STICKING TOGETHER
How much do South Africans trust each other?

PUBLIC SERVICE WAGE BILL
Linking earnings to productivity

AFRICAN GIANT
Professor Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane turns 80

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Who approves and disapproves
**THE CEO NOTES**

**THE HSRC KNOWLEDGE PRODUCERS SERIES**
The HSRC recently hosted the Ben Magubane Conference in partnership with other organisations (Freedom Park Trust, UNISA, South African Democracy Education Trust, National Research Foundation, African Institute of South Africa, Department of Science and Technology, and the Intellectual Heritage Project at Rhodes University).

This conference forms part of our African Knowledge Producers Series, a project initiated by the HSRC as a critical response to recognising the rich heritage of African histories, politics and socio-cultural production. It presents the work of a scholar, activist and intellectual giant who has made a monumental contribution to developing a field we can proudly claim and appropriate as a distinctive brand of African sociology.

Our African Knowledge Producers Series has its roots within an important intellectual trajectory at the HSRC. In 2008 we hosted a symposium on Knowledge and Transformation: Social and Human Sciences in Africa to showcase the intellectual contributions of Africa, notably the work of Professors Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Archie Mafeje.

From a policy perspective the African Knowledge Producers Series supports the principles of the government’s Ten Year Plan on Human and Social Dynamics, to which the HSRC is contributing. One of the key areas is innovation in respect of developing a knowledge-based economy, and the human and social sciences are appropriately positioned to realise this goal.

Our objective with the African Knowledge Producers Series is geared to stimulate, foster, promote, document and disseminate original and innovative contributions by Africans. We see the HSRC brand to have Pan-African coverage, and it is in keeping with developments within our institution to focus on research on Africa, where such scholarship will flourish. Knowledge, therefore, is not simply an asset or commodity, but it is a value, and by this we mean, its identification, construction and application has particular credence for how it is to be used and applied.

A second objective of this conference is the recognition that the sociological and political scholarship of Professor Bernard Magubane on African political history, political economy and political philosophy constitutes a rich archive from which future generations will have much to learn. But the value of the archive lies not only in the content of his books, but also in their revolutionary thought, which opened up further space for intellectual, social and political interrogation by a new generation of scholars and researchers. In this regard, we are proud to welcome several emerging scholars who have participated in the conference.

The programme delivered a rich, invigorating, and enriching dialogue that has offered a renewed appreciation of Professor Magubane’s African scholarship, stimulating our younger generation to take his critical work forward. Applying Professor Bernard Magubane’s life of learning and thought can stimulate our own progress in the way we deal with current problems, as well as re-think old, and sometimes forgotten, problems.

Also read the article on Ben Magubane on page 16 and 17
RESEARCH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HSRC AND NMMU ON HIV/AIDS

The HSRC and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) have signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) related to research on the social aspects of HIV/AIDS.

The agreement entails co-publishing the quarterly *Journal of the Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS Research Alliance (SAHARA J)* and co-hosting the biennial Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS Research Alliance (SAHARA) conference for the next five years. SAHARA is a network of African researchers on the social and behavioural aspects of HIV/AIDS. The secretariat of SAHARA is hosted by the HSRC.

Professor Leickness Simbayi, executive director of the HSRC’s HIV/AIDS, STI and TB programme, welcomed this as ‘an excellent example of local cooperation which is a win-win situation for both institutions involved. We are looking forward to an exciting five-year period of exceptional growth to the SAHARA brand as a result of this agreement’.

Vice-chancellor of NMMU, Professor Derrick Swartz, described this as a landmark agreement, providing a platform for the two institutions ‘to pursue rigorous scholarship into the social dynamics of HIV/AIDS that should provide an important empirical basis for our thinking around national policy and strategy in combating the pandemic’.

The SAHARA J was established in 2004 to provide an outlet for the publication of research articles in French and English on all social aspects of HIV/AIDS, including care, support, prevention, treatment, behavioural surveillance, evidence-based intervention and stigma, amongst others.

The MoU will see the HSRC and NMMU researchers in this field collaborate on the editorial board, with Prof. Nancy Phaswana-Mafuya, the director of SAHARA, Prof. Karl Peltzer, a research director at the HSRC, as the chief advisor, and Ms Mercy Banyini the managing editor.

Prof. Thoko Mayekiso, NMMU deputy vice-chancellor: Research and Engagement, will serve as the editor-in-chief, and Prof. Velile Notshulwana, executive dean of the Faculty of Arts at the NMMU, will serve as the co-executive editor. The two institutions will equally share the annual costs of publishing, printing, editing, translating and distributing the journal.

The inaugural SAHARA conference was held in Pretoria in 2002, with subsequent editions in Cape Town (2004), Dakar, Senegal (2005), Kisumu, Kenya (2007) and Midrand (2009). The conference usually attracts up to 600 delegates from sub-Saharan Africa, researchers in Diaspora, as well as other international delegates.

The sixth SAHARA Conference, to be co-hosted by the HSRC and NMMU in Port Elizabeth from 29 November–2 December 2011, will coincide with World AIDS Day on 1 December 2011.

Through the MoU, the HSRC and NMMU will develop a conference governance strategy for organising the event.

Read the latest issue of *SAHARA J* on [http://www.sahara.org.za](http://www.sahara.org.za)

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**Professor Richter runner-up in Women in Science award**

Professor Linda Richter, a distinguished research fellow at the HSRC, was the second runner-up in the 2010 Women in Science Awards, in the category Distinguished Woman Scholar in the Social Sciences or Humanities. This was the first time in the history of the award since 2003 that recognition was given to these disciplines.

Prof. Richter is on contract for half of her time to the Geneva-based Global Fund on a project to fight Aids, tuberculosis and malaria. She is an elected fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, an honorary professor at the University of the Witwatersrand, and an honorary fellow at the University of Melbourne, in Australia. She completed her PhD in psychology in 1981 at the University of Natal. She is rated a B researcher by the NRF.

The Distinguished Woman Scholar in the Social Sciences or Humanities was jointly won by Stella Nkomo, Professor of Human Resource Management at the University of Pretoria and Professor Clair Penn, chair of the Simmonds Hampton Trust of Speech Pathology and Audiology at Wits University. The first runner-up in this category was Erika de Wet, a constitutional lawyer from the University of Pretoria.

Apart from gifts donated by cosmetics group L'Oreal, who is a sponsor of the awards, Prof. Richter received R75 000.

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**Minister of Science and Technology Naledi Pandor (right), as the executive authority of the department, and interim chair of the HSRC Board, with the signed Shareholder’s Compact. The Compact represents the agreement between the two parties of the expected achievements in terms of outcomes and outputs, including regular reporting and quarterly performance reports.**

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**Professors Nancy Phaswana-Mafuya, director of SAHARA, Leickness Simbayi, executive director of HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB research at the HSRC, Thoko Mayekiso, deputy vice-chancellor: Research and Engagement, NMMU, and Velile Notshulwana, executive dean, Faculty of Arts, NMMU.**

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**Professor Richter**
A DECLINE IN NEW HIV INFECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

New findings indicate that HIV incidence is declining and that the impact of antiretroviral treatment is having an effect on the South African epidemic.

A series of repeated national population-based HIV surveys to help in monitoring the response as a nation to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, led by the HSRC, have been conducted in South Africa: the first in 2002, followed by surveys in 2005 and 2008. These surveys not only collected data on HIV status but also information on socio-demographic and behavioural determinants, which greatly enhanced the analysis and interpretation of the observed trends in HIV prevalence and incidence (new infections).

In an article by Thomas Rehle, Timothy Hallett, Olive Shisana et al, published in PLoS ONE on 14 June 2010, the authors present evidence for a shift in the epidemic and a decline in the rate of new HIV infections in South Africa.

Applying a previously published and thoroughly validated mathematical method, prevalence data from the three national HIV surveys were used to derive estimates of HIV incidence. The availability of survey data collected in the three population-based surveys allowed, for the first time, a comparison of incidence estimates for two inter-survey intervals – for the periods 2002–2005 and 2005–2008. Overall, among adults aged 15–49, incidence declined by 35% between the two inter-survey periods. The estimate of the average annual HIV incidence rate – that means the number of new infections occurring each year among 100 susceptible individuals – for the 15–49 years age group was 2.0 % in the period 2002–2005 and declined to 1.3 % in the 2005–2008 period.

The results imply that 1.3% of all uninfected South African adults aged 15–49 years became newly infected in the year 2007. This incidence level in the general population needs to be halved in order to meet the 2011 target of the current National Strategic Plan.

‘The study not only clearly demonstrates how serial measures of HIV prevalence can be used to estimate HIV incidence, but also shows the need to determine whether infected individuals are receiving antiretroviral treatment’, explained Rehle, research director in the HSRC HIV/AIDS, STI and TB programme.

One of the novelties of the 2008 survey was the detection of individuals on antiretroviral treatment (ART) by means of testing HIV-positive samples for the presence of antiretroviral drugs so that the effect of treatment on HIV prevalence could be analysed. Without this information, it would not be possible to fully interpret the prevalence estimates since treatment can lead to increases in HIV prevalence without concomitant changes in incidence. Quantifying the impact of treatment provision on the estimates of HIV, the authors showed that the ‘excess’ prevalence due to concomitant changes in incidence. Quantifying the impact of treatment provision on the estimates of HIV, the authors showed that the ‘excess’ prevalence due to antiretroviral treatment was 1.7 percentage points in the 15–49 age group. This means that about 440 000 HIV-infected South African individuals were alive in 2008 because they were on ART and would have been dead otherwise.

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Scaling up ART may have the potential to reduce HIV incidence, since effective treatment reduces viral loads and, as a consequence, the infectiousness of infected individuals. However, the authors point out that since access to treatment has only increased significantly in recent years, it is expected that such an effect would take longer to develop and require higher levels of ART coverage for an extended period of time.

HSRC CEO DR OLIVE SHISANA HAS BEEN REAPPOINTED FOR FIVE YEARS

The Cabinet has approved the reappointment of Dr Olive Shisana as chief executive officer (CEO) of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) for a second five-year term, taking effect on 1 August 2010–31 July 2015.

The interim chair of the board, Mrs Phumelele Nqimande, described Dr Shisana as ‘effective … and leading by example through hard work’, wishing her great success for the next five years.

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY

HOW SOUTH AFRICANS RATE THEIR QUALITY OF LIFE

An assessment of the quality of life of South Africans serves to provide a useful barometer for the government's progress in its efforts to provide all South Africans with access to basic services, as well as being useful for gauging the mood in the country. FAIRUZ GAIBIE examines indicators that reveal what makes South Africans happy, satisfied and optimistic, and who those happy, satisfied and optimistic South Africans are.

Apart from the economic crisis, South Africa is faced with other challenges, such as high levels of HIV and AIDS infections, renewed xenophobic attacks and racial tensions triggered by the killing of right-wing AWB leader Eugene Terre’blanche, suggesting that South Africans’ quality of life continues to be threatened despite major economic and political advances since 1994.

Black African respondents were the unhappiest and most dissatisfied with life but at the same time the most optimistic about the future.

To be able to assess South African’s quality of life, we employed the 2008 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS): a nationally representative survey that sampled 3 321 adult respondents from randomly selected households.

