid’ and what has been achieved since the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Dr Siphamandla Zondi, director of the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), concluded that the ‘decolonisation of Africa’ had not been realised. This, in spite of the consensus reached at Busan among 160 countries and 50 organisations towards more efficient and effective delivery of aid and the reform of the donor-beneficiary relationships towards one of equal partnership.

Zondi explained what he called the ‘ideology of development aid’, and said that Africans still thought through a European lens. ‘What you are writing is similar to what Europeans write; we use the same sources, methodologies and archives. We are local but thinking in Oxford.’ African development will happen in earnest when Africans are not dislocated from their own racialised history and context. ‘We need not hate the white way, but need to love the black way.’ What does this mean? Development is not just about water, health and sanitation, but a fundamental change in power relations, Zondi said. ■

Authors: Ina van der Linde, Science Communication unit, Research Use and Impact Assessment, HSRC; Professor Narnia Bohler-Muller, deputy executive director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC; Professor Vasu Reddy, deputy executive director, Human and Social Development programme, HSRC.
Demanding questions on the future of the social sciences

As we move forward in an ever-changing world, it is of critical importance that social scientists seek to understand global shifts and the consequent changing nature of the economic, social, cultural and political world. So argues Prof. Olive Shisana, taking notes from the transformative cornerstones of the forthcoming World Social Science Report for 2013, which aims to provide robust answers to social science problems.

The rise of the global South

Historical global dominance and wealth accumulation of what is often referred to as the global North – the high-income countries of Western Europe along with Japan, Canada, Australia and the United States (US) – have provided these countries with the economic power to control world trade, setting prices of commodities and natural resources, as well as the global political power that has allowed these select voices to determine the political direction of the world and related public policies, typically in a manner that suit their own interests.

It is now common knowledge that the 2008 financial crisis took a huge toll on the economies of the global North, resulting in stagnating economies, high unemployment, income disparities and other inequalities encouraged by austerity programmes and decreased social spending. It is expected that the negative repercussions of the 2008 recession on the economies of the North will have a resulting impact on who influences the global agenda. A new kid on the block has arrived – countries of the global South are experiencing rapid economic growth, and with that will come the power to influence the direction of global policy and politics.

Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for six out of 10 countries with sustained economic growth in the last decade.

Emerging economies of the global South continue to grow while the economies of the global North were abruptly halted by the global recession. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP 2013), the combined growing economies of China, India and Brazil will surpass that of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the US combined by 2020.

The 2013 World Bank report found that in 2012, economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding the region’s largest economy of South Africa, was at 5.8% – higher than the developing country average of 4.9%. An article in The Economist reported that sub-Saharan Africa accounted for six out of 10 countries with sustained economic growth in the last decade, i.e. Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda.

The number of low-income countries globally was reduced from 63 in 2000 to 35 in 2011. In 2011, US$1.1 trillion of investment capital flowed from developed to developing economies. These recent developments are evidence that the global South is rising. With this shift in global power comes the hope of structural transformation to a more balanced and equal world where the needs of citizens from all corners of the globe will be heard and met.

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It is expected that the rise of the global South will be accompanied by major global shifts in human development, patterns of resource consumption, regional expectations and ultimately the nature of global relations. New voices are beginning to shape the world we have come to know. What will these new entrants bring to the global stage? Importantly, what kind of world will they bring? What values will be driving this change? Who will benefit?

Development patterns

The post-colonial development path encouraged by the global North following the end of World War II has been that of capitalist accumulation of both financial and material resources – what is often referred to as ‘getting ahead of the pack’, or pursuing the American dream. This development model is not without benefit. Extreme global poverty was reduced in half between 1990 and 2012; an achievement met three years
before the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of 2015. A sizeable middle-class population in the North has been well established, and there is a growing middle class developing in the South.

But these gains are coupled with serious consequences; most critical is the perpetuation of global inequalities. A global wealth distribution study conducted by the UN found that the top 10% of adults in the world owned 85% of global household wealth. In 2007, the wealthiest 61 million people (1% globally) had the same amount of income as the poorest 3.5 billion people (56% of people around the globe). Forbes reckons that by the end of this year, 1,426 billionaires would have amassed a record net worth of US$5.4 trillion, while at the same time 20% of the world’s population of 1.2 billion people would have been living on less than US$1 a day. More than one billion people are without safe, clean water and 870 million people are hungry and suffering from chronic undernourishment – almost all of whom live in developing countries.

Such huge disparities in wealth, resource acquisition and general population well-being demand a shift in global structures. These vast inequalities are to be expected from a neoliberal model that encourages wealth accumulation, whether for individual billionaires who profit off the backs of their workers or high-income nations that accumulate wealth from controlling resources and means of production in developing countries. Happiness has become associated with obtaining material resources; even our measurement of development is in the form of economic muscle. This current model of development encourages excessive use of natural resources without any regard for equitable distribution. The idea that as long as ‘I have the means to purchase the resource I shall do so even if it means that I will deplete it’ has taken root in many economically endowed countries.

Such huge disparities in wealth, resource acquisition and general population well-being demand a shift in global structures. Can we create a new world order that is based on the values of sharing, as well-articulated by the organisation Share The World’s Resources in its advocacy for sustainable economics to end poverty? Can we grow the world economy without thwarting the survival of the poorest?

Questions moving forward
Economic growth in the South will bring opportunities and challenges, as we have seen previously with the economic powerhouses of the North. New questions will arise as to the exact implications of these shifting global power structures. What will these voices from the global South bring to the world by way of alternative approaches to development and improving population well-being? Will they promote economic growth at the expense of human development – for instance, prioritising physical infrastructure by building highways that bypass poor communities?

Will they promote a model that enables the creation of more billionaires in the face of global abject poverty? Will the vision of new leading countries be captured by private sector interests or by population needs? Will private profit supersede public interest as evidenced, for example, in the early days of the debate on access to essential medicines? Will the emerging economic powers of the global South focus on developing new global economic structures based on a redistributive model that will bring justice for all, or will they perpetuate the same inequitable systems that encourage material resource accumulation for some, while others suffer?

Author: Professor Olive Shisana, CEO of the HSRC and chair of the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) of the International Social Science Council and chair of the International Social Science Forum.

To read more, go to Transformative Cornerstones of Social Science Research for Global Change, on http://www.worldsocialscience.org/documents/transformative-cornerstones.pdf.
The increasing professionalisation of native and internal migrant African men and women and white women has significantly changed the distribution of high-skill occupations.

Growing numbers of low-wage, low-skill service sector jobs are said to attract poorly educated, unskilled immigrants from rural areas and developing countries. The contention is that these migrants become trapped in low-skill, low-wage service sector jobs, thereby exacerbating social polarisation.

An alternative argument is that there is a trend towards professional occupational structures, with a general upgrading of skills among the employed workforce and a growth in non-manual clerical, sales, technical, professional and managerial jobs. Consequently, unskilled migrants experience a skills mismatch and are likely to be unemployed rather than employed in low-skilled jobs.

This study used household survey and population census results for Gauteng, South Africa, from 1980 to 2007 to explore the relationship between migrants and social polarisation. The results showed that migrants had a very similar occupation and education profile to natives, and that their presence did not cause social polarisation but instead supported growing professionalisation instead. Here, a migrant to Gauteng is defined as anyone born outside of the province, while a native is someone born in Gauteng.

Migrants and polarisation

Most authors agree that global cities are points of concentration for the producer services vital to managing global financial systems and the high-skill, high-pay workers who perform these tasks. If this was the only phenomenon in question, there would likely be an indisputable trend towards professionalisation and no debate about increasing polarisation. The theory of social polarisation is indeed an appealing one, however some scholars question the evidence in support of it.

Many polarisation theorists also contend that while the native residents of the city fill the growing numbers of high-skill, high-wage service sector jobs, unskilled immigrants to the city fill the concomitantly increasing number of low-wage jobs.
service jobs. They argue that migrants are disproportionately concentrated in low-wage service sector jobs. Yet very few scholars provide any evidence at all for these types of claims and where evidence is presented, it often does not support the social polarisation hypothesis and the role of migrants therein.