Our investigation focused on three key questions that captured quality of life within South Africa, namely:

• Happiness: ‘Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy, happy, neither happy nor unhappy, not happy or not at all happy?’, with ‘not at all happy’ represented by 5 and ‘very happy’ by 1.

• Life satisfaction: ‘How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?’ Here, ‘very satisfied’ was represented by 1 and ‘very unsatisfied’ by 5.

• Optimism was assessed through asking, ‘Do you think that life will improve, stay the same or get worse in the next 5 years for people like you?’ Here, ‘improve’ was scored 1 while ‘get worse’ was scored 3.

The results of this study revealed that there were intra-national differences among the various race groups, genders, education levels, types of geographic locations and types of living standard measure (LSM) categories and age groups. For example, black African respondents were the unhappiest and most dissatisfied with life but at the same time the most optimistic about the future.

On the other hand, white respondents were the happiest and most satisfied with life but the least optimistic about the future. Interestingly, however, Indians/Asians displayed almost as low levels of optimism as whites, which seems to suggest that race is overridden by economic status as a predictor of optimism in the case of Indians/Asians.

FIGURE 1: QUALITY OF LIFE BY RACE

These findings are consistent with past research, as race has consistently predicted the
quality of life of South Africans, with white inhabitants enjoying the best quality of life and black Africans the worst. This study also indicates, however, that economic status is proving to be increasingly more predictive of the state of happiness.

**FIGURE 2: QUALITY OF LIFE BY ECONOMIC STATUS**
Males and females seem to have noteworthy differences in quality of life (QOL), with males reporting a higher quality of life than females. This finding suggested that, despite numerous efforts by government such as the provision of social grants to address the difficulties faced by vulnerable groups, economic deprivation remains a reality.

**FIGURE 3: QUALITY OF LIFE BY GENDER**
Age significantly predicted optimism, with younger respondents more optimistic about the future than the older respondents. However, age did not significantly predict differences with regards to life satisfaction and happiness.

**FIGURE 4: QUALITY OF LIFE BY AGE**
This survey reveals that although roughly half of South African citizens have a good quality of life, those who are more privileged are predominantly the ones who are happy, satisfied with their lives and optimistic about the future. While it is a step in the right direction for so many citizens to report a good quality of life, it is the other half of the country’s citizens that are the real concern. These results could further emphasise that worrying levels of social division and inequality still exist and only a minority of South African citizens’ lives are improving through redress strategies.

Note that in this study, the living standard measure is being used as a proxy for economic status. It is, however, acknowledged that the living standard measure only measures some components of economic status.
Social trust acts as a foundation for cooperation, contributes to social integration and harmony among people, leads to life satisfaction and ultimately to democratic stability and development. Social trust is therefore at the centre of issues pertaining to practical, daily life, including happiness, optimism, well-being, health, economic prosperity, education, welfare, and participation in community and civil society. South Africa’s history of segregation and apartheid produced multiple divisions, inequalities and injustices. Given the emphasis placed on national reconciliation since 1994 and the benefits of trust for society and democracy, the importance of monitoring and understanding the dynamics and determinants of social trust in our society assumes particular importance.

MEASURING SOCIAL TRUST

The data used for this study come from the 2008 and 2009 rounds of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). The survey consisted of a nationally representative probability sample of adults aged 16 years and over living in private households. The sample sizes were 3,321 in 2008 and 3,305 in 2009.

In both years, participants were asked the following interpersonal trust question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ Answers were captured on a scale ranging from 0 (‘you cannot be too careful’) to 10 (‘most people can be trusted’). This common trust measure has been included in a number of cross-national studies, such as the World Values Survey, but this specific form with the 11-point scale is derived from the European Social Survey. Responses to this measure can be interpreted as an estimate by citizens of the trustworthiness of the society around them.

IS SOUTH AFRICA A HIGH- OR LOW-TRUST SOCIETY?

The SASAS 2008 and 2009 results show that South Africans generally score low on the trust measure (Fig. 1). In 2008, 62% of South Africans placed themselves on the mid-point of the scale, 17% opted for the upper half of the trust scale, 17% opted for the lower half of the trust scale, while only a fifth expressed some measure of trust in others by choosing a point on the upper half of the scale.

The 2009 results provide a similar but slightly improved picture, with 52% distrusting, 26% trusting and the balance neutral. The average social trust scores for the two years were 3.82 and 4.20 respectively, with significance tests confirming that there was a modest increase in trust in 2009 compared with the year before.

It is difficult to determine with certainty what prompted the small increase in trust between the two years, but it is important to remember that this was a period of substantial social and political change with the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic attacks, the 2009 national elections, the inauguration of President Zuma, and the increasing optimism surrounding the hosting of the 2010 World Cup mega-event. It is plausible that factors such as these may have indelibly shaped feelings of trust.

An indication as to whether the fairly low levels of social trust evident from the SASAS is higher, lower or equivalent to other times in the country’s recent past can be obtained from the World Values Survey, in which South Africa participates. The same trust question was asked, but using a two-point scale, in interviews conducted in five-year intervals between 1990 and 2007. The findings are largely consistent with ours, with the share of South Africans stating that most people can be trusted being recorded at a mere 28% in 1990, 18% in 1996, 12% in 2001 and finally 19% in 2007.

When compared to citizens in European countries by directly comparing the 2008 SASAS results with those derived from the most recent round of the European Social Survey, conducted in the same year (Fig. 2), the analysis reaffirms our position as a country with relatively low interpersonal trust. With its mean trust score of 3.82, South Africa ranked 25th out of the 29 countries listed, placing us alongside countries such as the Russian Federation, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria.

By superimposing gross national income per capita statistics, Figure 2 also shows that individuals in wealthier, more established democracies tend to be more trusting, with high income countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), especially Scandinavia, reporting substantially higher scores than the transition countries of Eastern Europe.

WHO ARE THE TRUSTING?

When analysing the 2009 SASAS data on social trust by demographic characteristics (Table 1), no significant differences were found between men and women on average. There is nonetheless a significant age effect, with the results indicating that young people in South Africa are more trusting than certain older age groups. More specifically, those aged 16–24 years are more likely to trust others than those aged 25–34 years and 35–49 years. However, the average level of social trust among this young cohort is not significantly different from those aged 50 years and older. This seems to suggest a cohort effect, in that the generation of South Africans who are growing up in post-apartheid South Africa (the so-called ‘Born-Frees’) are appreciably
different in the extent to which they exhibit trust.

The data also provide evidence of a considerable racial gradient in social trust, with Indian respondents on average (mean score=5.12) emerging as distinctly more trusting of others than all other population groups. White South Africans are also more trusting than African adults (mean score=4.10), while the latter express the lowest mean level of interpersonal trust.

Persisting social inequalities may be a key factor underlying this finding, since a strong negative relationship is evident between socioeconomic status and social trust. For instance, those with low living standards are relatively more distrustful than those with medium and high living standards. Similarly, those with lower educational attainment (primary schooling or less) are significantly less trusting than those with higher levels of education.

Further affirmation of this pattern of socioeconomic disadvantage and vulnerability underlying social trust can be found when examining results by place of residence. People living in formal urban areas report significantly higher levels of trust on average than those in formal and informal rural areas as well as informal urban settlements. Conversely, residents in informal settlements report on average the lowest levels of trust in others relative to other geographic locations.

WHY ARE SOUTH AFRICANS LOW IN TRUST?

Examination of national and cross-national results on social trust suggests that South Africa could be classified a low-trust society, a trait that it shares in common with many post-communist states and other developing countries in Latin America and Africa.

Over the last two decades, trust in the country appears to have fluctuated within a narrow band. Levels of trust were found to be inversely related with the trustworthiness of our society being in general the more marginalised and materially deprived. There are also interesting signs of an emerging generational change, with today’s youth typically more trusting than older cohorts.

While one may have expected that the dismantling of apartheid legislation and the achievements of the post-apartheid developmental state would have translated into a considerable increase in interpersonal trust, this clearly has not materialised. There are also signs of a modest improvement post-2001, though these are from a low base are levels of trust in 2009 still do not appear to exceed those recorded in the early-1990s.

Why may this be the case? International evidence on the determinants of social trust remains somewhat mixed, though there is increasing support that factors such as good governance, the absence of corruption, safety from crime, national wealth accumulation, low levels of income inequality and egalitarian values all matter. Given the persisting social inequalities that characterise South Africa and the challenges that remain in relation to crime reduction, political corruption and municipal performance, perhaps it is ultimately unsurprising that citizens continue to voice scepticism about the extent to which we can trust in others.

From a policy perspective, the strong linkages between social trust and societal inequalities signify that the continued emphasis on addressing inequality through robust social spending and class-based redress policies may be important for strengthening the sense of trust, togetherness and tolerance needed to ensure further progress towards realising the vision of a united and cohesive society.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Social trust by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, 2009 (mean scores)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic characteristics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
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<tr>
<td>16–24 years</td>
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<td>25–34 years</td>
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<td>35–49 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>50+ years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
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<tr>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
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Ronnie Mмотlane, junior researcher, Education and Skills Development (ESD) research programme; Jarè Struwig, senior research manager, ESD; Ben Roberts, research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme.
A defining feature of the South African labour market is the disparity in access to and quality of employment. Apartheid education and labour policies produced a strong racial gradient in unemployment, employment and wage rates. The ANC government has been addressing this legacy of disadvantage and injustice through job creation programmes, progressive legislation and legal reform. The Employment Equity Act (1998) is a prime example, obliging employers to implement affirmative action measures to ensure equal representation of designated groups (black people, women and people with disabilities).

However, nearly 12 years since the Act was implemented, there is disappointment, disillusion and frustration about the slow pace of transformation. Criticism also points to a policy that mainly benefits the middle and elite classes while failing to meet the needs of those at the lower end of the income distribution. The recent release of the 10th Commission for Employment Equity report has intensified debate on the successes and shortcomings of affirmative action implementation, particularly the fact that black South Africans are still substantially underrepresented in private sector management structures. In this context, it is important to explore and understand public attitudes toward this policy.

DATA

Data for this study draws from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. The survey series consists of nationally representative probability samples of South African adults aged 16 years and over living in private households. Sample sizes for each of the seven survey rounds included in the analysis are as follows: 2003 (4 980); 2004 (5 583), 2005 (2 884), 2006 (2 939), 2007 (3 164), 2008 (3 321) and 2009 (3 305).

Questions that survey affirmative action ask about support for the preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans and women (and disabled persons in the 2006 round). In addition, the 2009 SASAS round included two experimental items on the perceived outcomes of affirmative action.

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY

Since its introduction 12 years ago, affirmative action has become an increasingly controversial policy to address labour market inequalities in South Africa. In this article, BEN ROBERTS, GINA WEIR-SMITH and VASU REDDY examine the reactions of the South African public to affirmative action, the factors influencing these perceptions, and whether they have changed in recent years.

Fig. 1: Percentage supporting different forms of affirmative action, 2003–2009 (% that agree or strongly agree)

Table 1: Percentage supporting different forms of affirmative action, 2003–2009 (% that agree or strongly agree)

Table 2: Percentage point difference between support for race- and gender-based affirmative action

SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT

At the national level, the survey results indicate there is broad support for affirmative action as a form of redress in the labour market (Fig. 1). Over the 2003–2009 period, the share of adults in South Africa agreeing or strongly agreeing that there should be racial- and gender-based affirmative action in the workplace ranged in a narrow band between 60 and 70%. More so, the 2006 SASAS survey round found that 68% of participants supported the preferential hiring and promotion of disabled persons.

Evaluations of affirmative action were more positive among intended beneficiaries than those belonging to non-beneficiary groups. Therefore, black respondents...
were more supportive of race-based affirmative action than other population groups, particularly white respondents (Table 1). Over the interval, support among black respondents ranged between four and six times that of white respondents. In 2008, only 22% of white adults favoured race-based affirmative action in the workplace compared to 76% of black adults. Women were also much more supportive of gender-based affirmative action than men. Another consistent finding is that support for gender-based affirmative action exceeded that of race-based affirmative action by a sizeable margin for all except black respondents.

The analysis suggests an inverse relationship between age and affirmative action support, with those aged 16–24 years and 25–34 years most supportive. Robust positive attitudes were also evident among those with no schooling or primary-level education, unemployed work seekers, those with a low living standard, and residents of informal settlements and rural traditional authority areas.

**PERCEIVED OUTCOMES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION**

Turning to perceptions of the efficiency of affirmative action in its implementation, the 2009 survey demonstrates that a considerable majority of adult South Africans were positive about the outcomes that affirmative action policy is yielding. Nationally, 71% agreed that it is ‘contributing to a more skilled workforce’ and 68% agreed that the policy is ‘creating a society that is more unified’.

Black respondents were again more positive about affirmative action outcomes than other population groups, with Indian respondents most skeptical. Although attitudes did not differ on the basis of gender, age apparently matters, with young South Africans (especially 16–24 year olds) more convinced of the beneficial outcomes of affirmative action than older age groups.

A socioeconomic gradient in opinion is discernible, but in this case the relationship is the opposite of that observed with regard to general support for affirmative action. Those with tertiary education and a high living standard rated the impact of affirmative action less positively than those with little education or poorer living standards. Residents of informal settlements and rural traditional authority areas were also less optimistic compared to those in formal urban areas. Regression analysis also identifies employment status as a significant predictor of beliefs in affirmative action outcomes. In this regard, the unemployed are less likely than full-time employees to agree that affirmative action is skilling the workforce or promoting social cohesion. Similarly, part-time employees, pensioners and the permanently sick or disabled are also less convinced of the skills gains from affirmative action than workers with full-time jobs.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Preliminary findings from this study demonstrate that attitudes to race- and gender-based affirmative action in employment were favourable on aggregate over the last decade. From a policy perspective, the specified beneficiary of affirmative action seems to matter, with more positive evaluations evident when the policies target women and disabled persons than when racial disadvantage is targeted. Furthermore, while there is a broad-based, resolute belief in racial equality in principle, there is less of a consensus on the implementation of particular redress policies. Affirmative action for instance enjoys less support than compensatory policies or those focused on addressing class-based disadvantage, such as increasing access to tertiary education for poor matriculants.

An element of self-interest appears to be informing evaluations among designated beneficiary groups, with black respondents more inclined than other population groups to support race-based affirmative action and women more partial to gender-based affirmative action than men. While the beneficiaries of affirmative action have typically been the better educated and skilled among the designated groups, highest support for this policy is reported by the less educated, unemployed work seekers, those with a low standard of living, and residents of informal settlements and rural traditional authority areas. Since these marginalised and vulnerable South Africans are least likely to have personally benefitted from affirmative action implementation to date, this support may reflect a sense of collective self-interest or possibly an expectation that this redress policy will bring benefits in the future.

Views on whether affirmative action is producing a more skilled workforce and socially cohesive society were again broadly positive (Table 2). Yet, apart from similar population group differences, the profile of those believing in such outcomes deviates from those expressing support for affirmative action in general. In this instance, those least likely to have gained from affirmative action in practice are those least confident in the policy’s outcomes. This fits well with the hypothesis about expectations. So, while the unemployed support the policy in principle due to the hope of benefitting in the long-term, they are also less likely than full-time employees to agree that affirmative action is providing skilling or promoting unity as this has not been their experience.

The implication of these findings is that efforts to broaden the base of affirmative action and black economic empowerment assume increasing priority. If education and labour-market interventions do not improve opportunities for poor, working-age adults to access employment and better working conditions over the medium to longer term, the risk is that the hopes that continue to be vested in redress policies such as affirmative action may dissipate and be replaced with increased disaffection.

Policy-makers also need to find ways of overcoming the division created by affirmative action, potentially by repackaging preferential redress policies in ways that are less threatening and that appeal to the aversion for inequality shared by South Africans across the social, political and economic spectrum. It has been increasingly suggested that policy should concentrate more on a class-based redress agenda rather than focusing primarily on racial redress. Our results suggest that there may be merit in such a proposal, certainly in ensuring that such interventions secure substantial public support in the wake of increased concerns about poverty, access to social justice and the building of a socially cohesive society.

**Table 2: Belief that affirmative action is producing a more skilled workforce and unified society in 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>AA policy is contributing to a more skilled workforce</th>
<th>AA policy is creating a more unified society</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-24 years</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-34 years</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-49 years</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>50-64 years</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+ years</td>
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**Ben Roberts is a research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery; Gina Weir-Smith is adjunct director, Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation; and Professor Vasu Reddy is chief research specialist, Human and Social Development.**
The soccer World Cup rekindled a spirit of national unity and left a legacy of transport improvements. Perhaps more important, it gave us a unique insight into how we might plan and manage our cities differently. Bringing crowds of people onto the streets in the fan walks and fan fests brought home the benefits of urban density for social mixing and conviviality. Attractive public spaces, where people from all backgrounds mingled together, created an unprecedented spirit of exuberance and diminished some of our fears and prejudices.

There is sense of safety and actual reduction in crime arose from the sheer presence of many people sharing the same places, and not simply from the heightened police presence. Security concerns have become powerful shapers of our cities – with middle-income groups retreating to gated communities, access-controlled business parks and high-surveillance shopping malls on the urban periphery. The World Cup showed us that cities can be organised differently, if we bring people back to live, work and socialise together.

BACKGROUND
South African cities are among the most sprawling, fragmented and divided in the world. This is inefficient, unfair and ultimately unsustainable. Densification has been a government objective since 1994. Successive legislation has reaffirmed that density matters for the efficient use of land and infrastructure, and for social inclusion and integration.

In practice, there has been little progress in altering the inherited apartheid geography and delivering more compact and cohesive cities. ‘Business as usual’ has dominated urban development processes, with little adaptation of the location and form of housing and other property schemes to the new dispensation.

The sense of safety and actual reduction in crime arose from the sheer presence of many people sharing the same places, and not simply from the heightened police presence.

There are many reasons for this. Developers and financiers remain wedded to the formula of low-density suburban housing. Landowners and ratepayers in the inner suburbs resist zoning alterations to permit higher density buildings in fear of overcrowded tower blocks and unfamiliar hustle on the streets. State-sponsored low-income housing models are not flexible enough for smaller, well-located sites, so homes for the poor continue to be built on cheap peripheral land.

In addition, major public landowners such as state owned enterprises remain disinterested in spatial matters and insist on commercial prices when disposing of surplus land. Urban planners are slow to develop constructive proposals for higher density, mixed-use schemes, preferring the simpler path of reacting to project applications from developers.

BREAKING THE IMPASSE
There is renewed interest in densification from the departments of human settlement and transport and several metropolitan municipalities. Spatial problems of sprawl and exclusion bite back in various ways that demand attention. Highway gridlock, costly new bulk infrastructure and misery for poor communities trapped in marginal locations are symptoms of poorly planned urban development.

The climate change agenda adds to the impetus. Decision-makers increasingly understand that restricting outward urban expansion could help to protect land with agricultural, biodiversity and mineral potential. Higher urban densities would make public transport and consumer services more viable, lower the carbon emissions from car travel and reduce energy consumption.

There is also an economic argument for densification, in that concentrating people and firms in close proximity creates critical mass. This promotes productive efficiency and growth through shared services and flexible use of resources. More intense flows of information and ideas in dense urban networks foster learning and creativity, generating more valuable goods and services.

State-sponsored low-income housing models are not flexible enough for smaller, well-located sites, so homes for the poor continue to be built on cheap peripheral land.

A POLICY PANACEA?
With densification back in vogue, there is a danger that it is seen as a cure-all pursued in isolation of other essential changes. Density is good for convenience and connectivity, but isn’t straightforward to achieve. There are deeper issues to consider before sensible decisions can be made about what forms of density are feasible and fair.

To begin with, the concept of densification is multi-layered and open to ambiguity and misinterpretation.
Density is the product of two elements: (i) physical structures (the supply of housing) and (ii) the actual resident population (reflecting the demand from people to live there).

Physical density gets all the attention, but the real objective is to raise the actual population density. The relationship between them varies with household size, which evolves over time with changes in income and social norms. As people become better-off, they aspire to more living space, so the density of existing buildings declines. A fall in household size through delayed marriage, higher separation rates or falling birth rates also lowers population densities.

The relationship between planned and actual densities is complicated because new buildings are a fraction of the existing urban fabric, so their impact on average densities is at the margin. Existing densities also influence who moves into the new housing through the character of the area and cost of housing. Communities may lobby vigorously against higher densities. This makes it difficult to increase density quickly.

City authorities need to encourage ‘incremental’ densification through sub-dividing properties and infill development. More can be achieved by consolidating adjacent plots and redeveloping existing houses into multi-storey buildings. This permits cross-subsidisation of affordable housing and coherent improvements to local energy generation and public spaces. It adds value to older properties and is most appropriate around public transport corridors and activity nodes.

There is no such thing as an optimum ‘one-size-fits-all’ density target. Different levels are appropriate in different parts of the city, depending on their access to jobs and amenities, transport connections and land values. In some overcrowded townships, excessive density levels expose people to public health risks, fire damage and other hazardous conditions.

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**City authorities need to encourage ‘incremental’ densification through sub-dividing properties and infill development.**

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### THE RATIONALE FOR DENSIFICATION

Central cities and inner suburbs are prime candidates for densification because of their accessibility and historic depopulation. These areas perform vital functions in relation to the wider city – major sources of employment, unique arenas for social mixing, centres for higher learning, and places with a distinctive heritage.

Attracting middle- and high-income families with a choice of where to live would reduce long distance car-based commuting and stimulate demand for downtown bars, restaurants, cultural and educational venues. A well-developed evening and weekend economy would strengthen the buzz of the inner city and its magnetic attraction for tourists and visitors. But well-off families might demand exclusionary urban design.

This would conflict with the need to give low-income groups better access to central city jobs, training and amenities. Affordability is a key consideration, implying different space standards in their homes and levels of design and maintenance of the built environment. Walk-up flats of three to four storeys offer better value for money than tall apartments served by lifts and requiring deep foundations and energy inputs. Subsidised schools, clinics and community facilities would also be needed.

This illustrates the tensions and trade-offs between different density objectives. These need to be understood and debated to reach agreement on the way forward.