**Migrants to Gauteng had a very similar occupational and educational distribution to native residents.**

The purpose of this research was to critically assess the social polarisation hypothesis using data for Gauteng. The evidence did not support the social polarisation hypothesis, namely that changes in sectoral structure have led to equal increases in high- and low-skill work, at the expense of skilled middle-income, manual employment. The dominant pattern was one of increasing numbers of high-skill, high-pay jobs. While the numbers of low-skill workers did increase in Gauteng between 1980 and 2010, the absolute growth in the numbers of higher-skilled, higher-paid managerial, professional, associate professional and technical workers was two-and-a-half times greater than that among low-skill workers. This led to a marked skewing of the occupational distribution towards high-skill work.

**The dominant pattern was one of increasing numbers of high-skill, high-pay jobs.**

I also found that migrants to Gauteng had a very similar occupational and educational distribution to native residents. They were well represented in high-skill, high-pay and semi-skilled, middle-income work and not overwhelmingly uneducated and marginalised in low-skill service sector work. Despite migrants having a similar occupational distribution to natives overall, individual immigrant communities had varied occupational outcomes.

Briefly, although historically the vast majority of high-skill jobs were held by white men, and despite the greatest trend towards professionalisation occurring among coloureds and Indians, it was in fact the increasing professionalisation of native and internal migrant African men and women and white women that significantly changed the distribution of high-skill occupations and contributed most in absolute terms towards increasing professionalisation in Gauteng between 1980 and 2007.

**Conclusion**

Contrary to what many polarisation theorists argue, it does not appear that uneducated, unskilled immigrants are being attracted in large numbers to work in a burgeoning low-wage service sector in Gauteng. Instead, the distribution of occupations among migrants is as diverse as among natives and they are not confined to low-skill work. The data for Gauteng show that migrants have similar occupational distributions to natives, and that all migrants have contributed significantly in absolute terms to the growth of managerial, professional, associate professional and technical occupations and therefore, the trend towards increasing professionalisation. The presence of migrants in this case could be argued to be more relevant to the process of the skewing of the occupation distribution towards increasing professionalisation than glaring polarisation.

**There are simply not enough low-skill, low-wage jobs for the large unskilled labour force.**

As South Africa is a country with large numbers of unskilled adults, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the growth in high-skill occupations would be accompanied by a concomitant growth in low-skill work. Why are the unemployed not taking up low-skill, low-wage jobs? There are simply not enough low-skill, low-wage jobs for the large unskilled labour force. This perhaps underscores a fundamental difference between developed countries and developing countries: vastly different levels of wealth. Arguably, even though there are increasing numbers of high-skill, high-pay workers, the percentage of the total population they form, and the amount of money they earn, is not enough to generate the demand for the low-skill, low-pay service sector jobs necessary to create employment for the majority of unskilled workers. There has simply not been sufficient economic growth and job creation in comparison to labour force growth in South Africa. This has also resulted in growing professionalisation accompanied by increasing unemployment and a large outsider surplus population.

This highlights two points: first, that professionalisation is not a process that occurs only in Western, developed economies, and second, that professionalisation can be accompanied by unemployment under quite different circumstances to those proposed by other authors (i.e. adequate welfare benefits making it unnecessary for workers to hold low-wage jobs and choose unemployment instead). Thus, growing professionalisation is accompanied by growing unemployment and a large outsider surplus population in Gauteng.

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The research was supported by the African Centre for Cities and the National Research Foundation (NRF). Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF.
In measuring social cohesion, three different sets of questions were compiled for three specific dimensions, namely national identity (proudly South African), social attachment and racial trust.

The Proudly South African Measure was constructed by combining the following two statements: 1) ‘I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the world’ and 2) ‘Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other countries’. The response options ranged from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.

The Social Attachment Measure was based on the extent respondents felt attached to the following types of people: 1) ‘Those who speak the same language as you’ 2) ‘Those who belong to the same race group as you’ 3) ‘Those who are in the same financial position as you’ and 4) ‘Those who live in your neighbourhood’. The response options ranged from 1 = very attached to 4 = not at all attached.

The Trust in other Race Groups Measure was constructed based on the following two statements: 1) ‘People of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other’ and 2) ‘People of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other’. The response options ranged from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree.

Levels of social cohesion with regard to national pride and social attachment were relatively high, but trust in other race groups was much lower.

It is important to keep in mind that social cohesion is a broad and complicated concept integrated in many domains of life. In this article we specifically examine the impact economic domain variables have on social cohesion. To investigate the impact of economic conditions on social cohesion, we borrowed from a conceptual framework developed by Turok (2006), according to which economic measures such as employment, income, health, education and housing are preconditions of social cohesion. These basic necessities are the foundation of strong relationships and strong communities.

Key findings
The SASAS 2009 results indicated that levels of social cohesion with regard to national pride and social attachment were relatively high, but trust in other race groups was much lower. For example, the vast majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (89.9%) that they would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country (Figure 1). Similarly, large proportions of respondents felt very attached or slightly attached to those people who spoke the same language (93%) and who belonged to the same race group (89.9%) (Figure 2). On the other hand, a large proportion of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (71%) that people of different racial groups did not really trust or like each other (Figure 3).
The vast majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country.

Explaining national pride
When explaining national pride, the study found that the respondents’ race group and level of income had a significant influence on how proud they were of South Africa. For example, we established that coloureds with high incomes had higher levels of being proudly South African compared to whites with the same income. Similarly, it was determined that black Africans and coloureds earning high incomes had higher levels of being proudly South African when compared to Indians with the same income.

The study also revealed that males living in urban formal areas were more proud of South Africa than males in urban informal areas. On the other hand, males in the urban informal areas were more proud of being a South African compared to those males living respectively in rural formal and traditional areas. In other words, these results seem to suggest that those respondents living in the urban areas of South Africa are more proud of South Africa than those in the rural areas.

We also found that those respondents who were satisfied with the quality of basic services (in terms of water supply, electricity provision, refuse removal, affordable housing and access to health care), were more proudly South African than those living in urban formal areas, or those who lived in rural and traditional areas. Similarly, it was found that those respondents who were satisfied with the quality of basic services and lived in urban informal areas were more proud of South Africa than those who lived in traditional areas.

Explaining racial trust
The results of this dimension revealed that older individuals (50 years and over) had lower trust in other groups compared to younger individuals (25-34 years). In terms of race, it was established that black Africans were the least trusted by the other major groups: whites, Indians and coloureds. Another interesting finding was that as the incomes of urban informal and urban formal residents increased to the same level of other urban informal or urban formal residents, there was an increase in trust in other groups.

Explaining social attachment
The results of the third dimension showed that an increase in satisfaction with quality of service resulted in a higher increase in social attachment among black Africans, coloureds and Indians, compared to whites. In other words, if the quality of services was improved, blacks, coloureds and Indians would have a higher social attachment than whites. The study also found that the social attachment would be much higher among blacks compared to whites and Indians when labour redress action was addressed or improved.

Conclusion
In general, the results from this study demonstrated that South Africa as a society continues to be plagued by large-scale inequalities along various dimensions such as race group and geographic location. Furthermore, these economic inequalities have a negative impact on creating a more unified South Africa that cuts across all boundaries. The South African Reconciliation Barometer also demonstrated that unchecked, economic inequality remains a key factor in keeping South Africans apart. More specifically, its results showed that ‘levels of interracial contact are closely linked to income’. The implication of these findings is that by improving the economic conditions of South Africans, their level of social cohesion increases. Thus, government should be encouraged to continue efforts to improve the nation’s economic conditions to achieve its social cohesion objectives.

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The concept of the green economy provides a potential framework to address some of South Africa’s major socioeconomic and environmental challenges by stimulating economic activity and employment through positive action on the environment, write Leanne Seeliger and Ivan Turok.

The country is a major global source of carbon emissions, many of our vital ecosystems are under threat, and there is a looming water crisis. Meanwhile, unemployment is exceptionally high and poverty blights many local communities.

The idea of green growth can constructively connect these themes by stimulating economic activity and employment through positive action on the environment. The South African government recognised the possibilities with the New Growth Path launched in 2010. It identified the green economy as one of five major employment drivers.