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**A well-developed evening and weekend economy would strengthen the buzz of the inner city and its magnetic attraction for tourists and visitors. But well-off families might demand exclusionary urban design.**

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### CONCLUSION

Densification is difficult for South African cities because of the level of social inequality and entrenched patterns of dispersed development. However, it could have far-reaching benefits for more cohesive communities and more durable patterns of development. More research and public discussion are needed to explore what levels and forms of densification are desirable, affordable and fair.

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*Professor Ivan Turok is the deputy executive director of the Economic Performance and Development research programme.*
Families at the heart of the matter

Children affected by HIV/AIDS
AIDS is fundamentally a family disease: infections run through families, families carry the burdens of infection, and growing evidence suggests that family-centred approaches to prevention and treatment are particularly effective. It is therefore not enough to merely provide antiretroviral drugs to mothers and children. It is critical that treatment and care for children are integrated into the broader context of family-support schemes, writes LINDA RICHTER.

A special edition of the Journal of the International AIDS Society, published online, brings together in one place – for the first time – the rationale for family-centred services for children affected by HIV and AIDS and some of the available evidence for the effectiveness of doing so. The authors of the series of articles will hopefully signal the start of a groundswell of interest in family-centred services for children affected by HIV and AIDS.

In areas where there is a high-prevalence of HIV, transmission occurs mainly in the family, between parents and children born from that relationship, and between partners and spouses.

ALL IN THE FAMILY
At its heart, AIDS can be thought of as a family disease. In areas where there is a high-prevalence of HIV, transmission occurs mainly in the family, between parents and children born from that relationship, and between partners and spouses. Families are also on the front line of prevention, providing education and reinforcing risk reduction, especially among young people.

It is now clear that the infection of an individual ultimately impacts on the structure and functioning of the entire family. The loss of income incurred when an HIV-infected parent becomes ill, the burden of healthcare expenses, and the psychosocial stress associated with this disease all transcend individuals.

AIDS throws families into crisis, causing anxiety and stress wherever it occurs. The full impact of HIV and AIDS, including its social and economic effects, is only appreciated when the family, and not only the individual, is the unit of analysis.

Families, defined in an inclusive way, can and should play a central role in the delivery of treatment, prevention and care for children, and family members should be involved in the decision-making for any health-related intervention.

Yet, pitifully few resources and services are directed at bolstering and protecting this front line. Fewer than 15% of families caring for orphans and vulnerable children in 2007 were estimated to have received any assistance from external agencies. Recognition of the role that communities play in supporting orphaned and vulnerable children, and the importance of strengthening community-based systems of care has also been slow to emerge.

Still, there are indications of change. During recent years, donors have increasingly recognised the need for programmes that specifically target families. Models of the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT) have been developed to provide comprehensive care and treatment to HIV-infected, pregnant women and members of their families. Increasing numbers of home-based HIV counselling and testing and treatment programmes are being implemented and are gaining ground.

To further strengthen these and similar programmes, the international community now needs to reshape its thinking and construct targeted approaches that build on the strengths of families and provide support in a framework for the benefit of the entire family.

WHAT THE EDITION EXPLORES
The articles in this issue have been solicited through The Road to Vienna, an initiative led by the Coalition on Children Affected by AIDS (CCABA), in preparation for the XVIIIth AIDS Conference held in Vienna. The initiative brings together a number of foundations and other partners committed to the well-being of children, and aims to facilitate the generation of evidence for family-centred services, as well as the promotion of their implementation.

... the international community now needs to reshape its thinking and construct targeted approaches that build on the strengths of families and provide support in a framework for the benefit of the entire family.

This special edition explores the various elements and dimensions of families affected by HIV and AIDS within a range of contexts. It includes the historical background of thinking around family-centred services; a review of the evidence for family-centred models of PMTCT; a systematic review of the impact of family-centred HIV treatment models on children’s health outcomes; family approaches to prevention among young adolescents; the families and children of men who have sex with men and injecting drug users; men as fathers, and their desire for fatherhood and paternal roles; and maternal depression as another example of where family-centred models are needed.

By publishing this issue, the authors hope to make an important contribution to the discourse around the prevention and treatment of HIV, targeting the broader public including community members, policy-makers, funders and researchers. Readers have the opportunity to comment on individual articles by scrolling to the end of the article on the website.


Professor Linda Richter, distinguished research fellow, HSRC.
The government and the unions appear to find themselves in an intractable situation, with COSATU insisting that the strike will continue indefinitely if its demands are not met and ANC economic policies not reviewed, and the government conversely warning public sector unions that excessive wage demands would irreparably harm the economy and compromise growth.

Patients at hospitals are bearing the brunt of the strike, as are pupils at schools where it appears that 90% of teachers affiliated to SADTU have heeded the call for a shutdown. Babies are dying, non-striking teachers are being intimidated.

**LEGITIMATE WAGE DEMANDS**

The demands of union members are not illegitimate and, in a country where the inequality of labour market earnings is among the highest in the world and plays a huge role in poverty formation, fighting for an increase of R300 a month (the difference between government’s offer of a R700 housing subsidy compared to worker demands for an amount of R1 000) might seem obstinate, but could well be the difference between a family eating and not eating at night.

As this piece is being written, close to a million public service workers are out on strike demanding a salary increase of 8.6%, and a monthly housing allowance of R1 000. The government has dug in its heels and has offered workers an increase of 7%, and a housing allowance of R700.
sustainable public service wage bill is having an impact on the nation's finances and substantially weakens the case of public services. These figures suggest a ‘runaway’ aspect to public sector wages and salaries. Analysts have pointed out that the increases over the past eight years have been a progression which economists suggest is unsustainable. At a provincial level, the public service salary level has increased by an average of 8.4%, 11.4%, 10.1%, 9.2%, 13.1%, 12.1% and 18.7% per annum between 2002 and this year. The total wage bill (national and provincial) has increased from R140bn in 2002–03 to R322bn in 2009–10, an average increase of 10.38%.

Besides the inflationary effects, it is argued that immediate budget cuts as well as austerity measures may be required. At a provincial level, the public service salary bill has increased by 8% and 10% until 2006–07, after which they skyrocketed. From then, the increases were 14.9%, 21% and 17.8% in each of the following years. According to analysts, the 21% increase in 2008–09 reflects the effect of the ‘occupation-specific dispensation’ which effectively provided a huge boost to public sector wages. When the whole eight-year period is considered, both national and provincial figures translate into average real increases in the public sector wage bill of 5.62% and 6.54% above inflation per year. According to Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, while the economy is well into modest recovery from the recession, with growth anticipated at around 3% this year, we need to set our ambition for growth targets. The unplanned expenditure, therefore, from the government’s higher than expected wage offer would place a huge burden on the fiscus, resulting in a carry-through effect of a further R2.7bn in the 2011/12 financial year. Besides the inflationary effects, it is argued that immediate budget cuts as well as austerity measures may be required. It is a scenario that does not bode well for South Africa’s growth prospects and the 7% target, especially in a context when the fiscus is carrying a deficit of 7.3% in the current financial year. There are no reserves to draw from.

NEW THINKING ON SUSTAINABILITY

What the analysis suggests is that South Africa’s ballooning public-service wage bill is not sustainable. It compromises economic growth, increases inflationary risks and may even harm the country’s job creation prospects. Indeed, there is even a school of thought that suggests that despite government’s R 846bn infrastructure spending programme, unreasonable wage demands may well result in job losses.

What may be needed is a debate on whether salary negotiations should take into account other important policy considerations such as the need to link wage growth to productivity, an assessment of unit costs of government labour in relation to trends in the rest of the economy and, most importantly, an analysis of the impact of a high wage bill on employment policy.

It may also be necessary – following the resolution of the current impasse – that government and the unions representing public sector workers start a conversation about how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service and its overall quality.

If our teachers and nurses, for example, are held more accountable by citizens for the level of services they deliver, our public sector will start working more efficiently. (HSRC research has pointed to the direct correlation between accountability and efficiency in the public service.) If this happens, two key sectors in the public service – health and education – may start working more optimally.

If our teachers and nurses, for example, are held more accountable by citizens for the level of services they deliver, our public sector will start working more efficiently. A well-educated and healthy workforce augurs well for our economy and levels of productivity. A growing economy has greater labour absorbing potential, creates reserves that serve as buffers during down times, allows for increased levels of foreign direct investment, helps with inflation targeting, and reduces the deficit on the current account. From a sound economic base, the national fiscus may be better placed to support competitive public service salaries. In other words, reinvigorating the public service, and reconstituting the relationship between performance and reward, may go some way in striking a balance between the demands of workers and the imperatives of government.

Having said this, there is no gainsaying the structural defects in our economy. South Africa is in dire need of a labour-absorbing economic growth strategy. The equation is simple: the more jobs around, the better for our economy and levels of productivity. A growing economy has greater labour absorbing potential, creates reserves that serve as buffers during down times, allows for increased levels of foreign direct investment, helps with inflation targeting, and reduces the deficit on the current account. From a sound economic base, the national fiscus may be better placed to support competitive public service salaries. In other words, reinvigorating the public service, and reconstituting the relationship between performance and reward, may go some way in striking a balance between the demands of workers and the imperatives of government.

Dr Udesh Pillay, executive director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme.
The legitimacy of appointments on the Performance Monitoring Evaluation and Administration (ME) in the Presidency is crucial to its success, argues JOSEPH LESIBA TEFFO. While government should take the lead, civil society must be able to participate, and therefore the ME would be best placed within the Chapter 9 institutions framework, which is aimed at protecting democracy.
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is arguably a precursor to the Performance Monitoring, Evaluation and Administration (ME) in the South African Presidency. The APRM is Africa’s home-grown governance and accountability tool. It is a method of self-appraisal introduced by the African Union (AU) after its inception in 2001. One of its positive attributes is that it provides a platform for countries to share experiences with a view to fostering good governance and deepening democratic processes. It also provides for early warning signals that would help avert political and economic crises.

**LEGITIMACY OF APPOINTMENTS CRUCIAL IN PRESIDENCY’S ME**

One of the thorny issues in this connection is the appointment of reviewers/evaluators. The point is raised precisely because people are often concerned about government-appointed commissions and panels. Who should then appoint the evaluators? Put differently, who should be policing the police? It certainly cannot be the state all by itself. The question speaks to the legitimacy of both the process and the outcomes.

The government should as a matter of fact take the lead. However, the participation of civil society and the average citizen is equally significant. The state should provide the resources and encourage others to evaluate it. Similarly, each government department, national or provincial, should have its own system in place. Better performing departments would have to mentor those lagging behind. Again, the reviews should be conducted in conjunction with the structures alluded to earlier. This has been a missing link and thus a welcome innovation.

**SELF-EVALUATION IS IMPORTANT, BUT IT NEEDS AN ENABLING LEGAL FRAMEWORK, UNQUALIFIED POLITICAL WILL, AND HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN ORDER FOR IT TO FUNCTION OPTIMALY.**

As the membership of the AU is voluntary, so is the participation of member states in the peer-review process. The model is lauded as unique and worthy of emulation in other parts of the world. Indeed, this mechanism marked in remarkable ways political maturity on the part of African leaders. After many years of denial, and evident collapse of certain economies and states, a way out of the rut had to be found. The APRM, therefore, signalled a promising start.

As a result of the APRM’s consultative nature, and willingness to raise uncomfortable questions, the model gained acceptance even among initial sceptics. While we acknowledge its modest success so far, it is important to interrogate its challenges and learn from its lessons if the Presidency’s ME is to chart a way forward with confidence. Self-evaluation is important, but it needs an enabling legal framework, unqualified political will, and human and financial resources in order for it to function optimally. There has to be adequate capacity to conduct and conclude reviews.

**THE RATIONALE FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS THAT IT WILL BE LESS COSTLY THAN A FULLY FLEDGED GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT, WILL BE INDEPENDENT, AND SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW, AND MUST BE IMPARTIAL, EXERCISE ITS POWERS, AND PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS WITHOUT FEAR, FAVOUR OR PREJUDICE.**

If you entrench this culture, the benefits for all would be enormous. The threats to our democracy – as has been the case with countries that obtained independence before us – are corruption, mismanagement and under-management. The monitoring and evaluation mechanism is about good governance, progress, sustainable development, achieving growth, and most importantly, providing quality service to the public. Among other things, transparency, through providing reliable, relevant, and timely information to the public should be the hallmark of democracy:

Transparency in government is a good thing, for governments in Africa have the most potential for going awry given their monopoly on force and power and the ease with which they abuse that force and power. Where there is transparency, government officials will be prevented from exercising discretionary powers. Transparency, therefore, complements and reinforces predictability, reduces the scope of corruption among public officials. (Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin: 2004)

As we forge ahead with resolute political leadership, and the ME as our beacon, there is likely to emerge a greater pool of expertise, heightened professionalism, and improved policies and procedures. We will also witness broadened participation by civil society, better integration of priorities of programmes and outcomes. Chapter 9 of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, provides for state institutions supporting constitutional democracy. On the same reasoning, I submit that the monitoring and evaluation unit in the Presidency should be part of these institutions, with the necessary adaptations. The rationale for this proposal is that it will be less costly than a fully fledged government department, will be independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and must be impartial, exercise its powers, and perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. Working together with civil society, this institution can achieve much more.

Professor Joseph Lesiba Teffo, research director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme.
On 26 August 2010, Professor Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane turned 80 years old. Nearly half of that life was spent in forced exile. His story, much like the story of South Africa, has been one of triumph in the face of overwhelming adversity. JIMI O. ADESINA celebrates Magubane’s life.

THE MAN
From being the son of a farm worker – on a piece of land that a generation earlier belonged to his progenitors – and life in Chesterville (a township of Durban), Bernard Magubane rose to become a celebrated and internationally respected scholar. Married to Ms Thembi Khaula in 1953, they went on to have four children (Gugu, Bongi, Vukani and Zine), a sustained and endearing life as a family unit, and several grandchildren.

THE SCHOLAR
His scholarly works range from the critical engagement with the colonial practice of sociology and anthropology to the issues of race and class and the historiography of the liberation struggle in South Africa. From 2000 he was the project leader and editor-in-chief of the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) project. He retired from SADET in 2009.

Professor Magubane combined staunch political commitment as an intellectual with prodigious scholarly output. His scholarly works range from the critical engagement with the colonial practice of sociology and anthropology to the issues of race and class and the historiography of the liberation struggle in South Africa. His 1971 paper, ‘A critical look at indices used in the study of social change in Colonial Africa’ (Current Anthropology), established his reputation for critical engagement with and displacement of colonial anthropology. The paper inspired a new generation of African scholars, in particular those trained in the United States. In 1972, the late Nigerian sociologist, Omafume Onoge, described him as ‘without doubt the most exciting African sociologist’ known to him.

Barely three years after his PhD thesis work at the University of California, Los Angeles, the publication of his papers on colonial practices of urban sociology and anthropology launched him into intellectual stardom. After teaching stints in Los Angeles and Lusaka, he became a full professor at the University of Connecticut (UConn), where he retired in 1997 and remains an emeritus professor. Between 1997 and 2000, Professor Magubane was a chief research specialist at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). From 2000 he was the project leader and editor-in-chief of the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) project. He retired from SADET in 2009.


“He was not afraid to address the issues that he thought were critical in the South African context, even though many of his colleagues at the time were minimising the role of race and racism in South African society”

From historiography to accounting for class and race in South Africa, Professor Magubane’s scholarly works stand in self-conscious contrast with the earlier generation of anthropological writings on southern Africa and Africans in particular. The later generation of liberal and ‘neo-Marxist’ scholarship share(d) the same ontological starting point as the older generation – they took the settlement of 1910 for granted. For Magubane, to understand South Africa is to view the
1910 settlement for the indigenous populations of South Africans as a catastrophe. A historiography that misses this crucial factor might gesture to a liberal or even Marxist scholarship but, ultimately, serves the cultural reproduction of a society rooted in violence and dispossession. From W.E.B Du Bois to Jack Simon and Amilcar Cabral, Magubane tapped into a long tradition of scholarly responses to domination and oppression, a scholarship inspired by the sacrifice of ordinary people from the ranks of the oppressed, who daily do extraordinary things.

The alternative narratives and traditions that scholars like Magubane offer are fundamental to the nation-building project in South Africa ...

THE ACTIVIST

Since joining the African National Congress in Durban as a student, Professor Magubane has remained firmly rooted in the South African liberation project. From the streets of Durban in the 1950s, to the Morogoro Conference in 1969, and mobilising the anti-apartheid campaign in the United States in the 1980s, Bernard Magubane was the quintessential embedded intellectual – not for him the cold complicity of being marooned in the cozy cocoon of the Ivory Tower. “What makes Ben Magubane a particularly interesting scholar is that his scholarship reflected his political commitment”, says Amii Omana-Otunnu, executive director of the UConn-ANC Partnership. “He was not afraid to address the issues that he thought were critical in the South African context, even though many of his colleagues at the time were minimising the role of race and racism in South African society”. As James Faris, his colleague at UConn and soul-mate, notes, “Ben spoke truth to power. He was a pioneer for his time and age”.

The silence regarding the works of scholars like Magubane in the dominant social science curriculum in South African universities is disturbing in a triple sense. First, silencing of this kind is censorship. It is a form of erasure which degrades our intellectual climate. Second, it sustains a tradition of Eurocentric scholarship. Third, it functions to deny the new generation of South Africans a sense of their intellectual heritage and the certainty of their contribution to global social science. Colonialism functions not merely as physical violence but more fundamentally as violence to memory. “If you control people’s mind”, Magubane noted recently, “you control a lot”. The alternative narratives and traditions that scholars like Magubane offer are fundamental to the nation-building project in South Africa and a genuinely South African intellectual community that is congruent with the essence of a post-racist, post-sexist society.

However, it is in celebration of the wider community of fellow scholar-activists that the works of Professor Magubane find meaning and relevance. A conference to mark his birthday, which was held from 26–28 August, combined the specific celebration of Magubane’s scholarship with a wider engagement with other African knowledge producers.

The conference was hosted by the HSRC in partnership with the Freedom Park, the University of South Africa (UNISA), the South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), the National Research Foundation (NRF), the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the Intellectual Heritage Project (Rhodes University).
Post-apartheid South Africa has not only seen South Africa expand its presence in other parts of Africa: we have also witnessed the ‘Africanisation’ of South African society. With democratisation, Africans from other African countries have migrated to South Africa in increasing numbers. The effect of this expanded African immigration (both legal and illegal) has been profound: townships and workplaces now reflect a regional demography that has presented its own opportunities and challenges, writes DARLENE MILLER and SIMON MUSHAVATU.

BLACK ON BLACK
In a recent interview (Friday 13 August 2010), a leading provincial director characterised the relationship between black South Africans and African foreign nationals as a ‘subliminal cold war’. And although rumours of a pending xenophobic onslaught during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa did not materialise, some (especially government) speculated that these claims of volatility were fuelled and instigated by the media.

The social cleavage between African foreign nationals and black South Africans has become an important new characteristic of South African working class life in particular.

But despite the charges against the media, ample anecdotal evidence exists of such African foreign nationals/black South African tensions in South African workplaces and townships. Instances of attacks against foreigners in the ensuing month point to some of these simmering social tensions. The varied responses to the xenophobic threat highlight the perceptions and misperceptions that inform and bedevil the relationship between African foreign nationals and South Africans.

While it is important to note that tensions in townships and workplaces have multiple fault lines – criminal/ordinary resident, Eastern Cape/Western Cape, African men/African women – the social cleavage between African foreign nationals and black South Africans has become an important new characteristic of South African working class life in particular.

Foreign nationals feel ill at ease in a country where they are simultaneously welcomed and threatened. Their educational and cultural skills are welcomed in the workplace; their entrepreneurial services are utilised in townships and elsewhere, and as car guards and security guards they help to secure aspects of South African social life.

HIERARCHIES OF BLACKNESS
Yet hierarchies of social ‘othering’ confound the peaceful evolution of multi-national democratic life in the new South Africa. While white foreigners are encouraged as ‘tourists’ and settlers who strengthen the South African economy are welcomed, many African foreigners complain of everyday forms of racism against them.

Our continental guests are identified as the ‘other’ that needs to be excluded and marginalised, as the hateful term for African foreign nationals – amakwerere – demonstrates. South African nationals mark other Africans as a problem in their society – objects of various forms of stereotyping as gangsters, stealers of local women, and most importantly, acquiescent workers who pinch jobs and work for less, driving down wages.

Like old racial hierarchies of apartheid South Africa, new racial hierarchies emerge. But these hierarchies now incorporate ‘Africa in South Africa’:

skin colour, accent and nationality become the stuff of racial epithets, tossed up in queues or work kitchens when South African working class life becomes too onerous.

Black South Africans still find themselves the structural majority of the poor and working class, living in overcrowded townships with poor services and infrastructure. New challenges such as HIV/AIDS and a deadly gangsterism confront the township resident, along with a contracting job market. Absorbing other regional nationals into these overcrowded townships and workplaces has become an onerous burden in a context where there is very little to give.

Locals respond to these economic and social challenges by lashing out against their working class competitors through calls for them to go back where they came from.

And, as is so common in other anti-immigrant environments in the North as well (witness the expulsions of immigrants in countries like France and Italy), locals respond to these economic and social challenges by lashing out against their working class competitors through calls for them to go back where they came from. For the many African foreigners who have made South Africa their temporary or permanent residence, these social pressures threaten to erupt and exclude in ways that turn them into easy targets – not
Modernist sensibilities among primarily white South African managers speak of a new colonial encounter – with claims that they are bringing modernity and development to the region.

Lacking the capacity to intervene at the regional level where its own companies were concerned, and following the prescriptions of a regionalism that eulogised foreign investment, the Mandela and Mbeki regimes failed to regulate the operations of these South African multinationals.

South African corporate intervention has therefore tarnished South Africa's image in many African host countries. If adversarial dynamics grow within South Africa between South Africans and other Africans from the continent, we further undermine our capacity for a regional leadership role.