One of the pillars of the green economy concentrates on expanding jobs and incomes by creating markets for environmentally-friendly goods and services, such as renewable energy, biofuels, retrofitting buildings and waste recycling. Another pillar involves promoting green technological innovation and enabling more efficient use of natural resources, such as water, soil for food production, coal and other minerals. The core idea is that a targeted financial stimulus can secure combined economic and environmental benefits from green initiatives.

South Africa faces big challenges in making the transition to a low-carbon economy because of its heavy dependence on coal-based energy generation and oil-reliant transport systems. The country’s historic growth path has consistently ignored the damage done to the natural environment as a result of mining, cheap energy and suburban sprawl. An incremental approach that gradually phases in alternative technologies and cleaner activities will avoid the economic shock that would arise from suddenly cutting back on ‘dirty’ industries, reducing energy consumption and replacing fossil fuels with more costly substitutes.

The initiative captured the public imagination and raised the profile of government action on the environment.

Ambitious green targets
The government signalled its intentions by launching the Green Economy Accord in November 2011 on the eve of the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Durban. This was a high-level agreement based on a broad consensus between the government, business, labour and civil society on greening the economy. Stakeholders in the social contract agreed on 12 commitments that seemed very bold and comprehensive at the time. The initiative captured the public imagination and raised the profile of government action on the environment.

The commitments included installing a million solar water heaters by 2014, procuring 3 725MWs of renewable energy for the national grid by 2016, substantial investment in green...
industry, energy efficiency targets of between 10-15% in many sectors, waste recycling targets of up to 61% on some substances by 2014, support for biofuels, the possible development of a carbon capture storage facility, phasing out incandescent lighting, the promotion of public transport and the electrification of poor communities.

Progress to date
Progress on these commitments has been somewhat uneven to date. In May 2013 the Economic Development Department issued a summary progress report. The government’s achievements against three commitments were highlighted: solar water heaters, renewable energy and investment in green industry.

Almost 340 000 solar water heaters have been installed and proposals are being reviewed to install the remaining 660 000. An energy efficiency campaign by Eskom is estimated to have saved 80GW of electricity consumption, reducing customer bills by about R80 million.

Most important, the Industrial Development Corporation has allocated R7.6 billion for 18 green industry projects since 2011, with an emphasis on renewable energy (mainly solar panels and wind turbines). This is expected to create more than 3 700 permanent jobs and many more temporary jobs. South Africa’s recent investment in renewable energy has been recognised as highly significant by global observers.

Progress on biofuels and the electrification of poor communities has been relatively slow. The commitment to promote biofuels experienced several delays, including public opposition using land designated for agriculture for fuel production. Meanwhile, there are about 3.3 million households without electricity. Three-quarters are in areas waiting for investment by Eskom, and a quarter are in areas dependent on municipalities.

The Green Economy Accord has not reported any progress on greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Department of Environmental Affairs expects to implement a mandatory greenhouse gas (GHG) reporting system in 2014. Companies and entities that emit more than 100 000 tonnes of GHGs annually or that consume electricity that results in more than 100 000 tonnes of emissions from the electricity sector will be required to report on their GHG emissions in the new system.

The Green Economy Accord was a good start to greening the economy.

Conclusion
All things considered, there is a broad consensus that the Green Economy Accord was a good start to greening the economy. The choice of some of the commitments was tactically astute because pledges had already been approved and actions set in motion, so progress was relatively assured. This was valuable for symbolic reasons and beneficial for building confidence among the various stakeholders.

Further progress will require stepping up a gear. The partnership with the business sector needs to be strengthened to accelerate the adoption of green economy principles and practices, especially in reducing carbon content and promoting resource efficiency. Private investment also needs to be attracted into green industries and infrastructure since there is a limit to the resources available to the government. Trade unions need to be persuaded that action on the environment need not compromise jobs, and to support public works programmes to restore and maintain water courses, green spaces, soil conservation and other ecosystems.

There is simply not enough professional staff available to translate the good intentions and targets of the Green Economy Accord into reality.

NGOs have important roles to play in extending the beneficial impacts of green economy initiatives to poor communities through solar water heaters, localised electricity generation and passive shelter design to reduce heat loss during winter. NGOs have a stronger track record and credibility of working with communities to provide better environmental services than municipalities.

Above all, greater technical and administrative capacity is needed within each sphere of government to follow through on the commitments made in 2011 and to realise the full potential of the green economy. Key government departments lack the capabilities to mobilise other partners and to unlock the bureaucratic constraints to green projects. There is simply not enough professional staff available to translate the good intentions and targets of the Green Economy Accord into reality.

Authors: Dr Leanne Seeliger, post-doctoral fellow, Economic Performance and Development (EPD) programme, HSRC; Professor Ivan Turok, deputy executive director, EPD, HSRC.
Are social grants a threat to fiscal sustainability?

The recent global economic crisis once again demonstrated that macroeconomic shocks can cause large and unforeseen losses that are unevenly distributed across the population. As the social grants and security system is one key dimension of individual and social well-being in South Africa, its effectiveness and equity is essential for improving social welfare. But does this pose a risk to the country’s fiscal sustainability, ask Ramos Mabugu and Margaret Chitiga-Mabugu.

Social welfare can be regarded as risk sharing, as it has the potential to prevent a group or class of people from falling behind the mainstream and from being unable to participate in the market economy. In this way it presents an insurance against risk (i.e. sickness, unemployment, and so forth). Social spending can also enhance productivity and human capital through spending on education, health and nutrition. However, while risk sharing embedded in social grants is highly desirable, some risk-sharing arrangements may have an economic cost by undermining people’s incentives to work, save or invest. Indeed, many people have a negative perception of grants, believing that grants create dependency and perverse incentives.

Balancing fiscal and political sustainability

Any fiscal system has to strike a balance between fiscal and political sustainability. South Africa’s fiscal system can therefore not only be judged on its fiscal outcomes, but also on its constitutional obligation to further the progressive realisation of socioeconomic rights, especially in the case of children and the dignity of the elderly. The system has to deliver on both these outcomes, giving tangible expression to the transformative vision of the country’s constitution.

In an economic situation where funding has become very scarce, the question is whether the government is making the best use of its money to achieve poverty alleviation, social inclusion and stability. In this article we present new analysis on these issues based on systematic, economy-wide projections that offer a vantage point from which to weigh-in on evidence-based versus ideological reactions to social grants. We examine how various macroeconomic risks have been shared within the economy, and suggest reforms to improve risk-sharing and make it more economically efficient.

Concern about the sustainability of the social grant system is at this stage unfounded.

Social grant spending is an investment in human capital, underpinning future inclusive growth.

Key findings

The main insights into the magnitude of the impact associated with social grants in South Africa and the extent of fragility in terms of poverty levels and well-being are:

- There is merit to the underlying concern about the lack of growth, need for more job creation and productivity enhancement expressed by many commentators, since these are the ultimate determinants of fiscal sustainability in any economy. Broadening the tax base through increased participation in employment and other sustainable livelihoods is absolutely critical.
- However, our research indicates that concern about the sustainability of the social grant system is at this stage unfounded, as the grant system is currently not a threat to fiscal sustainability. The growth in social grants spending has been driven by (a) changes in policy (such as increases in age of eligibility and the value of the grant over time) and (b) growing take-up rates among eligible populations. Given no foreseeable policy changes and as the pool of non-registered but eligible beneficiaries declines, this growth is expected to stabilise and is unlikely to accelerate to the same extent in coming years. Discounting for inflation and taking into account the lower than anticipated population growth projections implied by the 2011 Census affirms this trend.
- Despite the fairly widespread negative perceptions of grants, the findings from our systematic economic evaluations are encouraging. To evaluate this argument more robustly, our studies over the last three years have focused on the economic impact of the grant system, over and above its huge social value combating poverty among vulnerable groups such as children and the aged.
Social grants actually increase consumption of basics such as food and education. The direct effects of the change in grants have higher impacts on poverty and inequality than the indirect effects. This is consistent with the fact that grants form a large part of the income for households living in poverty. Improvements are found in the welfare of households in rural formal, tribal authority and urban informal areas. For households living in formal urban areas, poverty is hardly affected, but is reduced when the excluded children are included in the system. In addition, we found that the consumption and production of education and nutritious food products increases. All indications are that social grant spending is an investment in human capital, underpinning future inclusive growth.

- There is no systematic evidence that child maintenance grants create dependency, since mothers receiving child grants are indeed empowered to access the labour market. A positive link was found between the grants and the probability of participating in the labour force. Furthermore, to the extent that the vast majority of the beneficiaries are vulnerable and not economically active people, such as the elderly, children and people with disabilities, labour market disincentive effects or dependency arguments may not be as relevant.

- Previous studies have shown that social grants are exceptionally well targeted at the poorest of the poor. We found that in the absence of the child welfare grants, the impact of the global recession of 2008 on child poverty in South Africa would have been much more severe. The analysis shows that the impact of the economic crisis was not severe on children’s poverty headcount, but that material welfare declined across large parts of the distribution. The latter impact on welfare exacerbated poverty depth, moving the already poor further below the poverty line where they will now remain for much longer. This suggests that the major impact of the economic crisis was on the poorest, and that this is the most difficult to overcome.

There is no systematic evidence that child maintenance grants create dependency, since mothers receiving child grants are empowered to access the labour market.

The long-term view

The great danger confronting South Africa today is that longer-term fiscal imperatives could be used as reasons to limit necessary future growth in spending on social grants. Notwithstanding enormous sociopolitical pressures on the national budget after social grants reform, new analysis shows that the overall fiscal position is still stable.

At the economy-wide level, the results challenge the often-held view that these grants are squandered on non-productive consumption. Grants are not only consumption expenditure used to enhance intergenerational equity, but also promote productive efficiency and human capital. This suggests a compelling developmental state argument to preserve and protect current expenditure levels, even in fiscally austere conditions.

Our analysis leads to the recommendation that while fiscal prudence and consolidation are pursued in the medium term, social security spending should not be cut, especially in the wake of the prolonged global financial crisis, which is still being felt today. This must be coupled with decisive responses to the crises in the public education and health systems, as well as effective job creation initiatives, to ensure that growing social grants do not unnecessarily become a permanent feature of the South African landscape.

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South Africa’s constitution has been hailed the world over as truly revolutionary, yet over the past 19 years, the country has struggled to entrench a culture of constitutional democracy. Judith February and Gary Pienaar look at whether parliament has upheld the constitution, and progress towards the constitutional vision of human dignity.

When it was drawn up, the Bill of Rights in chapter 2 of the constitution incorporated justiciable socioeconomic rights, paving a way for the country to be organised through a separation of powers – though weak – between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. It envisaged an ongoing conversation between the three.

The founding principles of the constitution laid down the values that underpin the democratic state, namely accountability, responsiveness and openness, providing a bridge from a culture of authority to one of justification. These values underpin pursuit of the constitutional objectives of human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.

Accountability is necessary because of human tendencies to laziness, error and greed. Accountability from public officials is important to ensure that the central democratic values are upheld in government of, by and for the people. Substantive or political uncertainty remains a positive democratic value. Political leaders who feel relatively more vulnerable to being replaced tend to conduct themselves in a manner more respectful of agreed objectives, rules and standards. Institutional uncertainty, however, is a negative democratic value, implying vulnerability of the democratic system to undemocratic impulses.

Parliament shirks oversight responsibilities

Parliament’s attitude to judicial and other forms of oversight has been largely resistant.

The prospect of parliament abrogating its responsibility to apply its mind by not only involving and representing its diverse public, but also physically engaging it in public participation, generated a public outcry. Parliament has, however, recently bowed to a ruling by the constitutional court concerning the national assembly’s rules, which have been consistently interpreted as requiring the speaker’s consent before MPs could introduce private member’s bills.

Equally consistently, the speaker has been advised against such consent by the committee on private members’ legislative proposals and special petitions. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Mogoeng held that this interpretation was inconsistent with the constitution and therefore invalid.

The constitution establishes that the state is required to work to improve the quality of life for all citizens and free the potential of each person. An evaluation of the degree of access to those services and opportunities that contribute to achieving human dignity is therefore essential to assess the state of our democracy.
Parliament’s frequent failure to assert either its own authority or that of chapter 9 institutions to take firm action to hold the Executive accountable for non-delivery has been traced to the subordination of its representative functions to the power of the executive.

Towards the constitutional vision of human dignity
The exclusively closed proportional list system of electoral democracy has been identified as the principal reason for the reality that, in the absence of a meaningful, accountable relationship with defined voting constituencies, MPs feel greater responsibility towards party principals who decide on their inclusion in party lists than towards the general electorate.

Among the branches of the state, the Judiciary is uniquely vulnerable to criticism, lacking substantial power to enforce its own decisions. It can perform its functions in a ‘fair and appropriate manner’ only if its ‘independence is safeguarded and respected and when it enjoys legitimacy among a large section of the population’.

Public debate has flared on the meaning and role of the constitution – is it the primary obstacle in the path towards reducing social and economic inequality, or are our socially and ethnically untransformed Judiciary, Executive and public servants the reason for our lack of progress towards the constitutional vision of human dignity?

Finest hour or fatal compromise?
Illustrative of the widely divergent views on the constitution's legitimacy is the De Klerk Foundation’s description of the political settlement expressed in the constitution as South Africa’s ‘finest hour’. Other national leaders, by contrast, assert that it was a ‘fatal compromise’ extracted in unfair circumstances. Plausible explanations for this hostility towards the constitution and the institutions responsible for upholding and protecting it are not limited to considerations of self-interest and the general human dislike of public criticism, perhaps sharpened by the psychological wounds of apartheid’s humiliations.

Those who question the constitution's legitimacy as an elite pact influenced by contemporary neoliberal dominance are forgetful that the process was far more open to the public than a number of subsequent policy and legislative interventions that undermine basic human dignity, generating disappointment and disenchantment with both the ruling party and the democratic model.

The elitism of the private sector
The private sector has also attracted renewed criticism following the global economic and financial crisis of 2008. SA business is increasingly characterised as elitist, exclusive and resistant to transformation. The laudable motives underpinning the BBBEE policy notwithstanding, criticisms have swelled of its elitist outcomes, and its failure to enforce boardroom transformation.

Opportunistic elements in the NPA
Seeking to avoid the scrutiny of accountability demanded by the constitution, opportunistic elements have increased pressure on the constitution. Former National Public Prosecutor Bulelani Ngcuka declined to indict Jacob Zuma on corruption and related charges on the grounds that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) had a prima facie but not a ‘winnable’ case against him.

Ngcuka’s public statement to this effect led to widespread criticism about abuse of authority to Zuma’s reputational detriment. The NPA has been at the centre of public life and debate for more than half of South Africa’s two decades of democracy. The NPA itself, and its independent component units, the Directorate for Special Operations (DSO or Scorpions) and the Assets Forfeiture Unit, for many years led a high-profile fight against organised and white collar crime that began to include in its nets senior political figures.

An independent NPA that prosecutes without fear, favour or prejudice signals that no-one is above the law. It also helps bolster respect for the law and indirectly instil trust in the constitution and the institutions it creates, including the judiciary.

The political system has not yet internalised the responsibility of public representatives to account for their actions and performance.

Accountability of public representatives in question
The political system has not yet internalised the responsibility of public representatives to account for their actions and performance. It has not yet enacted legislation to remedy the continued absence of post-employment restrictions, to regulate the private business interests of public servants, or to render transparent private and foreign sources of political finance.

The impression has been created that accountability is something that needs to be avoided rather than embraced as an integral feature of a constitutional democracy.

President Nelson Mandela’s example of willing submission to the jurisdiction of the constitutional court out of respect for its sphere of authority finds few echoes in the conduct and attitudes of subsequent leadership. Instead, trench warfare involving significant expenditure of public monies on ‘litigation by exhaustion’ has characterised the attitude of too many government representatives.