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But how do the national responsibilities of the state articulate with political and economic relationships at the regional level? Are these goals potentially at variance with each other? Many would say that if you haven’t sorted out issues of transformation in your own locality, how can you hope to effect transformation at the level of supra-national region or the SADC? But what if these regional realities are inserting themselves into everyday life within South Africa?

Some have said - both within government and without – ‘that we should clean up our act at home first’. But what is home in South Africa if not a regional space?

The ‘Africanisation’ of South African social life and social reality has brought the region into our townships and into our workplaces. The sooner we come to terms with the multinational African character of many townships and workplaces, the more likely we are to plan and effect social redistribution and transformation that correspond with our actual social needs.

If we limit our vision to a contained South African society that exists only in our imagination, the reality of a regional existence within South Africa will elude us. We live in a regional space within South Africa, and our policies and plans need to reflect this changing social reality in a way that enhances democratic life in our country.

This is a shortened version of an article published in the African Sociological Review, No. 12, Vol. 1 2008.

Dr Darlene Miller, research director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery research programme; Simon Mushavatu, a Zimbabwean artist.
Before we embark on a national dialogue on morality and values, there are important questions to ask, namely: who currently speaks about morality?; what are each group’s main messages?; and is what they speak of enough?

The educational philosopher Graeme Haydon describes four voices that currently dominate discussions about morality and values. These are the ‘lay’ or popular voice; the ‘research’ or academic voice; the ‘official’ government or political voice, and the ‘professional’ educational voice. Each is characterised by a particular message. The book, Ikasi, adds a further dimension to these conversations, namely a youth voice.

In the African context, there is currently an important conversation underway showing how the indigenous notion of ubuntu may be used as an ethic to govern democracy, public governance, environmental protection, health, welfare, business practice and interpersonal relationships.

**LAY VOICE**

The ‘lay’ voice, usually that of parents, religious groups, media and community members is the discourse that usually shapes public consciousness. Frequently it is dominated by media-mediated moral panics, often concerned with young people’s delinquent and deviant behaviour. Events become moral panics when they are repeatedly portrayed in the media to such an extent that perspective is lost regarding how many incidents have occurred, and how widespread the phenomenon might be. School violence is one example of this. While it does occur (6% of youth report school-based assault), the media has over reported it to the extent that other places where youth experience violence is obscured (10% report experiencing violence at home).

**THE ACADEMIC VOICE**

The study of ethics and how it relates to human life and culture are key features of the academic study of morality. Theologians and philosophers have long asked what constitutes ‘the good life’ (for all rather than only the few), what makes one action right or good and others bad or evil, and others ask what makes a person good and how goodness can be achieved.

In the African context, there is currently an important conversation underway (see for example, Bénézet Bujo, Thaddeus Metz, Mogobe Ramose and Augustine Shutte) showing how the indigenous notion of ubuntu may be used as an ethic to govern democracy, public governance, environmental protection, health, welfare, business practice and interpersonal relationships.

While the philosophical and theoretical study of ethics is possibly the most familiar aspect of the academic discourse, psychologists have also played a role in the study of human morality – specifically regarding the stages of moral development. In this regard most would be familiar with the work done by child developmental psychologist Jean Piaget in the 1930s and Lawrence Kohlberg in the 1970s, who described a number of developmental stages through which children (and adults) pass in learning how to reason morally. This was later challenged by Carol Gilligan’s consideration of how being a woman and living in a male-dominated society affects women’s moral choices and actions.

Among academic voices, the one least heard is that of sociologists who study the impact of social context and institutions on human morality, and who provide empirical accounts of moral values, including the sources of moral authority and consequences of various moral beliefs.

Ikasi, in contrast to these four main voices, offers a research-based study of young people’s lived moral worlds in the context of poverty.

**THE POLITICAL VOICE**

In South Africa’s history there have been various political discourses about morality. Colonisation was promoted as a vehicle of ‘civilisation’ that had at its heart a so-called moral mission. Under Apartheid, the moral discourse was mainly about intimate and personal relationships – who could live where, who could have a sexual relationship with whom (the infamous Immorality Act of 1950) and who could own what and therefore prosper. The legacy of these damaging moral voices has been to taint the term ‘morality’ by loading it with references to miscegenation, white supremacy and social and economic control. This political discourse had little to do with morality as it ought to be understood, i.e. concerned with kindness, human flourishing, the good

life, or with the censure of people who perpetrate violence or perpetuate injustice.

After the advent of democracy in South Africa, and under the leadership of Kader Asmal, Smangaliso Mkhangwa and Jacob Zuma, a ‘moral regeneration campaign’ commenced in 2000. It aimed to popularise the values of the new constitution and also to address the social challenges that faced South Africa, many of which were moral in nature. This government-led movement provoked much debate with some averring that it was not the state’s place to promote one group’s values over another’s, whilst others welcomed government leadership on the issue. Of course the government’s intention was not to promote anything other than constitutional values, but this became confused as multiple voices interpreted government’s intentions. In a future dialogue this can be avoided through clear articulation of what voices exist and what each addresses.

Poverty produces a stress hormone which causes physical fatigue in children and impedes both their health in the long term and their ability to act on their plans and aspirations.

THE EDUCATIONAL VOICE

The ‘professional’ educational voice largely follows the lay voice of moral panics and views regarding moral degradation. As a result moral teaching is frequently conservative and treats young people as those whose are in moral deficit rather than promoting a question-based or Socratic discussion of human morality. Moral education, while absent as a standalone subject in South Africa (unlike in countries such as Botswana, Nigeria and elsewhere) is addressed in subjects such as life orientation and citizenship, sexuality and religious education. However moral education also occurs through the ‘invisible’ curriculum of the school climate created by relationships between educators and students, approaches to discipline and the physical conditions of the school. The educational voice is also frequently a site of contention regarding ‘whose values’ should be taught.

This gap is made worse by the availability of cheap alcohol and drugs that result in young people acting out of character (especially by participating in violent and criminal activities), or failing to act due to the lack of motivation that substance abuse induces.

This lack of motivation also occurs as a direct result of the stress of poverty. Poverty produces a stress hormone which causes physical fatigue in children and impedes both their health in the long term and their ability to act on their plans and aspirations.

In Ikasi, young people speak eloquently of being good people in order to complete schooling, get a job and then contribute to their family’s well-being. In this way Ikasi has an important role to play in helping us to embark on a deep conversation of what it means to live a good life and be a good person, especially in the context of our history of racial subjugation and the enormous inequality and poverty which we currently experience as a society.

Ikasi offers some explanation for this belief-behaviour gap in young people’s lives by showing how the effects of poverty and apartheid have resulted in youth having little opportunity to reflect on actions due to a lack of adult involvement and supervision, both at home and at school, and through poor quality education.

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A major consequence of South Africa’s strong economic growth since the democratic dispensation of 1994 is the rapid increase in domestic demand for oil energy. Growth in total oil consumption has averaged almost 2% per annum due to expansions in the transportation and mining sectors. With small amounts of proven oil reserves, the rise in oil demand as an energy source has resulted in South Africa’s growing dependence on external sources for its domestic crude oil needs amid substantial increases in world oil prices to unprecedented levels. Besides having huge impacts on economic growth and welfare, high oil prices are likely to lower consumption in favour of other sources of energy — such as coal — which are known to be more damaging for the environment.

The oil market is the most imbalanced of all energy markets. The Asia-Pacific countries, Europe, and North America consume approximately 80%, while controlling only 10% of the world’s oil reserves. At the same time, Africa, Russia, the Middle East, and South America consume 20%, while controlling 90% of the world’s remaining oil reserves.

For South Africa, 64% of the demand for liquid fuels is met from imported crude oil. Eighty-five percent of these imports currently come from the Middle East while the remaining 15% is mostly from the African region. These are two regions highly prone to geopolitical instability. Excessive dependence on imported oil from high-risk regions makes South Africa more vulnerable to both economic and national-security problems. Reducing this vulnerability requires a different approach to energy security.

We explore the nature of South Africa’s oil import risks and the impacts on oil prices; the potential government diversification strategies to mitigate against such risks; and the impact of such strategies on the overall South African oil import diversification policy.

**SOUTH AFRICA’S IMPORT STRATEGY**

South Africa’s imports of crude oil are carried out by private players linked to the major locally based energy multinationals, Petro SA and Sasol, that engage in petroleum refining, storage and marketing. The petrol price in South Africa is linked to the price of crude in international markets. With an increase in crude oil prices — as has been the case over the past three years — the petrol price has to increase so that crude oil refineries are able to cover their own costs.

Rising oil prices and price volatility stifle economic activity and reduce asset values. For energy-importing countries like South Africa, oil is the key to the country’s energy security. High oil prices are both a major threat to the country’s overall energy security and lead to high direct costs to consumers.

In shaping a portfolio of measures to reduce SA’s oil-import vulnerability, policy-makers should consider risks associated with imports from different supply sources. High-risk weight implies high costs and lack of consistency, a situation that can imply higher prices on oil-related products. Decision-makers should also consider the effects of different oil-import strategies and the need to foster bilateral relations with less risky oil suppliers.
OIL IMPORT DIVERSIFICATION

Diversification of oil import sources refers to the mix of state providers of oil. It is a policy designed to secure stable oil supply by reducing the risks that may arise from excessive dependence on a single import source. Having multiple suppliers provides security and reduces vulnerability in cases of temporary or permanent disruption of supply. Should one supplier fall victim to natural disasters, terrorism, war, regime change, or other export-damaging events, importers will only experience minor disruptions to their total supply.

In the period 1994–2007, South Africa sourced its crude imports from seven supply sources: Africa, Europe, the Middle East, North America, Russia and South America. There has been a gradual decrease in South Africa’s oil import diversification index, reaching its lowest value of 0.68 in 2007 (Fig. 1). Because lower values are equated with greater diversity, the 0.68 index indicates that SA has over time increased the number of crude oil supply sources.

The extent to which import risk is reduced by diversification is dependent on the nature and extent of market and political relationships between supply sources. We define the risk weighting for a particular supply region as a function of geopolitical factors, foreign direct investments in the country’s oil sector, and the country’s membership to OPEC. Imports from the Middle East carry the highest risk weight of 34.7%, followed by Africa with a risk weight of 19.2%, South America 14.7%, Russia 10.3%, North America 10%, and Europe 5.4%. High-risk weight implies high costs and lack of consistency, a situation that can imply higher prices on oil-related products, hence high direct costs to consumers. In general we should aim for supply sources with low-risk weights.

Should one supplier fall victim to natural disasters, terrorism, war, regime change, or other export-damaging events, importers will only experience minor disruptions to their total supply.

IMPORT RISKS AND ADJUSTMENT STRATEGIES

To examine South Africa’s energy import risks, we apply the modern portfolio theory developed to assist investors in optimising their portfolios and price-risky assets in financial markets. This serves two crucial functions: (i) it is a valuable tool for analysing choices between more or less risky sources of imported crude supplies; and (ii) it may assist policy and other key decision-makers in their deliberations on the relationship between diversification and crude oil import risks.

The two types of risks associated with disruptions to crude oil market are systematic and specific risk. The increase in specific risks (Fig. 2) can be attributed to South Africa obtaining its crude oil imports from only two sources, the Middle Eastern (82.2%) and African (17.5%) regions, both of which experienced oil supply disruptions in 2004.