Yet all is not lost. As South Africa heads towards 20 years of constitutional democracy, although uncertain at times, it remains ever hopeful that constitutional values will be embedded to ensure that the societal transformation the constitution envisages becomes a reality for the majority of South Africans.
Methodology wars in the measuring and evaluation of innovation

The typical instruments and manuals used to evaluate a country’s level and extent of research and development and science, technology and innovation, are not appropriate for many developing countries as they overlook the glaring differences between developed and developing economies, and the innovation (products) that do exist. Alexandra Mhula, Tim Hart and Peter Jacobs discuss alternative measurements employed by other developing countries and ask whether these should not also be adapted to local circumstances.

Globally, innovation and the recognition to be considered innovative appear to be increasingly popular ambitions among so-called developed and developing countries, with most striving for improved and increased innovative capacity, capability and output. To enable comparisons between countries, standardised survey tools are used to measure and evaluate a country’s level and extent of science, technology and innovation (STI), using indicators such as capacity, outputs, patents and intellectual property rights (IPR).

Since the early 1960s, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been compiling research and development (R&D) and STI indicators. The development of these indicators took years of experimentation and scrutinising by various government agencies. As a result, the OECD developed various manuals and survey instruments, such as the Frascati and Oslo Manuals for measuring the level and extent of R&D and STI.

The use of such standardised instruments overlooks the glaring differences between developed and developing economies.

These manuals, along with their measurement instruments, quickly became internationally accepted as reference points for the development of STI indicators and the comparative measurement of innovation. They are currently used to measure innovation activities in both the developed and developing countries. However, OECD indicators are largely based on experience and circumstances within the OECD countries, rather than developing countries. Furthermore, these indicators were developed for the purpose of using national surveys focusing on formal enterprises (i.e. firms).

However, the use of such standardised instruments overlooks the glaring differences between developed and developing economies, including the diversity of reasons why specific innovation activities are selected and others not. Consequently, there is a failure to recognise the subsequent innovations (products and processes) determined by these choices.

The need for developing more relevant indicators is perhaps most urgent in Africa.

There is a need for a more bottom-up approach to developing indicators, given that national innovation choices, outputs and capacity differ from those at the more localised level, while national comparisons do not take into account the inherent and structural differences between developing and developed countries and their economies. The need for developing more relevant indicators is perhaps most urgent in Africa.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, these indicators have been adapted to some extent to capture the innovation diversity found in many of these countries. This pioneering work was compiled into what is known as the Bogota Manual. Unfortunately, these important contributions to measuring innovation in developing countries are simply noted in the appendix of the Oslo Manual. Consequently, much of the innovation activities occurring in informal enterprises are not captured by these instruments. Even if they did attempt to consider informal activities, the indicators currently used (outputs, commercial/market value, tertiary education, IPRs etc.) are insufficient.

Local innovations occurring in the informal sector cannot be neglected, especially in developing countries where they play a crucial role in the local development
of rural communities and their livelihood strategies. In many cases such innovations address local social and economic challenges, including unemployment, food and water scarcity, and inadequate health, social and education services. While it makes sense to adapt the best and most relevant OECD indicators when compiling STI and R&D assessment instruments for developing countries, including South Africa, it is imperative to also develop and include indicators that would accommodate the local diversity of these countries.

The international PROLINNOVA (Promoting Local Innovation in Ecologically-oriented Agriculture and Natural Resource Management) network has made significant strides in emphasising the importance of local innovations, particularly in African agriculture and natural resource use. Where appropriate, the programme attempts to strengthen the linkages between farmers, users, researchers, NGOs and other more formal stakeholders in agricultural R&D. Partnerships are largely directed by farmers and increase the capacities of all partners to address their challenges in an ever-changing world. From this work PROLINNOVA partners have started working towards the development of locally relevant indicators, offering a pool of local level indicators that considers local realities in rural areas of developing countries. Without doubt, these realities should be incorporated into innovation decision-making at the national level.

It is critical to develop an approach that combines national and internationally comparative indicators... with indicators generated by innovators and actors active at the local level.

This participatory approach emphasises the importance of involving local communities in innovation activities to stimulate social action, while allowing for self-learning, reflection, appropriate action and improved understanding by all actors involved. It also provides additional benefits to both researchers and the local innovators, because it is not only an additional source of valuable information for the researchers, but also an important source of self-learning and understanding for both parties.

To have a coherent and informed picture of innovation activities in a developing country, it is critical to develop an approach that combines national and internationally comparative indicators, such as those developed by the OECD, together with indicators generated by innovators and actors active at the local level. Top-down development of instruments and indicators is inadequate. Such an approach needs to be well balanced to ensure local needs and circumstances that direct local innovation activities and ultimately, outputs, are not ignored.

Figure 1 is an illustration of the indicator pyramid, an approach worth experimenting with when developing a methodology for STI indicators for African and other developing countries.

**Figure 1: Indicator Pyramid**

The indicator pyramid consists of three levels of indicators: global, national and local. The top of the pyramid comprises global indicators such as the OECD indicators found in the Frascati, Oslo and other manuals that allow for international comparability among countries. National level indicators are those developed by national statistical agencies and research institutes, and are measured by means of large-scale surveys. Indicators at this level may also be developed by various research and academic institutions.

Often these indicators and measurement instruments do not differ from the ones used for global comparative purposes. At the bottom of the pyramid there are indicators that can be extracted from case studies and small sample surveys. These are especially important to collect information about innovation at the local level. The indicator pyramid suggests that rather than standing alone, the local level indicators should be used to develop relevant indicators for the national and global levels.

Despite the involvement of numerous research organisations, the development of local level indicators that could contribute to a framework such as the pyramid indicator framework is lacking, or slow, at best. Strengthening these contributions would enable the further development of stronger national and global level indicators, while ensuring that locally developed innovations were not ignored and their relevance to local people as part of their own attempts to improve their socioeconomic circumstances were acknowledged and given value.

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The textures of culture in post-apartheid South Africa

Social cohesion is a widely used phrase in the government’s goals for the country’s future. According to the National Development Plan, by 2030, South Africans will be more conscious of the things they have in common than the things that make them different. Are we looking then to a future where seemingly ubiquitous racial differences will hold less and less meaning, asks Safiyya Goga.

Studies on post-apartheid identities in South Africa seem to suggest that rather than the absence of racial differences, we are simply reproducing these differences in new ways. We do not talk about race as the basis for our differences; instead we speak of cultural differences. What is it about culture that makes it so crucial to claim, define and defend in post-apartheid South Africa?

Histories of colonisation and apartheid devalued African cultures and traditions.

Cultures are naturally different
Culture allows us to say we are different from other people without having to explain too much since cultural differences are considered obvious, natural or self-evident. We tend to think of culture as something quite fixed, as tradition, with a long history and also attached in fairly obvious ways to particular ethnic or language groups. So we have self-evident Zulu, Xhosa, Indian, Cape Malay and Afrikaans cultures, rooted in long-standing cultural practices and languages.

However, culture also gets taken up in the reverse. It is precisely because culture has the effect of making something seem coherent and solid and, most importantly, legitimate in a natural way, that we see it attached to spaces and practices that are looking for ways of being legitimised and accepted in post-apartheid South Africa. For instance, the reference to so-called township culture.

Culture is also achieved through demonstrating one’s global connectedness; a deep connection not to here, but to somewhere else.

Culture is powerful
An example of the emancipatory possibility of culture might be the Khoisan Revival Movement in parts of the Cape, which harnesses the power of culture, reclaiming their language, food, clothing, music, artistic expression and so forth. The fact that cultures have to be revived (or restored or reclaimed) points to the fact that they have been marginalised. The Department of Arts and Culture wants South Africans to reclaim and restore their cultural heritage. While local language is inclusive and seems to include equally all South African languages, traditions and cultures, it is recognised that histories of colonisation and apartheid devalued African cultures and traditions. Events such as national Heritage Day reflect efforts to once again give value to these constituents.