Adjusting crude oil imports to having constant imports from each of the five main supply regions, while holding total imports constant in each year for the period 1994 to 2007, would have reduced the specific risk index by a range of 63 to 74%; this is a significant reduction in the overall oil portfolio risk. Reduction in the systematic risk index ranges from 0.2 to 8%. By reducing dependence on high-risk regions and increasing supply regions, the net effect is the lowering of South Africa’s crude oil import portfolio risk. The lower reduction in systematic risk, approximately 8%, explains the impact of high international oil prices in raising the systematic risk and thus the high South

Systematic risk of oil imports is risk affecting a relatively large number of suppliers and by extension, a large segment of the global market for crude oil supplies (and production). This is caused by events such as an unanticipated surge in global demand for crude oil or the collective actions of the major oil producing nations seeking to use oil supplies as a strategic weapon. Such events make it difficult for oil importers to formulate strategies and measures to ameliorate the effects of such risks. The result are higher import prices.

Diversification Index is an indicator that measures the extent to which crude oil imports are diversified. The indicator ranges from 0 to 1. A low index indicates more import diversification or multiple suppliers.

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Africa’s oil imports. Reduction in specific risks of imports would only serve to enhance the specific risks of South Africa’s supplies from relatively risky oil producing regions, lowering of risks, increased diversification that increases while diversification of supply sources contributes to a lower import risk portfolio. Results also indicate that, variability in the systematic risk of South Africa’s oil imports.

Our analyses show that fluctuations in both international oil prices and South Africa’s oil imports result in variability in the systematic risk of South Africa’s oil import portfolio. Results also indicate that, while diversification of supply sources contributes to a lowering of risks, increased diversification that increases supplies from relatively risky oil producing regions would only serve to enhance the specific risks of South Africa’s oil imports. Reduction in specific risks of imports can be achieved if some of the Middle Eastern supplies

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. A policy of having constant monthly imports from each supply region reduces the specific and systematic risks of the oil import portfolio by an average rate of 71% and 2.9% respectively.
2. Significant reduction in specific risks of South Africa’s oil imports is achieved if imports from risky regions (mainly the Middle East) can be diversified to the relatively less risky regions of Europe and North America.
3. To ensure low import risks, South Africa needs to advance strategic partnerships and cooperation between subsidiaries of the government-owned Central Energy Fund (CEF) and private firms in the sourcing of crude oil; establish specific bilateral relations with less risky oil suppliers like Europe, North America and Russia, taking careful considerations of other cost factors.

**NEW ANGLES ON THE IMPACT OF**

The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme showed that it has considerable impact on household consumption for participants, established MALCOLM KESWELL, MICHAEL CARTER and KLAUS DEININGER in a recent study. Yet much work remains to be done to fully understand the connection between asset transfer programmes like the LRAD and a reduction in persistent poverty.

**DIVERSIFY OIL SUPPLIERS**

Our analyses show that fluctuations in both international oil prices and South Africa’s oil imports result in variability in the systematic risk of South Africa’s oil import portfolio. Results also indicate that, while diversification of supply sources contributes to a lowering of risks, increased diversification that increases supplies from relatively risky oil producing regions would only serve to enhance the specific risks of South Africa’s oil imports. Reduction in specific risks of imports can be achieved if some of the Middle Eastern supplies can be diversified to less risky regions of Europe, North America, Russia and Africa in that order.

And while the analysis provides a number of interesting insights into the issue of oil-energy security for South Africa, rising demand for energy in the country’s transport, manufacturing, construction and commercial sectors implies that future assessments of energy security will benefit from the inclusion of all types of energy resources and supplies.

**SPECIFIC RISK OF OIL IMPORTS**

Specific risk of oil imports is risk associated with events or conditions specific to individual or small groups of suppliers rather than the general happenings in the international crude oil market. For example, internal political strife or accidents that hinder productive capacity and limit the export quantity generated by a particular oil-producing nation would have implications for oil-energy security of countries that rely on such a nation for their crude imports.

**THE CHALLENGES**

These factors, however, are less relevant in South Africa’s case, making it an ideal case study of the redistributive efficacy of asset-transfer programmes. The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, launched in 2001, has been the main vehicle for enacting land transfers to the poor.

Styled on the so-called market-assisted land reform model, the LRAD programme provides land to individuals with an interest in farming. The programme works on the basis of a grant that is awarded to

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**Figure 2: The systematic risk, specific risk and the total portfolio risk for South Africa’s crude oil imports for the period 1994-2007**

**Policy Recommendations**

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2. Significant reduction in specific risks of South Africa’s oil imports is achieved if imports from risky regions (mainly the Middle East) can be diversified to the relatively less risky regions of Europe and North America.
3. To ensure low import risks, South Africa needs to advance strategic partnerships and cooperation between subsidiaries of the government-owned Central Energy Fund (CEF) and private firms in the sourcing of crude oil; establish specific bilateral relations with less risky oil suppliers like Europe, North America and Russia, taking careful considerations of other cost factors.

**This article is an extract from Wabiri, N. & Amusa, H. ‘Quantifying South Africa’s crude oil import risk: A multi-criteria portfolio model’, which appeared in Economic Modelling 27 (2010): 445–453.**

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**Dr Njeri Wabiri, chief research manager and mathematical statistician, HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB research programme.**
beneficiaries on a sliding scale, depending on the amount of the applicants’ own contributions, and these funds are then used to purchase land, which is then transferred to the beneficiaries.

While studying the impact of this programme presents relatively fewer challenges than, say, some of the land reforms undertaken in India a generation ago, the self-selectivity of the programme still makes it difficult to evaluate. Fortunately, the programme implementation and negotiation process creates an element of randomness about when programme applicants actually become programme beneficiaries, thus creating opportunities for innovative quasi-experimental approaches to identifying its impact.

Our study exploited this feature of the LRAD implementation process to disentangle the effect of the programme from the statistical bias that is induced by the programme’s self-selectivity.

This gain is large enough to bump the average participating household over the poverty threshold by a significant amount.

THE APPROACH
To statistically identify the impact of the programme, we did a qualitative study of the screening and administrative processes through which LRAD applicants were required to pass, and used this to inform an empirical model of a household’s selection probability.

The key idea behind this approach was to identify instances where random events experienced by applicants to the LRAD programme resulted in indefinite delays in them becoming beneficiaries, and then using this fact to construct a control group of households that had similar observable characteristics and probabilities of selection into the treatment group (i.e. households who were already beneficiaries of the programme).

This sampling strategy was then complemented by econometrically matching treated and control households with similar observable characteristics to control for self-selectivity bias induced by differences in individual characteristics.

THE RESULTS
The results of this study shows considerable impacts of the LRAD programme on household consumption for participants: accounting for differences in the length of exposure to the programme, monetary impacts of the programme peak at approximately R275 per capita monthly consumption. Assuming an inter-temporal discount rate of 5%, this estimate translates to a discounted gain in monthly per capita consumption of about 50% after three years of exposure to the programme.

This gain is large enough to bump the average participating household over the poverty threshold by a significant amount. The study also analyses the longer-term impacts and finds that these gains rise till about three years.

Yet much work remains to be done on fully understanding the causal pathways through which asset transfer programmes like LRAD might effect a reduction in persistent poverty.

A simple method of inferring the poverty impact of the LRAD programme would therefore be to evaluate where the average non-participating household would stand once exposed to the programme. By this approach, the impact on the (the depth of) rural poverty is R104.86 per capita monthly consumption. This gain is large enough to bump the average participating household over the poverty threshold by a significant amount. The study also analyses the longer-term impacts and finds that these gains rise till about three years.

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years into the programme and then declines, where the decline is probably due to households that entered the LRAD programme at an early stage when it was arguably easier to pass the screening process.

**FUTURE DIRECTIONS**

Does this new evidence suggest scaling-up the LRAD programme? While analyses of land reform and agricultural development programmes often privilege technical productivity and investment indicators, our work focuses on a consumption-based metric of welfare, thus allowing a direct input into the debate on poverty alleviation strategies. Yet much work remains to be done on fully understanding the causal pathways through which asset-transfer programmes like LRAD might effect a reduction in persistent poverty.

*... little is known about whether this evidence necessarily links back to an improvement in female bargaining power within the household.*

To fully trace the intergenerational effects, the types of child-centric outcomes (educational attainment and health) that have been the central focus of the evaluation work on cash-transfer programmes, like the South African Child Support Grant, also require attention.

A further gap in our understanding that could help to harness or tailor the targeting of the LRAD programme is to look at impacts by gender. Particularly, do the land transfers have a gender differentiated effect by influencing women’s bargaining power and resource control within households?

While much is known about the impact of cash transfers on child outcomes in South Africa, little is known about whether this evidence necessarily links back to an improvement in female bargaining power within the household. One promising method of probing this issue is to link ownership of the (prospective) asset transfer to the gender of the (prospective) beneficiary, and then trace the effect out onto the ‘sharing rule’ the household adopts by looking at the change in the demand for gender-specific goods that is caused by the change in income attributable to the exogenous asset shift. Such an approach could also be usefully complemented through qualitative work that seeks to probe the complex ways in which households assign residual rights of control and authority over household resources, both to get alternative ways of inferring bargaining power, as well as to sharpen the list of what constitute gender-exclusive or gender-assignable goods that might be useful analytically.

**ROUTINE HIV TESTING: what it means for rights to healthcare**

Will the impact of routine HIV testing, which forms part of the government’s national HIV counselling and testing campaign, lead to resource constraints at state antiretroviral therapy facilities? And if so, who will decide who receives antiretroviral drugs and who doesn’t? ADLAI DAVIDS and LINDI COETZEE explore these questions.

**HCT AND TREATMENT EXPECTATIONS**

Routine HIV testing forms part of the government’s national HIV Counselling and Testing (HCT) campaign in South Africa, announced on 25 March 2010. This approach will see provider-initiated, but voluntary and confidential HCT offered to all seeking healthcare at public health facilities. In addition to an HIV test, patients will also be checked for hypertension, diabetes mellitus, anaemia and tuberculosis (TB). The campaign will serve the objectives of mobilising people to know their HIV status and to fight HIV-related stigma.

At this stage, more than one million HIV-positive people are receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) through state facilities – the largest programme of its kind in the world. The implementation of routine HIV testing will reduce delays in HIV diagnosis and speed up the initiation of treatment for HIV-infected persons and will thereby increase the number of clients that will access free ART.

But during the latter part of 2009, some provinces ran out of antiretroviral drugs due to financial shortfalls and stock-outs, leading to interruptions in the ART of some patients. It is therefore likely that with a rapid increase in the number of patients wanting to access ART subsequent to the government’s nationwide HCT campaign, the same may occur.

The questions our research raise is whether the impact of routine HIV testing will lead to resource constraints at some ART facilities and to decision-making at that level as to who gets access to antiretroviral drugs and who does not.

**THE LAW ON ACCESS TO TREATMENT**

Access to ART services in South Africa speaks to the socioeconomic right of access to healthcare, on which duties are imposed by international instruments, the South African Constitution and Constitutional Court decisions. We reviewed these provisions to see whether they related to the socioeconomic right to access ART and to evaluate if any obligations were placed on the state to ensure that its ART programme was not negatively affected by stock-outs and other disruptive events.

The most important international instrument relating to socioeconomic rights is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Covenant). Although South Africa signed the Covenant in 1994, it has not ratified it. Ratification will place two positive duties upon the state, namely to provide a legislative framework that provides for individuals’ legal status, rights and privileges that enable them to pursue their rights; and a requirement that the state implements measures and programmes that are designed to assist individuals in realising their rights. A state is, however, granted discretion in terms of the qualification of the rights, namely ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘within its available resources’, to choose the methods for achieving socioeconomic rights.
Principles that have emerged internationally include:
• a state’s obligation to prove what it has done to make progress toward full realisation of the rights;
• a state’s obligation to justify the appropriateness of the measures it has taken;
• a state’s obligation to ‘strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the rights under the prevailing circumstances’; and
• if unable to carry out its international obligations because of a lack of resources, the state must prove that this is in fact the case.

**Testing the Laws**

Two decisions of the Constitutional Court put these provisions to the test. The first decision, the Grootboom and Others vs Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others, where the Constitutional Court deemed adequate legislation without directed policies as inadequate. The second decision, Soobramoney vs Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), confirmed that the provision of access to healthcare depends on the availability of state resources and that the right of access to healthcare is limited by the qualification that it is only available to the extent that the state’s resources permit. As more resources become available to a state, more must be done to fulfil socioeconomic rights.

In both the Grootboom and Soobramoney decisions the court declined to establish minimum core content for a socioeconomic right, stating that its role was limited to ensuring reasonable legislative and other measures. The Constitutional Court, however, found that the language of the South African Constitution does not support the imposition of core obligations on the state.

The implementation of routine HIV testing will likely increase the number of HIV-positive persons with a legitimate expectation of access to ART. Patients who qualify and are entitled to access ART as per the new treatment policy, will expect that there should be no treatment interruption at health facility level because of inadequate resources.

This expectation will continue to test South Africa’s public health system in providing ART. The test for reasonableness would require of the South African government to consider whether it will have sufficient resources for additional clients on ART when required. In the absence of sufficient resources and in cases where treatment will be interrupted, activists for HIV treatment buoyed by the implementation of routine HIV testing, should be mindful that the South African Constitution does not provide absolute guarantees if policies or resources for ART become inadequate for those in need of treatment.
According to the WHO, young motor vehicle drivers are significantly over-represented among those injured or killed in road traffic accidents. Crash risks for teenage drivers are greater than those for any other comparable group. SHANEEL BACHOO explores the role that personality plays in influencing the driving practices of young drivers.

Road traffic accidents constitute a serious global health issue that requires concentrated attention from governments, policy-makers, the transport industry, health promotion practitioners, researchers and all other relevant stakeholders globally. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the number of people killed worldwide in road traffic accidents each year is estimated at almost 1.2 million, while the number injured could be as high as 50 million. It has been projected that by 2020 road traffic deaths will rise 60% worldwide and by 80% in Africa.

**DEVELOPING COUNTRIES**

Over the past few decades, motor vehicles have become the primary mode of transport in developing countries. In 1998 these countries accounted for more than 85% of all deaths due to road traffic accidents globally. In 2002 an estimated 200 000 people died on African roads, but this figure is probably somewhat higher due to under-reporting.

Evidence suggests that the problem of road traffic accidents has been neglected in developing countries, the nations that are hardest hit by the epidemic. For instance, the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002, did not include a single agenda item on road safety, notwithstanding the significant contribution of these to the burden of death in Africa.

Casualty rates for road traffic accidents in South Africa are among the highest in the world, despite the efforts of state, civil society and research stakeholders to curb the problem. During the early 90s South Africa’s reported death rate of 11.7 per 100 million kilometres travelled was more than ten times that of the United States. More recently, Statistics South Africa reported that the frequency of immediate death as a result of a fatal road traffic accidents has increased from 4 251 in 2001 to 5 422 in 2006.

**PERSONALITY FACTORS IN RISKY DRIVING**

For decades researchers have investigated the relationship between personality and risky driving behaviour. The interest was perhaps sparked in the 1940s when authors Tillman and Hobbs claimed that....
‘a man drives as he lives’. Some of the more frequent personality factors that have emerged from studies focused on younger drivers include anger, sensation seeking, and impulsivity.

Regarding gender differences, males reported significantly more risky driving practices, while females reported a greater amount of impulsivity in daily living.

The study demonstrated that drivers with higher levels of anger, sensation seeking and impulsivity in their daily activities reported a significantly greater amount of risky driving practices, such as traffic rule violations, speeding, reckless driving, non-usage of seat belts and drunk driving.

Regarding gender differences, males reported significantly more risky driving practices, while females reported a greater amount of impulsivity in daily living. With respect to age-related differences, older drivers (25 years and older) reported a significantly lower sense of sensation seeking and impulsivity in life.

The study also demonstrated that driver attitudes towards risky driving practices significantly predict the extent to which they engage in such practices. So a driver with a more negative attitude toward speeding, for instance, is less likely to engage in this behaviour. The study also demonstrated that driver attitudes towards risky driving practices significantly predict the extent to which they engage in such practices. So a driver with a more negative attitude toward speeding, for instance, is less likely to engage in this behaviour.

... interventions to consider should be aimed at changing the behaviour of young drivers (and impending young drivers), focusing on impeding the manifestation of these personality traits in young people.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Since it has been demonstrated in this investigation, as well as in other studies, that risky driving behaviour among young drivers is positively associated with impulsivity, sensation seeking and anger, interventions to consider should be aimed at changing the behaviour of young drivers (and impending young drivers), focusing on impeding the manifestation of these personality traits in young people.

From a policy point of view, a review of the life skills high-school curricula and similar curricula at tertiary educational level is strongly indicated, so as to encompass a more holistic approach to risk behaviour than currently pertains.

The aim must be to challenge young people’s constructions of thrill-seeking behaviour in general and enable them with the requisite knowledge and skills to avoid making impulsive decisions and displaying impulsivity in their daily thoughts and actions.

Finally, the empirical support for the attitude-behaviour hypothesis evidenced in this study vindicates the development or continuation of interventions that focus on this dynamic.
TRADE UNIONS AND PARTY POLITICS: LABOUR MOVEMENTS IN AFRICA
Björn Beckman, Sakhele Buhtungu & Lloyd Sachikonye (eds)
In much of Africa, people look to trade unions for leadership, especially at times of economic downturn. Although Africa’s wage-workers are relatively few in comparison to those in the informal economy, their experience of organisation and mass mobilisation and their position in the modern economy give them a strategic role in the politics of democratisation and development.

This volume examines the political role of trade unions in seven African countries and the various ways in which they seek to influence political parties and the state. Whereas some, like the Nigeria Labour Congress, push for a political party of their own, others, such as COSATU in South Africa, opt to engage with the power struggles in the ruling party. In Namibia and Uganda unions have been incorporated by a one-party dominated state while in Ghana, unions insist on being autonomous. There is also a move towards autonomy in Senegal, despite the plurality of unions with party affiliations. In the case of Zimbabwe, unions took the lead in creating an alternative alliance in opposition to a repressive state. Trade Unions and Party Politics provides a finely tuned critique of the impact achieved by these strategies, within the context of both the unique forces shaping them and the looming shadow of the new global economy.

With contributions by established researchers, all of them engaged scholars and seasoned labour activists in the countries studied, the volume makes a major contribution to understanding the dilemmas facing unions in contemporary Africa. While examining the relationship of trade unions to party politics, the contributions also provide new insights into the relationship of trade union action to the politics of national liberation, a theme that has not received sufficient attention in the existing literature.

Soft cover, 224pp, ISBN 978-07969-2306-6, R180.00, June 2010

SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES – 2ND REPORT: REFLECTIONS ON THE AGE OF HOPE
Benjamin Roberts, Mthuthwa Kivulú & Yal Derek Davids (eds)
Since the transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa has become a well documented nation. A multitude of national and sub-national studies have been conducted, yielding a wealth of information about the characteristics of South African society, and how these have evolved over time. However, less is known about how South Africans feel about their world and themselves. There remains much scope for deepening our understanding of the public’s values, chronicling how these have been changing, and determining the extent to which different segments of the population vary in their attitudes and beliefs.

South African Social Attitudes: Reflections on the Age of Hope is the second in the HSRC series that aims to monitor the evolving dynamics of South African social values in relation to broader societal developments. It is based primarily on the findings of the 2004 and 2005 rounds of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which involved interviewing a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 individuals aged 16 years and older.

Like its predecessor, South African Social Attitudes: Changing Times, Diverse Voices, this volume is structured according to three thematic sections. The first section on race, class and politics examines the public’s views on issues such as national priorities, racial redress, local government, and includes an in-depth examination of youth attitudes. The second section addresses perceptions about poverty, inequality and service delivery. The final section on societal values focuses on attitudes in relation to religion, the environment, employment, and the fear of crime.

South African Social Attitudes is essential reading for anyone seeking a guide to contemporary social or political issues and debates.

Soft cover, 394pp, ISBN 978-07969-2217-5, R170.00, September 2010

GENDER, MODERNITY & INDIAN DELIGHTS: THE WOMEN’S CULTURAL GROUP OF DURBAN, 1954–2010
Goolam Vahed & Thembsisa Waejten
For decades, South Africans aspiring to make the perfect biryani have turned to Indian Delights, the best selling cookbook produced by Zuleika Mayat and the Women’s Cultural Group. This is the story of the women behind the recipes; it is an account that brings to life the changing, gendered worlds of Muslim women in 20th century Durban.

Through a blend of scholarly rigour and compelling biography, this book reveals how a group of women, who were formally excluded from both political and customary power, nevertheless forged a vibrant citizenship and public life for themselves. In the midst of unfolding global and local transformation – apartheid, feminism, colonial shifts in Islam – the members of the Women’s Cultural Group were themselves agents of change, not only within the local communities that benefited from their proficient and varied labours, but in the making of South African modernity.

Academic historians Goolam Vahed and Thembsisa Waejten have constructed a multi-layered narrative that captures the spirit and housewifely appeal of their subjects. A fascinating read for anyone interested in local history, gender identity, and Islam in the Indian-Ocean region.


THE COUNTRY WE WANT TO LIVE IN: HATE CRIMES AND HOMOPHOBIA IN THE LIVES OF BLACK LESBIAN SOUTH AFRICANS
Nonhlahla Mkize, Jane Bennett, Vesu Reddy & Relebole Moletsane
The country we want to live in: Hate crimes and homophobia in the lives of black lesbian South Africans offers a refreshing perspective on violence perpetrated against black lesbians. Based on a Roundtable seminar, held during the 2006 16 Days of Activism for No Violence against Women and Children, the text engages the heteronormative focus of the campaign, profiles aspects of the dynamic conversations, and builds strong arguments about violence against lesbians. It also profiles the voices of women who are central to the activism around hate crimes and homophobia. In capturing key aspects of the lively discussion of 2006, an update of subsequent events that have bearing on the original seminar is provided, concluding with recommendations that have relevance for research, policy and practice. The country we want to live in makes an impassioned plea about citizenship, belonging and social justice, confirming that silence about these issues is not an option.

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