Culture, or being cultured, is also achieved through demonstrating one’s global connectedness; a deep connection not to here, but to somewhere else. Cultures can claim to originate from, or be deeply connected to, somewhere else outside of South Africa, lending them a different kind of authenticity. White English-speaking South Africans (WESSA) may be an example of this through the claims and connections to an elsewhere (Europe). A newfound value in the claim to a Cape Malay identity among Cape Town Muslims is partly connected to a desire to originate from elsewhere (Indonesia). Indians and Indian Muslims in Durban have historically also kept connected (through travel, story-telling, food culture, clothing etc.) to an elsewhere (India), which may be seeing a post-apartheid shift to another elsewhere (the Middle East).

Cultures are not equal
The significant point is that all of these cultures are not discrete units. Rather, the various claims to culture that are being made may be seen as a kind of national conversation, where unequal participants are making claims about ‘who we are’ in relation to the claims being made by others. More attention needs to be paid to these conversations, both within and between cultures, in order to see where South Africa is headed.
Cultures often become sites of racialised struggle – who owns the culture?

Cultures are struggled over
Cultures often become sites of racialised struggle – who owns the culture? Who can speak on behalf of it? Who can propagate it and how are its boundaries policed? Who is on the inside of the culture and who remains on the outside? The struggle over Afrikaans – as both language and culture – which documentaries like *Afrikaaps* capture as a racial struggle, demonstrate that there is something significant at stake in claiming a language/culture as one’s own.

Similarly, the struggle over Muslim culture/identity in Durban is racialised in the sense that Indians are seen to own the religion. Indeed Islam has universalistic values, yet what Islam is, is also how it is lived and given meaning in a specific context. Cultures are struggled over from within (and questioned from without), with different voices competing for recognition as authentic representatives of the culture/identity.

Race and racial distinctions have not simply disappeared in post-apartheid South Africa.

If South Africans are equal in a significant sense, it is in the fact that all groups and communities are equally caught up in trying to find a space of belonging in the insecurity and yet immense possibility that the post-apartheid condition offers. We need to understand more deeply what lies behind calls for an authentic Cape Malay, Indian, African, Jewish, Muslim, Christian or any other culture or identity. The point of research into how cultures are developing, evolving, being (re)claimed, (re)stored and defended in post-apartheid South Africa is to understand how people are redefining themselves and what this means for the country’s multicultural and social cohesion projects.

The inequality of cultures is often a mark of racialised heritages in South Africa. It is not just the fact that racialised cultures have developed in post-apartheid South Africa, but crucially that these cultures are not equal. This is something that has been astutely observed by bloggers such as Sipho Hlongwane and Eusebius McKaiser, who have argued that young black people gravitate towards a white culture (whiteness). What precisely this means in different contexts in South Africa, needs to be explored empirically.

Race still in the room
When people assert a particular identity – cultural, religious, racial or any other identity – we should perhaps pay attention. Race and racial distinctions have not simply disappeared in post-apartheid South Africa. This does not mean that the whole of a culture/religion can be understood through race. But if we want to understand post-apartheid identities and cultures, we need to consider where race has gone. We are likely to find, as many studies have already shown, that race has not left the room but become entrenched in new and complex ways.

Acknowledgement: Much of my conceptual thinking on culture has been shaped by Terence Turner’s (1993) paper on Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is Anthropology That Multiculturalists Should be Mindful of it?

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Directly linked to this apparent focus on rural food security is the perception that food insecurity in cities can be solved by simply increasing the levels of agricultural production in rural areas. The argument goes that South Africa produces enough food, and the assumption therefore is that the country is food secure at a national level. However, this cannot be assumed at a household level. Household food insecurity in urban areas is an issue of availability and access, which mostly takes the form of food purchases. This study assessed food retail and purchasing patterns in South African cities, and patterns of unsustainability in food security.

Study sites and methodology
The study was conducted in February and March 2012 in the inner cities of Durban, Pretoria and Johannesburg with a total of 154 respondents. These respondents were selected randomly and interviewed in front of various food outlets in what is called intercept interviews. The outlets were selected according to the different types of food retail outlets available, namely large supermarkets such as Shoprite; smaller supermarkets such as Checkout Supermarkets; and informal traders and street vendors.

Findings

Food sources of the unemployed
Respondents who indicated that they were unemployed at the time of the study were asked what means or sources they used to obtain food on a daily basis (Figure 1). The significance of social assistance grants in this respect should be highlighted.

A surprising number of respondents in Pretoria (18.2%) indicated that they grew their own food. However, none of the respondents in Durban indicated that they grew their own food while only 6.7% of all respondents in Johannesburg indicated that they did so.

Urban food insecurity is one of the emerging developmental challenges associated with population growth in urban areas. Often international, regional and national policy agendas are more concerned with food security in rural areas, while food security of the urban poor is left unattended and under researched. **Charl van der Merwe** studied the patterns and sustainability of food retail and purchasing in the inner cities of Durban, Pretoria and Johannesburg.
All residents indicated that the decision where to buy their food was mostly based on price.

Figure 2: Frequency of respondents cooking for themselves or their households.

Source: Van der Merwe, 2012

Frequency of food purchasing and distance travelled to food outlets

When asked about the frequency of grocery shopping, 58% of respondents indicated that they purchased groceries (food) only once per month, which they supplemented towards the end of the month with small trips to a food outlet for those items that had been exhausted.

Figure 3: Respondents’ travel time to first-choice food outlets

Source: Van der Merwe, 2012

A total of 60% of all respondents indicated that they had to travel to get to the food outlet where they purchased most of their food (Figure 3). The alarming statistic was that 33.7% of these respondents indicated that they had to travel more than 10 kilometres or one hour to get to a food outlet, and 53.1% of the respondents had to travel between two and 10 kilometres to get to a food outlet. This figure could have a slight limitation, as a possible explanation could be that many respondents chose to purchase their food close to where they worked, which could mean these were the distances from their workplace. It was nonetheless alarming that many respondents reported long daily distances of travel for work purposes.

Discussion

The study showed that the majority of people who resided or worked in and around South Africa’s urban centres made use of large retail supermarkets for food purchases. Smaller supermarkets and informal markets were mostly used to supplement purchases made at larger supermarkets.

An emerging pattern in terms of urban diets and lifestyles was an increase in the consumption of prepared foods and fast food, and the adoption of more Western diets and lifestyles, in other words diets that had high intakes of fats and low intakes of carbohydrates and fibre. This finding confirmed the outcomes of other studies that indicated while many white and coloured urban populations already followed the typical Western diet, black urban dwellers were increasingly starting to adopt these types of diets and lifestyles too.

This study also highlighted the importance of social grants as a tool to enable the urban poor or unemployed urban residents to access food. In addition to these grants, food provided by parents or other family members also proved to be an important food source for unemployed urban residents.

Lastly, it was important to understand the three levels of food retail outlets (large supermarkets, smaller supermarkets and informal markets) and the relationship between them. Even though most respondents indicated that they bought the bulk of their groceries at large supermarkets, all residents indicated that the decision where to buy their food was mostly based on price.

Conclusion

The data presented in this article suggest that certain aspects of the broader food systems of South African cities could possibly be considered to be unsustainable. The following is therefore suggested:

- Geographical access to food seemed to be unsustainable in some cases because of the distances respondents had to travel. The cost of travelling such distances coupled with the already high prices of food means that this is not sustainable, and that it is a challenge that needs serious attention.
- Income and the availability of cash needs to be continuously highlighted and addressed, especially in urban settings where food is mostly acquired through food purchases.
- Diversification of food sources for the urban poor remains a challenge that needs further investigation, as this sector mostly relies on social security assistance from the government. The study showed that a very small percentage of people participated in urban agriculture.
- The relationship between the three categories of food outlets and exactly what influences people’s choices regarding the type of food outlet at which they choose to buy their groceries, as well as where they choose to go if they cannot find what they are looking for at their first choice of food outlet, could provide interesting grounds for further research.

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Interaction between towers of learning and poor communities
four case studies

Interaction between universities and marginalised communities around innovation activities that create or protect livelihoods, are rare in South Africa. Glenda Kruss and Michael Gastrow reports on preliminary results of a study on how universities may contribute to innovation for inclusive development.

A cademics are motivated primarily by their disciplinary reputations and traditions, and change in universities is driven by their substantive role in knowledge generation. In a context of multiple expectations of new roles for universities from government, the market and civil society, this study explored how each of four main types of universities in the South African national system of innovation responded to these expectations. The four case studies involved the following four types of institutions*, namely research, comprehensive, technology and rural universities.

Methods
The foundation of the study was a comprehensive process of mapping existing interactive practices with firms, farmers, communities, government, or social organisations. Research and innovation networks that impact on the quality of life of marginalised communities, focused on social innovation in relation to solar energy or sanitation or health for example, more commonly contribute to inclusive development.

For the purposes of this project, the focus was four in-depth case studies of networks between universities around livelihoods, meaning the way in which people or communities earn an income or a living subsistence. Each case study focused on investigating what facilitates, or constrains, interactions between universities and marginalised communities in relation to livelihoods in informal settings.

Four case studies

Sewing project
The first study was the technology transfer that takes place between a technology station (an area equipped with highly specialised technology for specific disciplines, in this case clothing technology) at a university of technology, and a hybrid NGO/social enterprise.

These two institutions were working together to address the livelihood problems of unemployed, unskilled women living in townships through a sewing project. New products were designed on cutting-edge equipment, and skills were developed to convert from domestic to industrial machinery. Support was provided to produce on a larger scale in order to access formal markets.

Fishing project
This case study involved a participatory network between an academic at a research university and a marginalised rural community aimed at protecting their fragile livelihood by supporting sustainable traditional artisanal fishing practices through research and process innovation.

Organisational innovations included training and support for a committee to represent the community in high level negotiations with government environmental authorities and intermediaries.
**Indigenous cattle breeding**

In this case study a network was formed between rural universities and marginalised communities to improve rural livelihoods by re-introducing indigenous cattle breeds and building new agricultural management systems. This required a community to form a cooperative to care for a breeding herd for a specified period, and then return the original herd to a pool for reallocation, based on traditional practices.

**Sustainable livelihoods**

This was an action research project between a comprehensive university and a local community based in an informal settlement. The project involved the development of innovative solutions for sustainable urban settlements, protected access to livelihoods, and created new livelihood opportunities through environmentally sustainable products that improved the quality of life in the settlement.

**Analyses**

Three of the four interactions have existed for 10 years and more, which suggests that they were not driven in response to current government policy imperatives promoting community engagement or social innovation in universities.

The cases were initiated out of a confluence of interests of the university and the community, facilitated by intermediary partners such as an NGO that supports fishing communities, or an NGO that hosts a social enterprise, or local government agencies.

Three of the cases were very weakly connected to the internal organisational structures that gave incentives to and supported innovation, research and community engagement at their university. The exception was an interface structure located at the university of technology and funded by the Department of Science and Technology (DST).

The evidence suggests that this form of interaction was strongly driven by socially-committed individual academic champions who pursue their own disciplinary knowledge agendas.

The form of interaction is, however, strongly shaped by the university mandate and strategic direction. For example, at the research university, the interaction was strongly oriented to research with traditional knowledge relations and slowly evolved into a bidirectional, mutually beneficial partnership. With its applied technology mandate and commitment to work-integrated and service learning, in contrast, interaction at the university of technology took the form of technology transfer to small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) partners with students as the main channel of interaction.

The rural university was well placed to initiate a network with local communities, extension officers from the department of agriculture, national funding agencies and agriculture students to ensure the effectiveness of the indigenous cattle breeding.

Indeed, for all of the cases, students were the main channel of interaction, bringing codified knowledge from the university, engaging on a daily basis, and consequently, benefiting through tacit learning from the community partners. The academic leader was drawn in actively at key points to give direction and high-level support.
Communities were largely driven to interact with universities by their proactive development strategies, rather than short-term needs. For example, the informal settlement community participated in a local government intermediary-led process that brought in the university academic as a neutral actor to find solutions acceptable to the community and environmental authorities, after prolonged service-delivery protests.

Initiation and maintenance of the interaction, however, relied strongly on community leadership who acted as intermediaries between academics and community members. All four cases included organisational innovations to facilitate new community structures, and educational interventions to support the active participation of some community members. For example, training community leaders in research to audit fish stocks or undertake household audits, or in new farming techniques to support indigenous breeds of cattle, or forming committees to represent the community’s interests.

The level of participation and agency possible on the part of the individuals in the marginalised communities seemed limited, and the direct benefit to their livelihoods was not evident in the short term.

The research raised critical questions about the role of the university in such forms of interaction for inclusive development.

Critical questions
The research raised critical questions about the role of the university in such forms of interaction for inclusive development.

Clearly, the boundaries of what can counts as innovation, defined as ‘a new product, or process, or form of organisation for production’, were stretched. The changes introduced were primarily new forms of organisation for production, or introducing existing technologies new to a ‘community’, in ‘doing-using-and-interacting’ modes, rather than science and technology-led modes of innovation.

If the distinctive role of the university is knowledge generation, and most of the activity with marginalised communities is local adoption and diffusion, should the university be involved in livelihood oriented projects? Is such work not the domain of organisations like development agencies and NGOs or local government?

Academics should not be expected to play the role of development agencies. The university’s distinctive role lies in extending its scholarship to the benefit of marginalised communities.

The answer lies in the fact that the impact of interactions on livelihoods may have been limited in their direct scale and reach, but the involvement of the university in the network meant that it could have wider implications. For example, intensive work with the small fishing community succeeded in protecting the access of some two hundred people to livelihoods, over twenty years. However, the significant research published and the engagement with government around the network could have an impact on practices in many other fishing communities.

Marginalised women in the sewing micro-enterprise improved their skills, designs and access to informal markets, but were unsuccessful in accessing formal markets or value chains. There was no sustained income source for individual members, and the reach of the project was limited to a small number of women per year. However, many women proceeded to their own micro-enterprise, students were trained, and the technology station gained valuable expertise that could be implemented in working with other micro-enterprises.

A general conclusion therefore, is to avoid slippage in expectations. Academics should not be expected to play the role of development agencies. The university’s distinctive role lies in extending its scholarship to the benefit of marginalised communities.

*The study agreement included a confidentiality clause that the names of the institutions involved would be withheld.

Authors: Dr Glenda Kruss, director, Education and Skills Development (ESD) programme, HSRC; Michael Gastrow, research specialist, ESD.

This article is based on a report for the UNIID Africa project, funded by the IDRC Canada. Glenda Kruss, Michael Gastrow, Bongani Nyoka and Christopher Divu, 2013. Linking Universities and Marginalised Communities: South African Case Studies of Innovation Focused on Livelihoods in Informal Settings.
Gauging awareness of the right to terminate pregnancy

The Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act was passed 18 years ago, yet a study conducted in the rural areas of the Vhembe district in Limpopo showed that less than 50% of its young participants knew about the act. This lack of knowledge could hinder young people who need to make use of termination of pregnancy (TOP) services, say Thelma Maluleke and Sylvia Vuledzani Hadzhi.

The Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act (CTOP) gives women of any age access to abortion services upon request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, and in some cases, up to 20 weeks of pregnancy. But even before its introduction, the CTOP evoked a lot of morally related debates and arguments, some of which had a negative impact on the implementation and dissemination of information related to the CTOP and abortion services.

These negative moral debates created several challenges for both the TOP service providers and the women needing these services. Firstly, they made it difficult for some abortion service providers to communicate their services, which affected the accessibility of those services.

Secondly, dissemination of information about the availability of abortion services in public health facilities was hindered by some healthcare workers and the public. In some instances, nurses and doctors providing TOP services were labelled murderers of unborn babies. Like their clients, they were often victimised, stigmatised and even ostracised by their colleagues and communities.

Thirdly, women needing abortion services were unable to access them because of fear of retribution from anti-abortion moralists. It is well documented that in some communities, women who have abortions keep them secret because they are afraid of victimisation or that they will be stigmatised or even ostracised by their relatives and community.

Some other studies show that women fail to access abortion services from government facilities due to the resistance and unwillingness of some health providers to perform the termination of pregnancy procedure. Some nurses and doctors are unwilling to assist in TOP and refuse to give any information as to where the CTOP clinics are located within health facilities.

The consequence of women’s failure to access TOP services is that they end up carrying the unwanted pregnancy to term, which could lead to the abandonment or neglect of the child. Studies show that women also resort to unsafe abortion, which could result in serious complications and death, and that women who cannot access the designated TOP clinics tend to seek assistance from traditional healers with dire consequences, ranging from infection to fatalities.

This article addresses the knowledge of the CTOP among young people in the rural areas of the Vhembe district.

Methods
Four remote rural villages with at least 300 households and a fixed clinic or mobile clinic visiting point were selected. Self-administered questionnaires were used to collect information from a random sample of 544 young people (136 per village, females and males). The questionnaires were in English, Sepedi, Tshivenda and Xitsonga.

Results
Profile of participants
The majority (87.5%) of the participants were unmarried and almost two thirds (64.7%) had never had children, 20% had one child and 5% had two children. More females (68%) than males (32%) participated in the study.

Those who had three and more children were mainly males, constituting 7.4% of the participants, assuming that male participants could have children with more than one woman.

The religious affiliations of the participants were as follows: Christian (65.9%); African religion (25.7%); Muslim (2.2%); and unaffiliated (5.6%).

Almost 60% of the participants had a secondary education, 35% a tertiary education, and only 4% had no education. Women and men were almost equal at all levels of educational attainment. However, almost 60% of those who had no education were women.

78.7% of participants had heard about termination of pregnancy.

Knowledge of the CTOP (n=544)
A total of 428 (78.7%) participants had heard about termination of pregnancy and among those, 248 (57.9%) knew someone who had had an abortion. The majority (93.6%) of those who knew someone who had TOP were adults aged between 20 and 25 years (80.24%), 13.31% were between 18 and 19 years, and 6.45% were between 15 and 17 years. Among those who had some knowledge of TOP, 295 (68.9%) had knowledge about the CTOP. Interestingly, there were more participants (73.5%) who were aware of the health facilities offering TOP in their district.
Participants who had some knowledge about the CTOP were asked to indicate what the act said about people who could access TOP (Figure 1). The results indicated that less than 50% of the participants who had some knowledge of the CTOP were aware that any pregnant woman seeking TOP could access the services.

**Figure 1: Knowledge of who can access CTOP**

![Graph showing percentage of participants aware of who can access CTOP services](source)

**Knowledge about who is responsible for taking decisions related to TOP**
Almost 60% of the participants were aware that the pregnant woman herself was the only person who could take a decision regarding termination of pregnancy, while more than 10% of those thought a health worker could make that decision and 9.6% and 3.7% were of the view that parents of the mother and the father of the child respectively were the ones that could make a decision about TOP. A little less than 50% of the participants who were aware of the CTOP knew that pregnant women did not need permission from the father of the child to terminate their pregnancy (Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Knowledge about who is responsible for taking decisions related to TOP (n=295).**

![Graph showing percentage of participants aware of who is responsible for taking decisions related to TOP](source)

**Weeks of pregnancy at which TOP can be performed**
Participants were further asked to indicate the gestational age of pregnancy at which TOP could be performed. A little more than 50% were aware that a pregnancy could not be terminated after its 20th week (Figure 3). Lack of knowledge and information about the period women are legible to terminate pregnancy could be a contributory factor for delays among women in seeking TOP services.

**Figure 3: Weeks of pregnancy at which TOP can be performed (n=292).**

![Graph showing weeks of pregnancy at which TOP can be performed](source)

The major source of information on the CTOP was through the media (42%), in spite of the fact that these villages had a fixed clinic and community health workers. Other sources of information were the school (15%) and health services (17%). The majority (94%) had knowledge of the places where TOP could be performed, while 4% indicated the traditional healer and another 2% did not know where TOP services were offered.

Support for termination of pregnancy by choice was low (15%). However, the participants supported TOP in case of rape (68%) and for medical reasons.

Generally the participants were opposed to the existence of the CTOP. In their view pregnant women should never be allowed a choice to terminate their pregnancy. The decision to terminate pregnancy must be made by a doctor and only if the woman’s life is threatened by the pregnancy or as a result of rape.

**Discussion and recommendations**
The age and education level of the participants were important factors associated with knowledge of the CTOP. Older participants had more knowledge about TOP in general and were more likely to know someone who had had an abortion than the younger participants.

More effort is needed to create awareness about TOP, the CTOP and the health facilities that offer TOP services to ensure young people needing these services access them, thus reducing the risk of unsafe abortions.

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America’s Deadliest Export: Democracy
The Truth About US Foreign Policy and Everything Else

Author: William Blum
ISBN soft cover: 978-0-9922-0850-9

About the book
Since World War II we have been conditioned to believe that America’s motives in ‘exporting’ democracy are honourable, even noble. In this startling and provocative book, William Blum – a leading dissident chronicler of US foreign policy and the author of controversial bestseller *Rogue State* – argues that nothing could be further from the truth. Moreover, unless this fallacy is unlearned, and until people understand fully the worldwide suffering American policy has caused, we will never be able to stop the monster.

About the author
William has been a freelance journalist in the US, Europe, and South America. In 1999 he was one of the recipients of a Project Censored award for ‘exemplary journalism’. Blum is also the author of *Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, West-Bloc Dissident: A Cold War Memoir,* and *Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire.* His books have been translated into 27 foreign-language editions.

Global Corruption: Money, Power and Ethics in the Modern World

Author: Laurence Cockcroft
ISBN soft cover: 978-0-9922-0856-1

About the book
Corruption has played a pivotal role in sustaining appallingly high levels of poverty in many developing countries, particularly in relation to the deficient provision of basic services such as education and healthcare. Corruption drives the overexploitation of natural resources, capturing their value for the elite who benefit. In the developed world, corrupt funding undermines political systems and lays policy open to heavy financial lobbying. *Global Corruption* attempts to identify the main drivers of corruption worldwide and analyses the current efforts to control them.

About the author
Laurence Cockcroft is a development economist and has been interested and committed to development in Africa since his first experience in Nigeria as a volunteer with VSO International in 1962. He has worked in the Ministry of Rural Development in Zambia as well as with small-scale farmers in Tanzania under the auspices of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank. In 1989 he authored *Africa’s Way: A journey From the Past.*
Voices of Liberation

This series celebrates the lives and writings of South African and African liberation activists and heroes. The human, social and literary contexts presented in this series have a critical resonance and bearing on where we come from, who we are and how we can choose to shape our destiny.

The Voices of Liberation series ensures that the debates and values that shaped the liberation movement are not lost. The series offers a unique combination of biographical information with selections from original speeches, interviews and writings in each volume. By providing access to the thoughts and writings of some of the many men and women who fought for the dismantling of apartheid, colonialism and capitalism, this series invites the contemporary reader to engage directly with the rich history of the struggle for democracy and the restoration of our own identity. The title of the series has been carefully chosen as it speaks to its purpose, which is not only to make a particular voice resonate but to strengthen the voices from the South and Africa in particular.

Voices of Liberation: Steve Biko
Author: Derek Hook

Steve Bantu Biko is an icon of the liberation struggle whose voice and actions continue to contribute to the shaping of our national discourse on identity, culture and values. The HSRC Press views Voices of Liberation: Steve Biko as an extremely important contribution to the series, not least because Biko represents the importance of dialogue as well as the necessary foregrounding of the relationship between identity, agency, citizenship and social action. Steve Biko believed in restoring people to their humanity: the need is now perhaps greater than ever before to hear his voice loudly and clearly.

Voices of Liberation: Chris Hani
Authors: Gregory Houston and James Ngcula
ISBN: 978-7969-2443-8

Chris Hani was a key figure in the South African liberation struggle, yet little has been written about this enigmatic leader of the SACP and Chief of Staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The year 2013 marks the 20-year anniversary of Hani’s assassination and the HSRC Press views the publication of this book as extremely important, not only to commemorate his death but to highlight the principles and values for which he stood. Despite being Chief of Staff of MK, Chris Hani was prepared to support the cessation of the armed struggle in the interests of the negotiations which would ultimately benefit the country as a whole.